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Abstract 
 
This dissertation argues that eighteenth-century fiction problematizes the relationships 
among virtue, modesty, and shame. Where the conduct manual and the moral novel 
demonize the shameless female subject, women writers such as Aphra Behn, Eliza 
Haywood, and Charlottle Lennox consistently decouple shame from virtue to expose the 
limitations of the virtuous principles in the world of the conduct manual and moral novel. 
The introduction considers the historical relationship between the conduct manual, the 
moral novel, and women’s writing and the ways in which each engages in the production 
of shame, arguing that the moral novel of the mid-eighteenth century neither negates nor 
contains the power of amatory fiction but illustrates the inability of “virtue rewarded” to 
resolve the tensions within eighteenth-century fiction and the representation of female 
subjectivity. Chapter 1 argues that Behn’s amatory fiction, Love Letters Between a 
Nobleman and His Sister (1684), The Fair Jilt (1688), and The History of the Nun (1689), 
resist the culture of shame and guilt surrounding the sexually available, desiring, and 
dangerous woman, blurring the lines between the moral and the immoral and questions 
the conduct manual’s insistence that virtuous behavior liberates the female subject. 
Chapter 2 analyzes the ways in which the heroines of Haywood’s early amatory fiction 
test the limits of virtue and shame in sustaining a woman’s reputation, arguing that public 
reputation is more important than a woman’s internalized sense of honor. Haywood’s 
fiction experiments with the heroine’s recognition of the mechanisms of shame and her 
ability to manage her reputation and sexual subjectivity. Chapter 3 analyzes the anti-
pamelist fiction by Haywood and Henry Fielding to argue that the virtuous example 
exalted by Samuel Richardson’s Pamela exposes women to, rather than preserves them 
 iii 
 
from, sexual danger and endorses social expectations that demand the performance of 
virtue and shame as a means of economic and social survival. Chapter 4 explores the 
consequences of virtuous reading in Lennox’s novel The Female Quixote, arguing that 
Lennox questions the moral novel’s capacity to instill that sense of virtue which makes a 
heroine an appropriate wife and exposes the need to internalize shame to survive in the 
eighteenth-century world. 
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Introduction 
VIRTUE.  
1. Moral goodness.  
2. A particular moral excellence. 
5. Efficacy; power. 
6. Acting power. 
7. Secret agency; efficacy. 
 
SHAME 
1. The passion felt when reputation is supposed to be lost. 
2. The cause of reason of shame; disgrace; ignominy. 
1. Reproach.1 
-From Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary of the English Language 
 
 
In a letter to George Cheyne, Samuel Richardson claimed that his goal in writing 
novels was “to make the Story rather useful than diverting” and that “the cause of Virtue 
and Religion was what I wish’d principally to serve.”2 Richardson’s professed aim to 
instruct and delight was also an attempt to “set VIRTUE in its own amiable light, to make 
it look lovely.”3  In making virtue look lovely, though, the novel fetishizes Pamela’s 
virtue.  This fetishization of female virtue in the eighteenth-century novel is more about 
the fetishization of female shame.  In calling attention to the fetishization of shame in the 
eighteenth-century novel, I posit that the history of the novel that circulates around 
Richardson’s Pamela circulates around limiting masculinist terms—virtue, domesticity, 
subjectivity, selfhood—all of which emphasize what women should be instead of what is 
realistically available to women.  In using “shame” as the lens to view novelistic 
discourse, I argue that women’s writing of the eighteenth century records the struggle of 
women who are forced to internalize, create, and sustain a sense of self defined by male 
                                                 
1
 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (London, 1756). ECCO.  
2
 Selected Letters of Samuel Richardson, ed. John Carroll (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1964), 54-55. 
3
 Preface to Pamela, or Virtue Rewarded, ed. Peter Sabor (London: Penguin, 1980), 31. 
2 
 
sexual interest.  This dialectical engagement between virtue and shame is the focus of this 
project.  While Pamela’s matrimonial conclusion highlights the consequences of 
maintaining one’s virtue, it assumes that virtue exerts itself even in the most dangerous of 
circumstances and ignores the reality of the eighteenth-century female subject’s position 
in a system that simultaneously expects virtue but, through its idealization, makes it 
unachievable.   
In placing shame at the center of novelistic discourse, I argue that the conditions 
of female morality become much more intricate than the opposition between virtuous and 
shameful.  In order to successfully improve readers’ morality, the moralizing novel needs 
its readers to possess a desire illicit thoughts and its content often encourages those 
thoughts in its readers in order to correct them.  By inadvertently encouraging untoward 
thoughts and vicarious participation in illicit behavior, readers feel a sense of shame in 
the act of reading.  This forces us to ask, though what virtue is supposed to do for the 
female subject.  On the one hand, to be “virtuous” in novelistic terms is to carve out a 
specific internalized self-identity, one that is assumed self-evident, self-contained, and 
unassailable.  However, it also establishes the female body and soul as an embattled 
citadel, constantly under attack and in need of protection.
4
 While the conduct manual 
might encourage virtue as a safeguard for woman’s reputation, the identity “virtuous” 
implies that the female body and soul are never safe from lecherous advances and that 
something shameful awaits every woman right around the corner.  In fact, in the progress 
                                                 
4
 George Halifax warns his daughter that going “out of your House in the World [is] A 
dangerous step; where your Virtue alone will not secure you, except it is attended with a 
great deal of Prudence. […] The Enemy is abroad, and you are sure to be taken, if you 
are found straggling.” The Lady’s New-year’s Gift: or, Advice to a Daughter (London, 
1724), 68.  
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of the novel from the scandalous fiction of the late seventeenth century, through the 
1720s, to the “moral” realism of Samuel Richardson, and to the domestic fiction of the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, countless women find themselves battling 
off and suffering the consequences of succumbing to, or resisting to a fault, dangerous 
sexual advances from men.  Masculinist obsession with virtue provides only two 
outcomes for the sexually persecuted heroine: if she refuses to internalize the 
mechanisms of shame, she becomes a whore.  If she successfully internalizes them, she 
becomes an idealized and eroticized paragon of virtue.  Either way, masculinist desires 
define the female subject.   For example, Moll Flanders, refusing to let shame control her 
desires, gives in to the advances of the older son in the house she serves only to be treated 
as a common whore.  Pamela, however, fends off the very persistent Mr. B who stoops so 
low as to dress in drag to find the opportunity to rape her.  The consequences faced by 
Moll are, on the surface, harsher than those faced by Pamela.  When her lover offers her 
five guineas in exchange for sexual favors, Moll presents this as the beginning of her 
career as prostitute and criminal.  Pamela is “fortunate” enough to marry the man who so 
relentlessly and violently pursues her.  Moll’s failure to preserve her virtue from the 
voracious desire of her superior deserves punishment and she finds herself living a life of 
crime from which she cannot escape.  Pamela’s virtue, though, is to be celebrated and her 
assailant is transformed into the perfect match for her.    
Rather than rehash the myriad debates concerning the origins of the novel, I 
would borrow Brean Hammond’s and Shaun Regan’s astute claim that we cannot recreate 
a singular “true story” of the novel, as “our perception of phenomena alters depending on 
the vantage point that we adopt, and the ‘true story’ of the novel partly depends on when 
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and where one chooses to begin it.”5 Histories of the novel have begun in any number of 
historical moments with critics positing the novel as a genre that is spontaneously born 
with the introduction of “realistic” qualities, as the product of “dialogical progress” 
confronting “both intellectual and social crisis simultaneously,” and as a part of literary 
history with roots in Greek and Roman literature.
6
 My aim is neither to discover the 
mysterious point of origination of the novel nor to argue for a separate feminine history 
of the novel.  Criticism since the mid- to late-1980s has made great strides in recovering 
works by women writers left out of seminal histories such as Watt’s and McKeon’s, 
creating alternative histories that focus on creating a female canon, question the 
representation of desire, or create a history of feminocentric writing by tracing it to 
French romance.
7
 More recently, others have crafted histories that connect the novel to 
less “fictionalized” forms like periodicals or the travel narrative.8 If Hammond’s and 
Regan’s study is any indication, we have progressed to a more multifaceted appreciation 
of “the novel.”  
                                                 
5
 Making the Novel: Fiction and Society in Britain, 1660-1789 (New York: Palgrave, 
2006), 16.  
6
 See Ian Watt, The Rise of the Novel (Berkeley: U of California P, 1957); Michael 
McKeon, The Origins of the English Novel, 1600-1740 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 
1987), 22; and Margaret Anne Doody, The True Story of the Novel (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Rutgers UP, 1996).  
7
 Jane Spencer, The Rise of the Woman Novelist: From Aphra Behn to Jane Austen (New 
York: Blackwell, 1986); Janet Todd, The Signs of Angellica: Women, Writing, and 
Fictions, 1660-1800 (Columbia UP: New York, 1989); Patricia Meyer Spacks, Desire 
and Truth: Functions of Plot in the Eighteenth Century English Novels (Chicago: U of 
Chicago P, 1990); Ros Ballaster, Seductive Forms: Women’s Amatory Fiction from 1684-
1740 (New York: Oxford UP, 1992).   
8
 See Lennard Davis, Factual Fictions: The Origins of the English Novel (New York: 
Columbia UP, 1983); J. Paul Hunter, Before Novels: The Cultural Contexts of Eighteenth 
Century English Fiction (New York: Norton, 1990); and more recently Kate Loveman, 
Reading Fictions, 1660-1740: Deception in English Literary and Political Culture 
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008). 
 5 
 
This is not to say, however, that this multifaceted model is any more complete 
than the teleological one offered by Watt.  In focusing on the relationship between 
amatory fiction and “the novel,” I argue that our representation of critical tradition still 
needs redirecting.  At best, most critics of the eighteenth-century novel have encouraged 
a segregated understanding of the novel’s development by elevating “moralistic”9 fiction 
as the standard by which earlier works are judged and treating amatory fiction as a form 
of literary counter-culture, a sexually transgressive literature that compels the birth of the 
novel.
10
 Armstrong’s, McKeon’s, and Warner’s studies all provide valuable contributions 
to our understanding of the dialogical preoccupations of the genre.  This study, however, 
focuses on the women writers and their fascination with female shame as opposed to 
virtue.   
 
I. “The Sin of Shame”: Defining Shame and Female (Sexual) Subjectivity 
“Virtue” and “modesty” have long been placed at the forefront of our critical 
understanding of the novel’s thematic development, not the least because of Pamela’s 
Virtue Rewarded.  Samuel Johnson’s 1756 Dictionary of the English Language defines 
                                                 
9
 I use “moralistic” and “moralizing” as opposed to “moral realism” to emphasize the 
inconsistencies within the subgenre.  While Richardson purports to have revised the 
immoralities within amatory fiction, he has actually internalized them and uses them to 
his advantage.  
10
 Though Richetti and McKeon both have revised their earlier claims regarding amatory 
fiction, their revised perspectives still tend toward downplaying the contributions and 
aesthetic qualities of early women’s fiction. Richetti does find amatory fiction “in some 
way” resistant to masculinist norms but still insists on its “looseness and artlessness” and 
thinks it “best approached as a formulaic and commercial product” (Introduction to 
Popular Fiction Before Richardson, xxviii, xxvii). Of Behn’s Love Letters, McKeon 
notes that “the change in narrative technique over the course of Love Letters is a 
paradigmatic shift in the emergence and development of the domestic novel” (538). See 
The Secret History of Domesticity: Public, Private, and the Division of Knowledge 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 2005).   
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“virtue,” unsurprisingly, as “moral goodness” and “a particular moral excellence.”  
However, it also defines “virtue” as “efficacy; power, “acting power,” and a “secret 
agency.”11  It is this power attributed to virtue in not only Johnson’s definition but the in 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century conduct manuals and the eighteenth-century that 
creates problems for the eighteenth-century female subject.  These works (typically male-
authored) imbue virtue with the power to preserve reputation and safeguard women from 
the inappropriate advances of men.  To lose that sense of virtue poses any number of 
dangers to a woman’s good reputation, almost all of them resulting in shame.  Johnson’s 
definition of shame, “the passion felt when reputation is supposed to be lost,” suggests 
the relationship between virtue, reputation, and shame. It is in this relationship, I argue, 
that the discourse of the novel is established.  Shame, not virtue, is the key player in 
constructing eighteenth-century female subjectivity. Reconsidering the place of “shame” 
both in the construction of female sexual subjectivity and in the novel’s development 
necessitates carefully defining “shame” in relation to “virtue” and “modesty,” terms that 
are quite slippery and difficult to pin down.   In my usage of these terms as well as their 
usage in contemporary discourse, “virtue,” “modesty,” and “shame” often imply each 
other.  A virtuous (or chaste) woman is a modest woman who has successfully 
internalized the mechanisms of shame to maintain her virtue and modesty.   If shame is 
an important means of constructing virtue, referring to a woman’s “virtue” or “modesty” 
always refers to her sense of shame. 
Though she focuses on the rise of the domestic, middle-class wife in the novel, 
Nancy Armstrong’s argument that the conduct manual establishes a female figure which 
                                                 
11
 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (London, 1756). ECCO. 
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“awaited the substance that the novel and its readers, as well as the countless individuals 
educated according to the model of the new woman, would eventually provide” is 
relevant here. These manuals, she writes, rethink “at the most basic level the dominant 
(aristocratic) rules for sexual exchange. Because they appeared to have no political bias, 
these rules took on the power of natural law, and as a result, they presented—in actuality, 
still present—readers with an ideology in its most powerful form.”12 In Pamela, 
Richardson assumes that shame, modesty, and female sexuality are a naturalized part of 
feminine sensibilities. Richardson’s Pamela is always instinctively virtuous.13 In its literal 
sense, shame is confined to internal experience as part of an internalized ideology.  In 
conduct manuals, however, shame becomes an attractive and sexually desirable innate 
characteristic in women. It is both passive and active—simultaneously controlling 
feminine action and, potentially, male (mis)behavior, as well as creating a means of 
attracting the opposite sex. The conduct manual eroticization of shame naturalizes the 
sexually desirable but desire-less virtuous woman who Richardson elevates to the status 
of paragon. 
In presenting Pamela as a paragon of female virtue, Richardson enforces the 
distinctions between virtue, shame, and modesty, but constructions of female morality are 
much more complicated, incapable of being neatly divided into the virtuous, the shamed, 
the modest, and chaste. Our awareness of virtue relies on our common knowledge of 
what shame is and what it reveals. The OED defines shame as “the painful emotion 
                                                 
12
 Desire and Domestic Fiction: A Political History of the Novel, (Oxford U. Press, 
1987), 60. 
13Rarely is Pamela’s behavior corrected. Early in the novel, however, she is admonished 
by her parents for accepting gifts from Mr. B for fear that she might “reward him with 
that jewel, your virtue, which no riches, nor favour, nor any thing in this life, can make 
up to you” (46). Samuel Richardson, Pamela, (London: Penguin, 1980).  
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arising from the consciousness of something dishonouring, ridiculous, or indecorous in 
one's own conduct or circumstances  . . . or of being in a situation which offends one's 
sense of modesty or decency,” and specifically for women, as the “violation of a woman's 
honour, loss of chastity.” This definition leaves out any explicit indication of physical 
indications of shame. That it is defined as a “painful emotion” seems to imbue it with 
natural characteristics. Shame, in this light, is an internalized sensation which, though not 
visible, limits a subject’s behavior. However, the power of shame is not in its naturalized 
characteristics but in its insidious presence in what Norbert Elias would call civilized life 
as a public control for one’s private thoughts and behaviors.  In The Civilizing Process, 
Elias declares shame as an emotion “which is automatically reproduced. . . by force of 
habit.” One does not naturally feel shame. Instead, in circumstances that would require a 
modest appearance, one performs, unconsciously, shame. This automatic performance 
implies the individual’s internalization of social rules which moderate behavior based on 
a “fear of social degradation or . . . other people’s gestures of superiority.”14 Shame 
forces an individual to “[recognize] himself as inferior.”15 Kathryn Shevelow employs a 
similar definition in the context of eighteenth-century English culture, adding that shame 
“is attached to that which cannot be expressed publicly.”16  For both Elias and Shevelow, 
a fine but clear delineation exists between the private experience of shame and its public 
ramifications. Shame is not simply experienced as a result of transgressive behavior but 
                                                 
14
 The Civilizing Process: State Formation and Civilization, trans. Edmund Jephcott with 
some notes and revisions by the author. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982), 292. 
15
 Elias, 292-3. 
16
 Women and Print Culture: The Construction of Femininity in the Early Periodical 
(New York: Routledge, 1989). Shevelow cites David Bakan who argues that shame 
“plays a critical role in keeping public and private separate. It is precisely by means of 
the mechanism of shame that the distinction between public and private is maintained” 
(72). 
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is also a mechanism in place to keep private desires private. One’s sense of shame (an 
awareness of what is socially/publically unacceptable) keeps one from exhibiting 
transgressive public behavior. Shame, therefore, becomes an internal motivator for one to 
act in a prescribed manner, to be the “good girl.” 
For the eighteenth-century conduct manual, modesty and shame are often 
interchangeable: one cannot possess a sense of modesty without an awareness of the 
threat of shame.
17
 Both The Tatler and The Spectator define modesty in such a way that 
emphasizes its relationship to the fear of public shame: “Modesty, therefore in a woman, 
has a certain agreeable fear in all she enters upon” and “is a kind of quick and delicate 
feeling in the soul, which makes her shrink and withdraw herself from every thing that 
has danger in it.”18 Bernard Mandeville also connects shame to the fear of public 
judgment, but he also highlights the necessity of innocence and virtue in the experience 
of shame: when “obscene words are spoken in the presence of an unexperienc’d virgin,” 
her fear that someone will suspect that she is less than innocent, will “bring upon her that 
Passion which we call Shame.”19  
                                                 
17
 In Fictions of Modesty: Women and Courtship in the English Novel (Chicago U. Press, 
1984), Ruth Bernard Yeazell, similarly, acknowledges the relationship between modesty, 
specifically the blush, and public (not private) shame in Bernard Mandeville’s The Fable 
of the Bees: “Mandeville’s subsequent acknowledgment that a young woman might blush 
in private would have been far from consoling [to the authors of conduct books who 
insisted on a woman’s modest response to inappropriate social situations], since he 
continued to insist that her blushes would only signify her fear of exposure:. . .[the 
‘modest woman’ blushes because] ‘she’ll be ashamed . . . tho’ nobody sees her; because 
she has room to fear, that she is, or if all was known, should be thought of 
Contemptibly’” (71). For Mandeville, the blush is not a sincere display of a woman’s 
modesty but of her fear that she will be publicly shamed.  
18
 The Tatler No 52 (August 9, 1709) and The Spectator No 231 (November 24, 1711). 
19
 The Fable of the Bees, (London, 1714), 52. 
10 
 
Where the periodicals and Mandeville emphasize fear and public consequences, 
Richard Allestree, in The Ladies Calling, defines the “Virtue of Modesty” more along the 
lines of Elias’s sense of shame, hinting at the ability of shame to create a sense of 
inferiority in the individual: “it being that which guides and regulates the whole 
Behaviour, checks and controlls all rude exorbitances, and is the great Civilizer of 
Conversation. It is indeed a Virtue of general influence, do’s not only ballast the mind 
with sober and humble thought of ones self, but also steers every part of the outward 
frame.”20 Allestree emphasizes both the ability of internalized shame to control external 
behavior and to create a humbled sense of self. It civilizes “conversation” by making the 
subject enforce her society’s perception of what constitutes appropriate gendered 
behavior. In all these instances, though, whether these writers advocate or criticize the 
cultivation and internalization of modesty, shame and modesty are always attendant on 
each other. 
The internalization of modesty further collapses the public and private divide 
because modesty, rather paradoxically, becomes an external physical attribute which is 
often highly eroticized and focused on the promise of male pleasure.
21
 The Tatler claims 
“that there is nothing in woman so graceful and becoming as modesty. It adds charms to 
their beauty, and gives a new softness to their sex . . . [and] is so necessary a qualification 
for pleasing, that the loose part of womankind, whose study it is to ensnare men’s hearts, 
                                                 
20
 The ladies calling in two parts. (Oxford, 1720), 5. 
21
 Yeazell argues that part of the appeal of a woman’s modesty is the man’s anticipation 
(46). She writes, “A proper reserve, the conduct books never tired of repeating, makes a 
woman more, not less, desirable.… they [authors of conduct books] were fond of 
pointing out that men desire most what is hardest to get—and that holding herself 
prudently in reserve, therefore, would only increase a woman’s value” (44).  
 11 
 
never fail to support the appearance of what they know is so essential to that end.”22 
Allestree describes modesty’s physical manifestations as “calm and meek looks [in the 
face], where it so impresses it self, that it seems thence to have acquir’d the name of 
Shamefac’dness. Certainly, there is nothing gives a greater luster to a Feminine Beauty: 
so that St. Paul seems not ill to have consulted their Concerns in that Point, when he 
substituted that as a suppletory Ornament to the deckings of Gold and Pearl and costly 
Array, I Tim. 2.9.”23 In collapsing the distinction between the internal emotional 
sensibilities and the external physical appearance of a woman, Allestree eroticizes a 
woman who possesses an appropriate shame or modesty. She becomes more physically 
beautiful and potentially more sexually gratifying for her future husband. By equating 
feminine shame with feminine beauty, Allestree begins to naturalize the notion of the 
sexually desirable (but desire-less) virtuous woman on which Richardson’s Pamela 
depends.
24
  
Doctor John Gregory’s 1774 A Father’s Legacy to His Daughters identifies 
modesty as a woman’s most alluring quality, one which draws attention to her sexual 
appeal: “One of the chief beauties in a female character is that modest reserve, that 
retiring delicacy, which avoids the public eye, and is disconcerted even at the gaze of 
admiration.”25 The ability of modesty to preserve a woman from public visibility (Elias’ 
social degradation) and to produce unease at “gaze[s] of admiration” ironically 
emphasizes the woman’s ability to display publicly her modesty: 
                                                 
22
 No 84, Saturday, October 22, 1709 
23
 Allestree, 6. 
24
 Allestree advocates, as Yeazell calls it, a “mental virginity” (52). Not all conduct 
manuals insisted upon this kind of mental innocence. See Yeazell, 51-53. 
25
 John Gregory, A Father’s Legacy to His Daughters, 6th ed. (Dublin, 1774), 13.  
12 
 
When a girl ceases to blush, she has lost the most powerful charm of 
beauty. That extreme sensibility which it indicates, may be a weakness 
and incumbrance in our sex, as I have too often felt; but in yours it is 
peculiarly engaging. Pedants, who think themselves philosophers, ask why 
a woman should blush when she is conscious of no crime. It is sufficient 
answer, that Nature has made you to blush when you are guilty of no fault, 
and has forced us to love you because you do so.—Blushing is so far from 
being necessarily an attendant on guilt, that it is the usual companion of 
innocence.
26
 
The blush, then, becomes an external marker of internal purity. In courtship, according to 
Yeazell, the blush is a critical means of enticing the opposite sex because it is a genuine 
expression “not subject to her will and …, therefore, be affected” evidence that a woman 
is “innocent of pretense or manipulation.”27 Pamela’s blushing serves a means of sexually 
attracting a potential husband without her overtly desiring sex herself, all the while 
presenting physical proof of her virtue.  
As contemporary conduct manuals would have it, it is in woman’s nature to be 
modest.  Failing to possess modesty constitutes an aberration of femininity: “the total 
abandoning [of] it ranks them among Brutes […] an Impudent Woman is lookt on as a 
kind of Monster.”28 Richardson’s assumes Pamela’s virtue is a natural condition of her 
femininity, as well.
29
 Possessing that virtue secures her reputation: “Fame is one of the 
                                                 
26
 Gregory, 13. 
27
 Yeazell, 73. 
28
 Richard Allestree, The Ladies Calling, (Oxford, 1720), 15, 16. 
29
 I discuss the naturalization of virtue in Richardson, Fielding, and Haywood in chapter 
3. 
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natural rewards of virtue.” 30 With a solid reputation, she becomes the ideal wife: “A 
woman of virtue, of good understanding, of family, skilled in, and delighting to perform 
the duties of, the domestic life, needs not fortune to recommend her to the choice of the 
greatest and richest man, who wishes his own happiness.”31 And while virtue serves as 
proof of a woman’s sexual innocence, it also simultaneously creates a sexual object out 
of her, fetishizing her virtue.
32
 A woman with a virtuous reputation need not feel the 
stings of shame, and a woman who lacks a proper sense of virtue is scorned. 
 While male-authored conduct manuals allow us an understanding of how the 
virtuous woman and her manifestations of shame are fetishzed, they limit our 
understanding of shame in their overdetermination of shame as feminine, overshadowing 
shame with constructions of virtue and modesty.  In order to understand shame as 
construct of virtue, as opposed to a product of the loss of virtue, shame must be 
historicized not in philosophical terms but in the gender specific terms of the conduct 
manual.  In her poem “The Golden Age,” Behn criticizes moral and political ideology as 
responsible for the invention of shame and the repression of desire. The poem celebrates 
a prelapsarian world in which desires are unchecked by custom: “Monarchs were 
uncreated then,/Those Arbitrary Rulers over men/[…] Till then Ambition was not 
known,/That Poyson to Content, Bane to Repose;/Each Swain was Lord o’er his own will 
alone,/His Innocence Religion was, and Laws” (ll 51-52, 55-58).33 In Behn’s “The 
Golden Age,” mankind’s natural state is autonomous, subject to no arbitrary law, only his 
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desire.  That desire, though, is not envisioned as a Hobbesian form of desire, self-
interested and vicious, with every man out for himself.  Instead, Behn criticizes 
masculine self-interest: “Right and Property were words since made,/When Power taught 
Mankind to invade:/When Pride and Avarice became a Trade;/Carri’d on by discord, 
noise and wars,/For which they barter’d wounds and scars;/And to Inhaunce the 
Merchandize, miscall’d it Fame” (ll 65-70).   Desire, in Behn’s Golden Age, is a natural 
characteristic; however, when desire is overshadowed by political (masculine) self-
interest, man’s natural state becomes corrupt, resulting in the repression of desire.34 
 Behn imagines a “Blest Age! When ev’ry Purling Stream/Ran undisutb’d and 
clear” where “no Winds blew fierce and loud/The Skie was dark’ned with no sullen 
Cloud” (ll 1-2, 17).  The poem depicts the state of mankind before the advent of 
(masculine) government, portraying a decidedly feminine utopia with an astonishing lack 
of violence: “The stubborn Plough had then,/Made no rude Rapes upon the Virgin 
Earth;/Who yielded of her own accord her plentious Birth,/Without the Aids of men” (ll 
31-34).  Behn figures violence as sexual assault, and the absence of that sexual violence 
simultaneously disempowers male sexuality while sexualizing the Golden Age: “Beneath 
who’s [sic] boughs the Snakes securely dwelt,/Not doing harm, nor harm from others 
felt;/With whom the Nypmhs did Innocently play,/No spightful Venom in the wantons 
lay;/But to the touch were Soft, and to the sight were Gay” (ll 44-48).  Though Behn 
                                                 
34
 Behn’s vision of the fall demonizes the “Hobbesian political realm.” See Robert 
Markley and Molly Rothenberg, “Contestations of Nature: Aprha Behn’s ‘The Golden 
Age’ and the Sexualizing of Politics,” Rereading Aphra Behn: History, Theory, and 
Criticism, ed. Heidi Hutner (Charlottesville: UP of Virginia, 1993), 301-321. 
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disempowers male sexuality, she maintains its erotic possibilities.  Sexuality (both male 
and female) poses no danger and no repercussions.
35
  
 Rather than subject one’s desire to ideological controls (what Behn calls 
“custom”), one followed the laws of pleasure: “Than it was glory to pursue delight,/And 
that was lawful all, that Pleasure did invite” (line 81).  Establishing custom, however, “set 
the World at Odds” (line 54) and, after the fall of the Golden Age, desire becomes 
subordinated to “Honour, the Error and the Cheat/Of the Ill-natur’d Bus’ey 
Great,/Nonsense, invented by the Proud” (ll 74-76).  Honor becomes the great enemy of 
desire, demarcating a distinct period before custom in which “The Nymphs were free, 
[and] no nice, no coy disdain,/Denyd their Joyes, or gave the Lover Pain” (ll 97-98).  
When maids tremble and blush, they do so because of their desire, “not [as] marks of 
shame” (line 100).  Female desire is not only real; it is accepted and celebrated.   
 By validating and celebrating female sexual desire, Behn portrays the invention of 
honor, a social control that the conduct manual would have us believe is a natural 
characteristic of femininity, as unnatural and sinful: “Oh cursed Honor! thou who first 
didst damn,/A woman to the sin of shame” (ll 117-118).  Behn rejects the masculinist 
version of original sin (Eve’s disobedience of God’s commands) and identifies ideology 
as original sin.  Before honor, the nymphs “innocently played” with the dephallicized 
serpent and lacked coquettish behavior.  Honor, however, “taught lovely Eyes the art,/To 
wound, and not to cure the heart:/[…]To Veil ‘em from the Lookers on,/When they are 
                                                 
35
 Markley and Rothenberg note that Behn’s disempowerment of male sexuality relies on 
the creative management of Biblical narrative: “the innocence of the nymphs and snakes 
defines itself in opposition to a phallic sexuality that is ostensibly a consequence of the 
fall from the Golden Age but in these lines already is inscribed in the series of negations 
[…] used to mark their ‘play’ (307).  
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sure the slave’s undone” (ll 122-123, 126-127).  While Behn does not excuse coquettish, 
manipulative constructions of female sexuality, “The Golden Age” poses those 
constructions as the result of an honor that oppresses, suffocates, and controls: “Honour! 
that hindered mankind first” (line 120) and “gathers up the flowing Hair,/That loosely 
plaid with wanton Air./The Envious Net, and stinted order hold,/The lovely Curls of Jet 
and shining Gold” (ll 130-133).   It is honor, not desire, that creates sin: “Thou base 
Debaucher of the generous heart,/That teachest all our Looks and Actions Art” (ll 140-
141).  Honor demands that desire be denied, but “The Golden Age” understands desire as 
a “sacred Gift” that “should be confest” (lines 142, 145).   From Behn’s perspective, it is 
Honor, not desire, that produces shame. 
Where Behn understands honor and shame as a part of a circularity of interior and 
exterior repressive structures and as a mechanism of self-policing, Astell, in A Serious 
Proposal (1696), defines shame as a fixation on one’s beauty, a vacuousness created by 
custom’s emphasis on superficiality: “For shame let’s abandon that Old, and therefore 
one wou’d think, unfashionable employment of pursuing Butter flies and Trifles.  No 
longer drudge on in the dull beaten road of Vanity and Folly which so many have gone 
before us, but dare to break the enchanted Circle that custom has plac’d us in.”36  Custom 
demands that woman preoccupy themselves with “what Colours are most agreeable, or 
what’s the Dress becomes you best” rather than with improving their intellect and 
spirituality.
37
  Ultimately, patriarchal expectations produce the eighteenth-century 
equivalent of Paris Hilton, a woman concerned with consumption as opposed to devotion.   
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 Mary Astell, A Serious Proposal to the Ladies, ed. Patricia Springboard (Peterborough, 
ONT: Broadview P,  2002), 55. 
37
 Astell, 52.  
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Astell criticizes the figure of the coquette (or, as Richard Steele defines her, “a chast 
Jilt”38) who hoards the very commodity she is expected “spend”: her body.   Rather than 
encouraging the coquette to preserve her body, though, Astell denigrates the body in 
favor of improving the soul.  Astell finds this hoarding and decorating of the body 
shameful as women age: “do not neglect that particle of Divinity within you, which must 
survive, and may (if you please) be happy and perfect, when it’s unsuitable and much 
inferior Companion is mouldering into Dust.”39 Unlike male-authored texts, however, 
Astell sees herself not “expos[ing] but rectify[ing]” women’s shortcomings: “I love you 
too well to endure a spot upon your Beauties, if I can by means remove and wipe it off.”40 
Astell’s desire to rectify the shame of women’s social position illustrates an important 
difference between women’s writing and the conduct book tradition.  While the conduct 
book tradition calls attention to women’s (sexual) shame in an attempt to eradicate desire, 
it simultaneously reinscribes sexual shame as a mark of virtue which should produce 
desire.  Women’s writing, on the other hand, deconstructs the feedback loop of virtue and 
shame that masculinist tradition creates. This deconstruction, though, results in a variety 
of strategies for operating in a masculinist world obsessed with women’s sexuality.  
 Trying to reconstruct the definition of shame poses a “chicken or the egg” 
problem.  For Behn, there is no such thing as shame if there is no such thing as honor.  
Only when man invents honor does shame exist, and yet, as will I argue in the subsequent 
chapters, a woman cannot understand honor and virtue until she has experienced shame.  
In the introduction to Conjugal Lewdness (1727), Daniel Defoe follows a similar pattern 
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of thought, presenting shame as something that is learned: “Modesty is no natural virtue; 
what the Latins call’d Pudor or Shamefacedness, is the Effect of a Crime.” Before their 
Fall, Adam and Eve “went naked, and blush’d not, and ‘tis most significantly express’d, 
they knew not that they were naked” and, therefore, were unashamed by their 
nakedness.
41
 Modesty and shame are the result of custom: “the untaught Savages […] 
where Nakedness is no Offence on one side […] but Custom being the Judge of Decency 
to them, takes away all Sense of Indecency in going uncovered.” When custom and 
decency collide, “a Sense of Shame comes in, with as much Force as if all the Laws of 
God and Man were broken at once.”42 Though Defoe deploys modesty, shame, and 
innocence in an explicitly Christian context, he recognizes, like Behn, that specific 
dictates of morality are the result of cultural practices.  Twenty-five years earlier, in 
Essays Upon Projects, Defoe claimed that “Custom with Women ‘stead of Virtue rules” 
and “Only by Custom ‘tis Virtue lives.”43 For Defoe, shame, not virtue, is the result of 
custom. Only in the experience of shame can custom be sustained, and it is shame that 
lays the foundation for virtue. 
 For my purposes, then, eighteenth-century femininity depends on the relationship 
between virtue and shame and not on a woman’s ability to display her “characteristic” 
virtue.  A woman’s virtue is not self-evident.  Women must constantly perform acts of 
shame and modesty to illustrate their virtue, most commonly in the form of the blush.
44
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While virtuous performances are essential to survival, which I will discuss in detail in 
chapter 4, that ability relies on a woman’s willingness to accept and perform shame as a 
component of her virtue.  The insistence on performativity makes the position of the 
eighteenth-century woman particularly precarious.
45
  In order to perform virtue 
successfully, a woman must be capable of performing shame and that cannot be done 
until a woman has “lost” her virtue or has, at least, has experienced her virtue in danger.  
A woman who has not experienced and come to terms with shame cannot be considered 
virtuous.  To be virtuous, one’s virtue must be tested, and the eighteenth-century woman 
cannot fully be virtuous until she understands the limitations of that virtue: those 
limitations cannot be known until she has crossed the boundaries of what is acceptable.  
Knowing where those boundaries are between what is virtuous and what is shameful 
allows women to display their virtue by successfully performing the signs of shame and 
modesty.   The defining feature of women’s fiction in this study is the woman writer’s 
(and her heroines’) struggle with the naturalization of virtue and virtuous performance. 
                                                                                                                                                 
evidence that “She knowes the heate of a luxurious bed;/Her blush is guiltinesse, not 
modestie” (IV.i.37, 35, 38-39). 
45
 While my study is partially considered with external manifestations of woman’s 
internal virtue and shame, the body, though essential for maintaining the ideological 
expectations of female virtue, is not my primary focus. Gail Kern Paster, in The Body 
Embarrassed, analyzes manifestations of embarrassment in the early modern humoral 
body, particularly on stage. Paster argues in favor of a “connection between the history of 
the outer body—physical and social, the body visible in different ways to self and 
other—and that of the inner body, the physical and social body perceived, experienced, 
imagined from within” (3). Paster’s study, though, focuses on the shame of the physical 
products of the body (particularly bladder incontinence and lactation for the female 
body). While I plan to expand this project by reconstructing a more comprehensive 
history of physical shame and embarrassment in the female body, my primary concern is 
understanding the ways in which the eighteenth-century female subject manipulates 
conventional understandings of female morality in her body (both internally and 
externally) rather than the ways in which they are mapped onto her body. 
20 
 
 This tension between the naturalization of virtue in conduct manuals and 
Richardson’s Pamela, on the one hand, and the insistence on performativity in amatory 
fiction, on the other, becomes the defining feature of eighteenth-century female 
subjectivity.
46
 My use of “subjectivity” refers specifically to women’s sexuality and 
desire.  Most commonly, “subjectivity” is short-hand for the modern contractual subject, 
an identity available to men.
47
  In using “subjectivity,” I refer not to the masculine 
privilege to agree to or to reject certain terms of subjection but to the tensions inherent in 
feminine identity.
48
 These tensions are evident throughout the literature of the period, not 
only in conduct manual’s insistence on inculcating virtue in women by insisting on it as a 
natural component of femininity but also in the woman writer’s struggle to constantly 
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negotiate the tensions between internalizing or rejecting virtue, modesty, and shame.  
Desire has been a central term for understanding the relationship between the history of 
the novel and women’s writing and how well it is repressed is often used as criteria for 
designating prose fiction as “novel.”49 While many studies of the novel expose the active 
repression and redirection of female subjectivity, this study focuses on reconstructing the 
process of that repression.   
 
II. “Overwriting” Amatory, or The Critical (Mis)fortunes of Amatory Fiction  
Just as the development of early prose fiction into “the novel” is a history of 
repression, so is the critical history of amatory fiction in novel studies.  The history of the 
novel is a hotly debated one and critical studies reflect the myriad cultural tensions in 
categorizing a work of prose fiction as “novel.” While modern readers often delight in 
listing the novels they have read, “novel” is a historically loaded term.   No history of the 
history of the novel would be complete without beginning with Ian Watt’s The Rise of the 
Novel, in which Watt argues that “The Novel” makes use of “formal realism,” 
the narrative embodiment of a premise that Defoe and Richardson 
accepted very literally, but which is implicit in the novel form in general: 
the premise, or primary convention, that the novel is a full and authentic 
report of human experience, and is therefore under an obligation to satisfy 
its reader with such details of the story as the individuality of the actors 
are concerned, the particulars of the times and places of their actions, 
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details which are presented through a more largely referential use of 
language than is common in other literary forms.
50
  
Watt’s reliance on realism as a distinguishing feature was not new,51 but his study set the 
tone for novel studies in the twentieth-century and, until the latter decades of the 
twentieth century, effectively shut out amatory fiction from the history of the novel.  
Numerous critics have since taken on Watt’s “rise” and his insistence on, among other 
characteristics, the truth of individual experience and the psychological interiority of the 
novel’s characters, all seemingly fulfilled by male writers and most completely by 
Richardson.   
 Exactly why amatory fiction is shut out of the novel’s history has been a major 
component of the feminist recovery of the genre and reexamination of criticism has 
offered numerous explanations.  Ros Ballaster faults both formalist and historicist 
accounts of the novel for their insistence on teleological narratives, always moving 
forward toward the established novel forms embodied by Richardson’s fiction.52 Toni 
Bowers cites critics’ tendency to disparage the quality of amatory fiction in addition to 
the genre’s lack of conventional realism, an emphasis on women’s sexuality, and its 
thematic repetitions.
53
 Paula Backscheider and John Richetti attribute it to amatory 
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fiction’s status as “precursor of modern mass market or popular fiction, highly readable 
and in effect disposable entertainment.”54 Attempts to legitimize its recovery and 
incorporation into the larger history of the novel trace both the novel, generally, and 
amatory fiction, more specifically, to French heroic forms and even classical forms.
55
   
 Certainly, amatory fiction’s critical reputation reflects its historical treatment.  
After Samuel Richardson’s moralizing fiction of the 1740s was published, amatory 
fiction began to recede into the shadow of the “moral” novel.   With the publication of 
Pamela in 1741 and Clarissa in 1748, the subject of fiction shifted.
56
  Amatory fiction 
had been a genre that privileged women’s fantasy and, as Catherine Ingrassia notes, 
“offered women discursive representations that challenged the dominant construction of 
gender and depicted women acting in empowering and at times transgressive ways”.57  
Moralizing fiction, on the other hand, encouraged a literary culture that, conversely, 
reaffirmed the dominant constructions of femininity and became the foundation for the 
domestic novel of the early nineteenth century, reinforcing the notion of the de-eroticized 
angel in the house.   Canonical fiction following Richardson became fixated on courtship 
and marriage rather than the sexual intrigue plots of Behn and Haywood.   Following suit, 
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literary criticism, until very recently, considered amatory fiction as immoral, trivial, or 
insignificant.    
Though critics such as John Richetti, Michael McKeon, and William Warner have 
sought to incorporate amatory fiction into a coherent history of eighteenth-century 
fiction, they ultimately subordinate Behn and Haywood to canonical standards of moral 
“realism.” Richetti calls the “hysterical romance fiction of Mrs.  Manley, Mrs.  Haywood, 
and other lady novelists … unreadable.”58 Though he admits to “a condescension in [his] 
attitude to early fiction,” he still refuses to see it with “the complexity, density, and 
authorial singularity of particular novels by Defoe, Fielding, or Richardson.”59 Not only 
is it unreadable, it is unredeemable “morally or aesthetically.”60 In The Origins of the 
English Novel, McKeon analyzes various shifts in the period leading up to Fielding and 
Richardson’s “great debate” over Pamela but McKeon’s conclusion focuses on this 
“climactic” moment, implying that all of the history that he has given us to this point is 
simply a mechanism to continue justifying the elevation of these ‘great male writers.’  
McKeon’s argument about ‘truth’ and virtue,’ then, in the novel amounts to an 
exploration of what men deem important in the question over truth and virtue.   Though 
he identifies various social concerns such as economics, class, sexuality, capitalism as 
concerns in literature before the novel, the conclusion reaffirms the magical Wattian 
notion of a sudden explosion of the novel and its theoretical concerns.
61
  And though he 
argues against histories like McKeon’s, Hunter’s, and Richetti’s as they perpetuate the 
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notion that these fictions fall egregiously short of being ‘the novel,’62 Warner downplays 
their ideological complexities.
63
 Their novels, Warner claims, advocate sexuality without 
rules.
64
 Warner’s phrase “novels of amorous intrigue” emphasizes not the ability of this 
literature to navigate social expectations of women but in its more masturbatory qualities: 
Novels of amorous intrigue are a “form of private entertainment that incites desire and 
promotes the liberation of the reader as a subject of pleasure.” They do not “anticipat[e] 
modern feminism” but “teach readers—men as well as women—to articulate their desire 
and put the self first, through reading novels in which characters do so.”65 Ultimately, 
Warner’s insistence on these writers’ reliance on formula to take advantage of the market 
limits the ideological and aesthetic value of amatory fiction.    
 Conversely, feminist critics engaged in the admirable effort to recover amatory 
writers have more or less pitted male writers and female writers against each other rather 
than considering their tangled relationship.   Ros Ballaster’s Seductive Forms, while 
giving the oft-maligned amatory fiction her full attention, results in establishing a 
dichotomized relationship between pre-Richardsonian and post-Richardsonian fiction.   
Jane Spenser, identifying amatory fiction as part of a women’s tradition of protest, claims 
that Manley and Haywood criticized the “prevailing sexual mores more effectively than 
the respectable early writers of feminist polemic […] and more trenchantly, too, than the 
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respectable women novelists who succeeded [them] in the middle of the century” (113).  
However, Spenser ultimately argues that, in Haywood’s case, the only option women 
have is to opt out of society, a strategy Mary Astell advocates in A Serious Proposal.   
Paradoxically, arguments such as these unintentionally distract scholarship from the 
larger ideological critiques presented in amatory fiction and misrepresent its lasting 
impact on novelistic representations of the sexualized female subject.    
These studies, quite dated, represent a variety of shifts in the critical landscape 
regarding amatory fiction: from Richetti’s dismissal, to McKeon’s Marxist inquiry, to 
Armstrong’s analysis of women in (largely) male-authored novels, to Ballaster’s and 
Spencer’s efforts of recovery, and to Warner’s analysis amatory fiction’s relationship to 
print culture.  This study, however, belongs to a new critical tradition of feminist 
criticism, a tradition which has been revising the terms in which amatory fiction, 
specifically, and women’s writing, more generally, is discussed.  Critics like Helen 
Thompson, Laura Rosenthal, and Melissa Mowry have applied a variety of discourses, 
often thought of as more masculine, to the study of women’s writing: Cartesian 
philosophy and domesticity; the development of modern capitalism, modern subjectivity, 
and the female prostitute; and eighteenth-century political ideology and pornographic 
representations of “the common woman.” Similarly, this study applies the conditions of 
masculinist expectations for female morality to women’s writing analyzes the ways in 
which Behn, Haywood, and Lennox deconstruct the assumptions about virtuous women.  
 
III. Women’s Reading and Constructing Feminine Ideals 
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The act of reading for women, by mid-eighteenth century, was firmly established 
as dangerous and novel-reading women were thought to be susceptible to seduction.
66
 Of 
the novel-reading young woman, Scribble, in George Colman’s satirical 1762 Polly 
Honeycombe, says, “Miss reads—she melts—she sighs—Love steals upon her—/And 
then—Alas, poor Girl!—good night, poor Honour!”67 When D’Elmont catches Melliora 
reading Ovid in Haywood’s Love in Excess, he chastises her for “contradict[ing her] 
former argument […] that these sort of books were […] preparatives to Love” that 
“melted the soul, and made it fit for amorous impressions.”68 Because “the young, the 
ignorant, and the idle” read books “as lectures of conduct, and introductions into life,” 
Johnson argues that “the best examples only should be exhibited.”69 While Richardson 
offered Pamela as a proper moral influence to replace the salacious novels of women 
writers like Behn and Haywood,
70
 the conduct guides of the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries devoted themselves to instructing women in proper behavior with 
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modesty at its core.  Ruth Bernard Yeazell’s Fictions of Modesty traces the relationships 
between narratives of modesty in conduct manuals with the narrative focus of the novel:  
[M]odesty is a tempering of behavior that allows individuals to meet and 
come to terms with one another, whether for marriage or other purposes; 
and in this sense what we think of as a virtue can perhaps only be 
understood as a story.  By adopting the modest women as a subject for 
narrative, the novelists were able to represent modesty not as a set of rules 
but as a series of changing responses—not as a fixed condition but as a 
passage in time.  Both in the forward movement of the plot and in the 
persons who surround a heroine, novels could accommodate the 
aggressive energies and desires that her modesty might superficially 
appear to deny.  Though novels shared with other kinds of writing the 
impulse to moralize the subject, at least some novelists were also capable 
of approaching its contradictions in a spirit of comedy or satire.
71
 
I quote extensively to draw attention to several key components of Yeazell’s argument 
relevant to this study.  First, virtue is to be understood as a story, although that story 
begins long before the novels that Yeazell focuses on in her study.  Not surprisingly, 
Yeazell begins her study of fiction with Richardson’s Pamela, a reasonable starting point, 
with given her assertion that constructions of modesty circulated around courtship and 
marriage.  However, and this is the second key feature to which I would draw attention, if 
virtue is a story, shame must be part of that narrative and part of the “series of changing 
responses” provided by the story’s development.  By focusing on conduct manuals, 
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amatory fiction, and the birth of the moral novel, this dissertation reconstructs that 
narrative to consider the influence of amatory fiction’s management of shame on 
constructions of female virtue.  While the women writers Yeazell analyzes are considered 
“critics and theorists of modesty,” I would argue that those criticisms and theories are the 
result of a tug of war in the discourse of female morality that leads to the Richardsonian 
moment and begins with the exchange between amatory fiction and the conduct manual.   
 Of course, this focus on amatory fiction, the conduct manual, and anxieties over 
women’s reading implies that a major concern for my argument is the real readership of 
these texts.   Critics have often assumed that women were the primary audience of 
amatory fiction and that the act of reading amounted to an act of seduction.
72
 Bradford 
Mudge claims, “The feminization of the novel thus establishes a series of analogous 
relationships: Novels (and their writers and readers) are to literature (and their writers and 
readers) what Eve was to Adam and what all women are to men.”73 Based on the number 
of women writers of “scandalous memoirs,” Richetti concludes “it is certainly likely that 
their most eager readers were largely women as well.”74 Though he concedes that literacy 
figures are “uncertain,” Hunter believes that “we can be sure—as novelists were 
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themselves—that large numbers of female readers were ready for them.”75 Recently, Jan 
Fergus has criticized arguments that readers were overwhelmingly female because 
evidence for such readership “is largely anecdotal or circular.”76 Fergus, like Margaret 
Doody, emphasizes the criticisms against female reading advanced by proponents of 
moralizing fiction as a means of neutralizing the threat the novel posed.
77
 For my 
purposes, I am less concerned about the true identity of factual readers and instead focus 
on the ideal female reader—a convenient fiction that writers deploy in a variety of 
complex ways.  It is this figure who compels novelistic discourse and around whom 
ideals of femininity are constructed.
78
  
 By emphasizing the ideal female reader, I do not aim to reconstruct “her” identity.  
Instead, I use this eighteenth-century obsession to turn my focus to literary constructions 
of femininity to understand the agency denied or offered women.  Vivien Jones’s Women 
in the Eighteenth Century identifies “‘women’ as a culturally defined category which 
women had to negotiate and to suffer.”79  The writers I have selected for this dissertation 
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are themselves concerned with discovering the limitations of femininity: what they can 
negotiate in order to survive and what they must suffer with or through.  Novelistic 
discourse, then, begins constructing ideals of femininity and makes available to women 
two types of “women” with which they can identify: good girl or the bad girl.  
Richardson’s Clarissa clearly divides the two for readers with Clarissa embodying the 
good, Mrs.  Sinclair and her whores the bad.
80
 This bifurcation of femininity seemingly 
implies that the “good” or virtuous girl preserves her chastity and that the “bad girl” has 
lost hers.
81
 Laura Rosenthal, though, argues that Richardson defines Clarissa’s virtue by 
her refusal to engage in the economic institution of prostitution after her rape rather than 
in her actual loss of chastity.
82
 Unfortunately for Clarissa, this rejection precludes 
survival.
83
 Though Rosenthal argues that Richardson maintains Clarissa’s virtue despite 
the loss of sexual chastity, her construction as virtuous paragon is still troubling.  While 
Clarissa’s death signals her virtuous refusal to commodify her sexuality, it 
simultaneously signals the limits of that virtue: “What defines Clarissa’s tragedy,” 
Rosenthal argues, “is Richardson’s fundamental observation that in the eighteenth 
century’s emergent capitalist economy, those who refuse contracts cannot survive.  
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Everyone has to alienate something.  Clarissa’s quixotic heroism consists of her refusal to 
do so.  Alienation may threaten abjection, but resistance can be fatal.”84 In order to be 
truly virtuous, Clarissa must opt out of the possibilities available to her, leaving a passive 
and virtuous suicide as the only option available to her.  This model of virtue, though, is 
just as troubling as the model of chaste virgin.  Amatory fiction has already recognized 
the near-impossibility of safeguarding one’s virginity; a woman’s honor is continually 
under attack.  For each of the women writers concerned with here, it is her unique 
position as woman and “woman” that allows her to explore the possibility of survival, 
redefining the conditions of female morality along the way. 
 It is crucial, though, to understand what it means to be a “woman” in the 
eighteenth century in order to understand how Behn, Haywood, and Lennox redefine 
female morality.   Modesty was essential in defining eighteenth-century femininity.  In 
the section “On Virgins” in The Ladies Calling, modesty, along with obedience, is 
“essential to the Virgin-state” and “should appear in it’s highest elevation [in virgins], 
and should come up to shamefacedness.”85  The virgin is free from indecent thoughts, 
impervious to scandalous conversation, and is refined and restrained in speech.
86
 John 
Gregory’s A Father’s Legacy credits “a modest reserve” with being “one of the chief 
beauties” in a woman.87 A modest woman is free from sexual desire, but her very 
modesty encourages desire for her.
88
  Elaine Hobby calls modesty a “primary ‘necessity’” 
and notes that being labeled “immodest” had dire consequences: “Whatever the initial 
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grounds of the attack on a woman’s reputation, an association with sexual misbehavior, 
with a lack of concern for her family’s ‘honour’, was always in danger of following.  The 
terms ‘honour’, ‘reputation’, ‘modesty’, ‘chastity’ formed such a tight group when 
applied to women that the use of one of these words—or its opposite—would inevitably 
bring the others to mind, and into question.”89 It is with this pattern of association in mind 
that I bring the term “shame” to the forefront of this study.  When a woman is faced with 
dishonoring her family, losing her reputation, having her modesty or chastity called into 
question, she struggles with shame rather than virtue.  “Honor,” “reputation,” “modesty,” 
“chastity,” and “virtue” all mean nothing if a woman is either shamed or shameless, or if 
she fails to understand what would constitute or the effects and consequences of shame.  
A woman who has compromised any or all of these virtues must feel shame.   
 A virtuous reputation was the crowning glory of eighteenth-century femininity 
and to gain and maintain that reputation was no easy feat.
90
 In his Collection of Moral 
Sentiments, Richardson likens a woman’s reputation to “a tender flower, which the least 
frost will nip, the least cold will blast; and when once blasted, it will never flourish again; 
but wither to the very root.”91 Many of the conflicts for the heroines in the novels I 
discuss revolve around their efforts to preserve their reputations.  Isabella’s fears that she 
will become the “the scorn of the town, who will look on her as an adulteress” when her 
first husband returns from the dead force her to take desperate action in Behn’s The 
History of the Nun.  Haywood’s Fantomina conceals her identity from her lover with a 
multiple disguises, preventing any blight to her reputation.  The lengths that these 
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heroines go to preserve their reputations reflect the difficultly of not only establishing 
one’s virtue but also maintaining it. 
 Undeniably, “virtue” played a significant role in shaping eighteenth-century prose 
fiction.  The heroine of the “new moral romance” reflected a specific version of idealized 
femininity that never fully experiences the consequences of shame.  Though heroines in 
the domestic novel of the latter eighteenth century certainly experience shame, the 
domestic novel tends to oppose virtue and shame: a woman who is virtuous does not 
know shame.  For the early eighteenth-century women’s writing, however, virtue and 
shame coexist.  Maintaining one’s virtue requires a woman know shame.  She must not 
only know the consequences of losing her virtue, and she must fear those consequences.  
The eighteenth-century woman and the woman writer must not only know what is 
expected of her but must also be able to bend the rules of those expectations in order to 
survive.
92
 The woman writer’s awareness of the circulating discourses of shame, virtue, 
and modesty inform her writing, and it is this awareness that structures the decisions that 
Behn, Haywood, and Lennox make about form, theme, character.  In the late 1680s, Behn 
struggles with the limitations of typical romance tropes and feminine types, though she 
briefly employs the epistolary form in volume I of Love-Letters Between a Nobleman and 
His Sister.
93
  Haywood experiments with generic expectations throughout her career, but 
this experimentation is less evidence of her “reformation” than it is evidence of her 
response to redefinitions of femininity.  It is this ever-changing discourse of femininity 
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and female morality and the self-reflexive nature of the terms association with female 
morality which shapes early women’s prose fiction.  For this reason, I argue that 
understanding ‘shame’ as dialectically bound to ‘virtue’ more thoroughly encompasses 
the experience of the eighteenth-century woman and the eighteenth-century woman 
writer.   
 
IV. Chapter Summaries 
 For Behn, Haywood, and Lennox, the difference between survival and suffering 
varies, and in the following chapters, I have positioned these women writers against the 
masculinist discourses of the conduct manual and the moralizing (domestic) novel to 
explore the contradictions of gender identity available to the heroines of these novels.  
Chapter 1 analyzes the prose fiction of Aphra Behn, specifically Love Letters Between a 
Nobleman and His Sister (1684), The Fair Jilt (1688), and The History of the Nun (1689), 
and argues that Behn, her narrators, and her heroines must confront the limitations of the 
conduct manual’s ideal woman.  Behn’s fiction challenges the conduct manual fantasies 
that shame reforms the “bad girl” and that internalizing highly oppressive rules of 
conduct ironically liberates women from the indecencies of a coarse, masculinist world.   
In her fiction, Behn’s heroines struggle with the internalization of modesty, virtue, and 
shame that the conduct manual assumes.  Confronted with myriad moral dilemmas, 
Behn’s heroines lie, cheat, and even resort to murder to maintain some pretence of honor 
and virtue.  Though their actions are never pardonable, their individual predicaments and 
the options available to them reveal the harsh realities of the eighteenth-century female 
subject’s position.   Behn’s heroines are unable to consider critically the social limitations 
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imposed upon them and either unquestioningly internalize or outwardly reject 
contemporary ideals of feminine shame, exposing a system that suffocates women but 
offers no viable means of survival for the female subject. 
 Chapter 2 analyzes Haywood’s Lasselia, or the Self-Abandoned (1723), 
Fantomina (1725), and The City Jilt (1726) and argues that these novellas illustrate a 
progression in Haywood’s writing from the seemingly formulaic Lasselia to the revenge 
fantasy of The City Jilt.  In the latter, Haywood rejects and revises the Behnian model of 
female subjectivity which is, ultimately, disempowered by her novels’ conclusions 
despite Behn’s recognition of the arbitrariness of moral codes.  Haywood’s fiction, 
conversely, moves beyond exposing the arbitrary nature of a contemporary morality and, 
rather, breaks apart the implications of a system that requires the external appearance of 
virtue and modesty, exploring the consequences of a virtue defined by a woman’s sense 
of shame.  Lasselia cautions against abandoning one’s reputation in favor of desire, its 
heroine relinquishing control of her reputation to her lover.  When her affair is exposed, 
Lasselia is doubly shamed: not only has she abandoned herself in relinquishing control of 
her reputation, she is also abandoned by her lover who returns to his wife, leaving her to 
the shame of exile.  Haywood’s later novellas leave behind the model of the ill-fated 
heroine in favor of exploring the possibilities of desire managed alongside reputation. 
Fantomina and Glicera both experience shame but reject the limitations imposed by 
shame, internalized or externalized. Haywood’s early fiction recognizes the necessity of a 
virtuous appearance but suggests that that virtuous appearance can be managed 
successfully only by a woman who has compromised her virtue and felt the stings of 
shame.   
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 Chapter 3 moves forward from the assumption that a woman can successfully 
manage her virtuous reputation only after she has compromised her virtue and analyzes 
the relationship between the performances of virtue and shame and the construction of 
eighteenth-century femininity in Samuel Richardson’s Pamela, Henry Fielding’s 
Shamela, and Haywood’s Anti-Pamela.  By including Haywood’s Anti-Pamela, this 
chapter argues that Richardson and Fielding advocate paradoxically very similar ideals of 
femininity while Haywood deconstructs Richardson’s virtuous paragon and Fielding’s 
scheming whore.  Finally, Chapter 4 analyzes the consequences of the “new moral novel” 
in Arabella’s struggle with proper reading in Charlotte Lennox’s The Female Quixote.  
While criticism of this novel has largely focused on the domestic closure to Arabella’s 
“bad” reading in her proper marriage to Glanville, I argue, instead, that her cure 
highlights the irreconcilable tensions in the process of eradicating amatory fiction, a 
process which relies on an audience with an internalized sense of shame.   
 While questioning the realistic qualities of the eighteenth-century novel has been 
a fixture of literary criticism for decades now, I argue that the terms used to examine the 
novel ignore the reality of the eighteenth-century woman’s experience.  Though the title 
page attests to a “Foundation in TRUTH and NATURE,” the realities of Pamela are that 
it advocates feminine ideals unrealistic in the eighteenth-century world and throughout 
much of history.  Certainly, this is not a ground-breaking revelation in eighteenth-century 
studies.  However, in challenging the terms of female morality that are commonly applied 
to the novelistic heroine, a fuller portrait of the eighteenth-century female experience can 
emerge.  The struggle of the eighteenth-century woman is not the struggle to preserve her 
virtue but the struggle to balance properly her virtue with the threat of shame.    
38 
 
Chapter 1: 
Navigating Honor and Shame in Behn’s Amatory Fiction 
In The Rover, Florinda, after a near-rape at the hands of Willmore, justifies 
entering into unknown lodgings by arguing “since nothing can be worse than to fall into 
his hands, my life and honour are at stake, and my necessity has no choice” (IV.iii.224).94 
Florinda recognizes that preserving her honor leaves her with no other choice than to 
enter into a house whose occupants she does not know. Though it happens to be her lover 
Belville’s lodgings, necessity exposes her, in this instance, to what should be predictable 
danger. Florinda’s dilemma illustrates just one configuration of a problem Aphra Behn 
repeatedly attempts to puzzle through in her writing: how does a woman’s sense of honor 
dictate her choices or does a sense of honor mean a woman has any choice? Florinda’s 
sister, Hellena, manages to avoid victimization and engages in libertine repartee with 
Willmore, and though she successfully negotiates her way out of taking vows in a 
convent through her courtship of the libertine figure, she has died when the second part of 
The Rover opens. By opening with a dead female libertine, Behn asks if female 
libertinism is a viable option for the Restoration woman and implies that female 
libertinism is not only dangerous but potentially fatal. Though the first part of The Rover 
holds Hellena up as witty heroine, her behavior is unsustainable in the real world, and the 
second part of The Rover reflects that. Florinda, controlled by an internalized sense of 
shame, has a limited set of options which force her to play the role of perpetual victim. 
Hellena, on the other hand, uses her wit to broaden her options but fares no better.  
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The Rover, however, fails to answer fully the question of the viability of female 
libertinism and the choices available to a woman who has internalized the sense of shame 
touted in conduct manuals of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century. In her 
amatory fiction, Behn begins experimenting with the narrative complexity prose fiction 
allows, exploring the psychological forces which guide women’s modesty and shame and 
the choices they make. In a form with no established formula, Behn creates narrative 
complexities which consistently play with the accepted norms and set a foundation for 
early women’s fiction. This chapter focuses on three of Behn’s fictions: Love Letters 
Between a Nobleman and His Sister (1684), The Fair Jilt (1688), and The History of the 
Nun (1689). Each work presents a woman who must reconcile the social normatives of 
female behavior, specifically the relationship between modesty and shame, with her own 
desires. To varying degrees, each woman internalizes or rejects these norms and Behn 
explores how that internalization or rejection defines the actions available to them. 
Together, these three works illustrate two very important concepts about women’s shame 
in Behn’s work: first, that shame can, ultimately, be used as a means of sexual conquest 
and as a weapon against other women, and second, that the overt rejection of internalized 
shame provides a woman with a certain autonomy not afforded to the “modest” woman 
even if that autonomy means rejecting moral behavior.  Resultant from these two 
principles is a heroine Behn cannot help but revere, even if the heroine must face some 
sort of punishment. Sylvia, Miranda, and Isabella all must face punishment in one form 
or another, yet in each woman’s exile or execution, each finds a means to preserve her 
reputation. I argue that Behn’s amatory fiction, by addressing the shame and guilt 
attached to sexual, social, and monetary desires, tests the social dictates which restrict 
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feminine sexuality and action by exploring the ways in which women can manipulate 
their sexuality to challenge, if only situationally, masculine prerogatives. In these texts, 
Behn subverts (and erases) the dutiful wife/whore dichotomy, an opposition Richardson 
later reinforces. Ultimately, Behn’s amatory fiction establishes extensive social and 
political commentary on the lack of choice women have in their public and private lives.    
If love and honor pose a danger to women, women must learn to navigate the 
threats posed by both; and despite her recognition of the artificial construction of honor 
and virtue, Behn does not ignore the need for women to negotiate properly the social 
dictates of these moral codes.
95
 Before turning to Behn’s fiction, I would, first, look to 
Behn’s poems, poems which explicitly articulate a theory of desire that is implicitly 
operative in Behn’s amatory fiction. Behn’s poems both recognize the artificiality of 
virtue and honor. In “On Desire,” Behn chastises “virtuous” women as cold and 
manipulative. Those who “hid the kindling fire” of desire lack any real sense of desire, 
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the term virtus, arguing that “Behn uses ‘virtue’ to consider gender transgression, 
advising the reader to look beyond the prescriptive, and oft cited, model of virtue as 
simply ‘a chaste, silent, and obedient female.’ The ‘virtuous’ woman, then, can be seen as 
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making “all [their] virtue's but a cheat/And honour but a false disguise/[Their] modesty a 
necessary bait/ To gain the dull repute of being wise.”96 “The Golden Age” celebrates a 
time when “the amorous world enjoyed its reign” (line 81) and the construct of “honor,” 
“Nonsense, invented by the proud,” (lines 75) held little sway.97 It is honor, Behn claims, 
that “first didst damn/A woman to the sin of shame” (ll 117-118). Additionally, honor, 
not hedonistic sexual desire, must take the blame for encouraging what becomes a 
naturalized representation of female modesty in conduct manuals and later in 
Richardson’s Pamela, or what amounts to female sexual manipulation for Behn: “Honor! 
who first taught lovely eyes the art/To wound, and not to cure the heart” (line 123). 
Honor, not female nature, becomes responsible for teaching coquettish behavior.  
 Behn’s poems “Honour” and “The Loss,” poems which chronicle the love affair 
of Lysander and Aminta from her collection The Land of Love, similarly assume an 
artificial quality in honor but paint a much more terrifying image of honour as a spectral 
force. In “Honor,” Lysander and Aminta encounter Honour, a “Phantom” (line 1), at the 
gates to Love’s Bower, blocking their way inside. 98 Honor “rarely ever takes its flight” 
(line 5), “plays the Tyrant o’er their Souls” (line 14), and is a “necessary Evil” women 
obey “most for Fear, as Indians do the Devil” (ll 29, 30). In fact, when Honour speaks to 
Aminta, it is a “Goblin” which “the lovely Maid alarms” (line 38). Honour warns her of 
the consequences of an excess of love: her “Fame, Content, and Lover [would all be] 
lost” (line 42) if she gives in to her desires; her beauty, “stript of Virtue, [would] grow 
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abhorr’d” (line 49) and would die “like a Flow’r, whose Scent quick Poyson gives” (line 
50). Honour’s warning strikes fear in Aminta, who stands “Surpriz’d” and “like an 
Image, dumb” (line 54). In “Honour,” Aminta has not internalized a moral sense of honor 
as conduct manuals encourage women to do and as Richardson’s Pamela will later 
assume of its idealized heroine. Instead, honor acts as a rather frightening external force 
which manipulates female emotion. 
“Honour” not only emphasizes the artificial nature of honor, but also proposes a 
theory of honor’s origins: 
Some cross proud Woman, old, and out of Fashion,  
Too ugly for the Trouble of Temptation;  
Unskill'd in Love; in Virtue, or in Truth,  
Preach'd his false Notions first to plague our Youth. (ll 23-30) 
The poem, rather strangely, attributes honor’s birth to a woman but she is a woman 
clearly at odds with what Behn represents as nature. This woman’s professions of honor 
go against notions of love, virtue, and truth. In opposing honor to virtue and truth, Behn 
reinforces an earlier charge that honor’s “chiefest Attributes, are Pride and Spight,/His 
Pow'r is robbing Lovers of Delight,/An Enemy to human kind,/But most to Youth severe” 
(ll 15-18). As I will later argue about shame, this woman’s construction of honor 
becomes a weapon to wield against her own sex. Honor, then, appears vengeful, 
dangerous, unbending; it does not preserve reputation but, in debauching young women, 
dissuades them from becoming self-aware, desiring subjects.  
Behn’s poetry recognizes that possessing a sense of honor necessarily entails 
possessing a sense of shame. In fact, Aminta upbraids Lysander for his sexual 
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presumption and her honor-inspired admonishments cause Lysander to repent: “I saw my 
Error, blush’d, sigh’d, wept, and vow’d,/And all the Marks of deep Repentance show’d” 
(ll 66-67). Lysander’s blushing and the signs of deep repentance imply that Aminta’s 
honor has forced Lysander to feel a sense of shame. Once Aminta has fled with honor, 
though, Lysander seems to have lost his sense of shame, regretting that he did not 
“Hymen’s Priests obey;/And for the Marriage-Ceremonies stay” (ll 13-14), though he 
does confess that he “should have us’d more soft and pleasing Words” (line 26).99  Love 
pursues Aminta and pleads with her to return, asking her why she has followed honor, 
“this fantastick Sprite,/This faithless Ignis fatuus of the Light?” (ll 51-52). The 
complicated tug-of-war between love and honor, in which both Lysander and Aminta are 
caught, illustrates not simply that honor is falsely constructed or that it is a detriment to a 
woman’s sexual identity.  
Behn’s representations of honor emphasize the tenuous hold that honor has on 
female sexual autonomy, which presses the question as to whether there is such a thing as 
female libertinism, an incredibly complicated question with no clear-cut answer.  Susan 
Staves claims that “a central problem [for Behn] was to work out the sharply different 
consequences of libertinism for women.”100 Libertinism, an ideology that inherently 
privileges male pleasure, disregards the consequences of sexual liberty for women and 
implicitly endorses practices dangerous (both physically and socially) for women.
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While Staves adroitly parses out what Behn sees as the difference between male and 
female desire, I would like to push her examination of libertinism not only to consider 
what Behn sees as the differences in male and female sexuality but also to assess the 
viability of a female libertine ethos. Behn’s use of the phrase ignis fatuus in her poetry 
gestures, not so subtly, toward the Earl of Rochester’s “A Satire Against Reason and 
Mankind,” but it also contrasts strongly with Rochester’s use: where Rochester calls 
reason itself “an ignis fatuus of the mind” that leads man astray,102 Behn refers more 
specifically to sexualized “honor” as an illusory social construct detrimental to women in 
particular. In redeploying Rochester’s terminology, Behn insists upon an elaborate 
gendered difference between male codes of honor and female codes of honor. 
Nevertheless, Rochester’s argument that reason leads man down dangerous paths applies 
to Behn’s usage of it, as well, and implies that “honor” is as contrived as reason. 
Rochester completely rejects reason because it contradicts instinct, and he dares his 
reader to prove him wrong. If Rochester can be proved wrong by a truly virtuous 
counterexample, he says he will “Adore those shrines of virtue, homage pay,/And, with 
the rabble world, their laws obey” (line 218-219). In comparison, Behn not only asserts 
that honor is a man-made moral construct but simultaneously recognizes that women 
must operate within its system. Behn’s transgressive women rarely go unpunished for 
skirting social conventions, but her narrators often distance themselves from such 
judgments, and her fiction is rife with ambiguous endings. Love Letters, The Fair Jilt, 
                                                                                                                                                 
provided by nature for men’s pleasure, and sometimes did not scruple to resort to 
violence to gratify male desire. […] libertinism regarded marriage as a betrayal of the 
good […] it countenanced sexual practices that had fewer problematic consequences for 
men than for women” (21).  
102
Lines 12-15.  
 45 
 
and The History of the Nun pursue the question of female libertinism from different 
angles: while Sylvia, Miranda, and Isabella, ultimately meet with different fates, their 
individual circumstances allow Behn simultaneously to critique both the patrilineal 
ideology of female honor and modesty and the potentially exploitive quality of 
Rochesterian libertinism.  
 
I. Love Letters Between a Nobleman and His Sister 
 Love Letters Between a Nobleman and His Sister criticizes the arbitrary nature of 
honor and virtue in the first volume, carrying out the themes found in Behn’s poetry. 
Early in the first volume, Philander criticizes honor for the same phantasmagorical 
qualities “Honour” attributes to it: “A fit of Honour! a fantome imaginary and no 
more.”103 For Donald R. Wehrs, this exclamation is part of Philander’s attempt to 
encourage Sylvia to “‘deconstruct’ all the uses of language that locate identity anywhere 
other than in private will or individual desire.”104 While this declaration is certainly part 
of Philander’s attempts to manipulate Sylvia rhetorically, this sentiment is not without 
precedent in Behn’s work. While Philander does want Sylvia to follow her private will 
for his own benefit, the image of honor as a “fantome imaginary” contextualizes honor 
and other moral concepts like virtue as false yet powerful, a force which, though socially 
constructed to limit desire, still maintains a strong influence over its devotees. Sylvia 
finds herself “unresolv’d between violent Love, and cruel Honour” (24-25). She “was all 
despairing raging Love, jealous, fearful, and impatient” but his letters “dispers’d those 
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Damons, those tormenting Councellors, and [gave] a little respite, a little tranquility to 
my Soul.” “That Traytor Honor” is “warm’d and reviv’d by thy new protested flame, 
makes War against Almighty Love” and Sylvia finds herself returned to “Honour’s side” 
(25). While Wehrs claims that Sylvia entertains Philander’s arguments because she is 
“already inclined to accept the vision of selfhood that Philander offers,”105 I argue that 
reading Sylvia’s struggle in the first volume in conjunction with the poems from The 
Land of Love, forces us to reconsider Sylvia’s internal struggle with private desires and 
public constraints. While she is certainly susceptible to Philander’s advantageous 
rhetoric, Love-Letters is not merely about Philander’s sexual pursuit and the potential 
love has to ruin Sylvia; it is also about her struggle with her own sexual identity, an 
identity which must define itself within a system reliant on the internalization of false 
moral concepts meant to instill fear in women.
106
  
 This fear manifests itself as a sense of shame and it is this threat of public shame 
that exerts control over a woman’s actions, not her sense of honor. As Aminta faces the 
shameful consequences of losing her fame, growing “abhorr’d,” and dying “like a Flow’r, 
whose Scent quick Poyson gives,” Sylvia recognizes her erotic indulgences could bring 
public shame not only upon her but also upon her family: 
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[I]ndiscreet was I; was all for Love, fond and undoing Love! but when I 
saw it with full Tide flow in upon me, one glance of Glorious Honour, 
makes me again retreat. I will—I am resolv’d—And must be brave! I can’t 
forget I’m Daughter to the great Beralti, and Sister to Mertilla, a yet 
unspotted Maid, fit to produce a race of Glorious Hero’s. (25) 
The threat of facing shame causes Sylvia to profess that she would rather “dy before [she 
would] yield [her] honour” (29), and she sees her resistance to Philander as the means to 
“redeem the bleeding Honour of [her] Family, and [her] great Parents Vertues shall shine 
in [her]” (30). Sylvia’s does struggle with her sense of honor and it does slow down, 
though it does not stop, her yielding to Philander’s desires.  
In resisting Philander, Sylvia’s honor befits her position, but despite the honorable 
control she tries to exert over her desires, she still finds herself “grow[ing] wild and 
know[ing] not what [she] say[s].” She is betrayed by an “Impatient Love” to “a Thousand 
folly’s, a Thousand rashness” and dies “with shame” (38). Though she “know[s] [her] 
danger,” she realizes she must give in to her suitor: “Love soft bewitching Love will have 
it so, that I cannot deny what my feebler Honour forbids” (30). The consequences cannot 
outweigh her desire. While she waits for Philander to arrive for a late night liaison in her 
bedroom, she confesses that she is “fond of being undone [and suspects she will face] 
either the loss of Philander, my Life, or my Honour, or all together.” She imagines the 
consequences: “What but death can insue, or what’s worse, eternal shame? eternal 
confusion on my honour?” (49). Though she fears her sister Mertilla’s jealousy, she still 
permits Philander into her chambers and all her internal struggles over her honor, shame, 
and familial obligation to this point become insignificant in light of her excessive desire 
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for Philander: “My heart beats still, and heaves with the sensible remains of the late 
dangerous tempest of my mind, and nothing can absolutely calm me but the approach of 
the all-powerful Philander; though that thought possesses me with ten thousand fears, 
which I know will vanish all at they appearance, and assume no more their dreadful 
shapes till thou art gone again” (55). Her confession recognizes that, while she might face 
emotional consequences following her liaison with Philander, her sexual desire is far too 
great to be repressed by a sense of honor. Though Sylvia recognizes that she might face 
repercussions from her excessive desire, her inability to thoroughly repress them signals 
her ultimate inability to thoroughly internalize shame. 
 Following her late night liaison with Philander, Sylvia’s guilt and shame do 
return, but she is still consumed with thoughts of him. She wonders where to hide her 
“guilty blushing face” (63) and claims that “to shew desire is such a sin in vertue as must 
deserve reproach from all the world” (65). Sylvia faces not only internal admonishments 
over her transgressive desires but also external ones, as well, from Mertilla who insists on 
both the social ridicule Sylvia will face and the familial shame Sylvia’s actions produce. 
Mertilla tells Sylvia to “[c]onsider [. . .] the infamy of being a Prostitute” and that her 
affair comes with the added shame of an incestuous affair with her sister’s husband (74). 
In fact, Sylvia’s actions are so abhorrent that Mertilla insists Sylvia “must obscure thy 
self in some remote corner of the world, where honesty and honour never are heard of: 
No thou canst not shew thy face, but ‘twill be pointed at for something monstrous: for a 
hundred ages may not produce a story so lewdly infamous and loose as thine” (74). 
Mertilla’s admonishments direct a sense of shame at Sylvia by asserting that she has no 
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place in moral society. Even her physical appearance indicates her shame: she can never 
show her face and will be marked as monstrous.  
 Though Sylvia struggles early on with her own sense of shame and Mertilla 
attempts to reinforce the social contempt Sylvia could face, Behn and her heroine reject 
an internalization of shame by the end of the first volume in favor of sexual desire.
107
 As 
early as Sylvia’s failed liaison with Philander, Sylvia’s sense of shame is overpowered by 
the thrill of sexual desire. Despite her internal virtuous conflict, she “can think of nothing 
but” Philander and “loath[es] the sound of Love from any other voice” (66). Judith 
Keegan Gardiner notes that Sylvia “does not rejoice or repent [at avoiding shameful 
ravishment]. Rather, she glories in her new desires. Throughout Love Letters, Behn 
alludes to the traditional battle between love and honor only to undermine it and the 
social laws that uphold it.”108 Though she confesses that she is prepared “for the worst 
that can befall me [. . .] being rendered a publick shame” (107) in a letter to Philander 
after learning that he has been arrested by her father for their affair, her next letter further 
rejects the shame of desire and places blame on custom instead. She writes, “‘tis not my 
love’s the criminal, no nor the placing it on Philander the crime; but ‘tis thy most 
unhappy circumstances—thy being married, and that was no crime till man made laws” 
(110). In recognizing the arbitrary construction of moral code based on manmade laws, 
Sylvia begins the process of rejecting the shame associated with flouting social 
convention and praises the integrity of a match made by choice:  
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that’s a heavenly match when two Souls toucht with equal passion meet 
(which is but rarely seen)—when willing vows, with serious 
consideration, are weigh’d and made [. . .] who find the beauty of each 
others minds, and rate ‘em as they ought, whom not a formal ceremony 
binds [. . .] but well considered vows from soft inclining hearts, utter’d 
with love, with joy, with dear delight when Heaven is called to witness; 
She is thy Wife, Philander, He is my Husband, this is the match, this 
Heaven designs and means [. . .] (112) 
Sylvia’s insistence on Heaven’s role in their union rejects the social convention which 
threatens to shame Sylvia and keep her and her lover apart. Philander finally proposes 
marriage to Sylvia at the end of the first volume, though it is not to him and is only 
intended “to save thee from being ravisht from [his] arms.” Philander’s proposal is that 
Sylvia marry Brilljard and assures her “it is but joining hands—no more” as “Brilljard’s a 
Gentleman […] handsome too, well made, well bred […] and he’ll pretend no farther 
than to the honour of owning thee in Court” (113). While the marriage is sold to Sylvia as 
a means to protect her, it is more beneficial to Philander as it provides him sexual access 
to his lover and cannot preserve Sylvia from Philander’s abandonment or Brilljard’s 
sexual pursuit in the second volume. Though I will return to the question of marriage’s 
ability to preserve women from danger later, the first volume closes in ambiguity, leaving 
suspect the ability of Sylvia’s pretend marriage to protect her. The volume closes with 
Philander’s proposal, and the reader can only assume that Sylvia has agreed to his plan. 
Her willingness to take part in a sham marriage signals the end of her struggle with 
shame.  
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While volume I uses plot to signal Sylvia’s impending rejection of internalized 
shame, volume II uses narrative form to reinforce Sylvia’s rejection. In the second 
volume, Behn begins abandoning the epistolarity of the first volume.
109
 Sylvia’s letters in 
the first volume reveal her struggle with appropriate emotion, her struggle with “the 
violent effects of Love and Honour, the impetuous meeting tides of the extreams of joy 
and fear” (32). She confesses her shame and her letters present a sympathetic portrait of a 
young woman struggling with the potential shame of not meeting her social 
responsibilities. By the time the second volume opens, though, Sylvia feels little need to 
dwell upon the consequences of her actions and the letters become less frequent. Her 
circumstances have surpassed worrying over the social repercussions of her affair. To 
dwell on the shame theoretically attendant on her actions would create a static identity
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for Sylvia, one in which she was forever (passively) ruined and never (actively) 
vindicated.
111
 When the second volume opens, Behn abandons the exclusive use of the 
epistolary and begins to narrate between letters. Ros Ballaster attributes this shift to a mix 
of epistolarity and narration as “a response to the problem of authenticating voice in first-
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person epistolary writing […] The lack of third-person commentary on the nature of 
lovers’ passion means that the reader has no information about the motivations of the two 
lovers, other than the accounts they offer, not the eventual results of the affair.”112 As 
Ballaster notes, the first volume’s epistolarity is “centrally concerned with the attempt to 
inscribe and engender sexual desire. These epistolary writings seek both to stimulate 
desire in the other, lover or reader, and to represent the specific ‘difference’ of female 
desire.”113 While Sylvia’s and Philander’s letters certainly stimulate desire in one for the 
other, I would argue that Behn’s shift from the epistolary signifies Sylvia’s rejection of 
internal shame. Because she no longer struggles with her shame in volumes II and III, her 
voice becomes less important. Sylvia’s rejection of internal shame negates the need to 
rely on the epistolary in volume II. By rejecting Sylvia’s voice, Behn forces the reader to 
think about mediation between Sylvia’s actions (or Philander’s actions) and the 
judgmental faculties reliant on the status quo expectations of female virtue, honor, and 
sexuality.
114
 In abandoning the epistolarity of the first volume, Behn forces her readers to 
think carefully about the situations her characters find themselves in and the conditions 
which produce them. To effectively comment on a patrilineal system which frames 
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Sylvia’s behaviors, Behn’s readers need a narrator who comments on and frames 
narrative action.
115
  
Volume II chronicles Sylvia’s complete transition from passive victim to 
calculating seductress.  The marriage intended to protect Sylvia incites Brilljard’s desires 
for her, placing her in direct danger. Brilljard’s proximity to Sylvia encourages fantasies 
and ever-increasing jealousy at his inability to possess the woman he imagines to be his 
wife. He “often wisht his Lord wou’d grow cold as possessing Lovers do” and “he cou’d 
not see her kist without blushing with resentment” (125). Eventually, Brilljard seems 
completely under the delusion that “she is his wife, and has forgot that he’s her creature, 
and Philander’s Vassal” (126). Brilljard seizes every opportunity he can to manipulate 
circumstances to gain access to Sylvia. He finds the perfect opportunity when Sylvia 
confides in him and shows him a letter she has written to Philander expressing fear that 
he no longer loves her. Brilljard encourages her fear, telling her “‘[t]is evident, that he’s 
the most ungrateful of his Sex!” (148). Sylvia, overcome, faints in Brilljard’s arms and 
becomes the passive victim Brilljard desires. Briljard takes advantage of her swoon and 
“give[s] himself the pleasure of grasping the lovely’st body in the World to his Bosome, 
on which her fair face declin’d cold, dead and pale” (148). He lays her down on the bed 
nearby and, as he is about to rape her, “some kinder God awaken’d Silvia, and brought 
Octavio to the Chamber door” (148). Brilljard, fantasizing he has all the rights of a 
husband, attempts marital possession of Sylvia’s body. The very marriage that Philander 
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arranges under the premise of protecting Sylvia from being forcibly removed from him 
has become the very thing that presents the most danger to her.  
Upon realizing the imminent danger she had been in, called to her attention by 
Octavio, Sylvia begins the shift from passive victim to calculating seductress. When 
Brilljard returns, Sylvia “lookt upon him as a Ravisher, but how to find that Truth, which 
she was very curious to know, she call’d up all the Arts of Women to instruct her in, by 
threats she knew ‘twas vain, therefore she assumed an Artifice, which was indeed almost 
a stranger to her heart, that of gilting him out of a secret which she knew he wanted 
generosity to give handsomely” (157-158). Sylvia becomes flirtatious with Brilljard to 
encourage a confession from him which reveals his fantasies that her body is passive and 
excessively available. He recalls “the lovely Victim […] ready for the Sacrifice” and  
“[his] lands [sic], [his] eyes, [his] Lips, […] tir’d with pleasure, [and the] joys beyond 
those ravishments of which one kind Minute more had made me absolute Lord.” His 
confession prompts Sylvia’s complete transition from victim to aggressor and she 
“Snatch[es] a Penknife that lay on her Toylite, which she offered so near his bosome that 
he believ’d himself already pierc’d, so sensibly killing were her words, her motion, and 
her look” (158). However, Sylvia takes pity on him, remembering that he has preserved 
her secrets, and instructs him to “have a care you never raise your thoughts to a 
presumption of that Nature more […] repent your Crime” (159). In making Sylvia’s most 
imminent threat come from her sham marriage, Behn exposes the danger an eighteenth-
century woman faces not only from libertine ethos but also from adhering to legitimate 
social institutions. Sylvia’s participation in both realms forces her out of passive 
participation and into the role of a self-aware, calculating seductress. In order to 
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successfully manage herself in a world driven by masculine sexual desires, Sylvia must 
take charge of herself. 
Having shed her identity as a passive victim, Sylvia writes to Philander, rants 
against his infidelity and laments her gullibility, implying she should have known better 
than to believe her lover all along. In doing so, she finds agency in her victimization.
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Sylvia acknowledges the social scorn she has reaped in “the accusation of all the good, 
the hate of all the Virtuous, the reproaches of her kindred, the scorn of all chast Maids, 
and curses of all honest Wives; and in requital had only thy false Vows, thy empty love, 
thy faithless imbraces, and cold dissembl’d kisses [in return]. My only comfort was to 
fancy that they were true; now that’s departed too, and I have nothing but a brave revenge 
left in the room of all!” (219). She makes her plan for revenge clear to Philander: “there 
remains about me only this sense of Honour yet; that I dare tell thee of my bold design; a 
bravery thou hast never shew’d to me, who takest me unawares, stab’st me without a 
warning of the blow [. . .] I will expose myself to all the World, Cheat, Jilt, and flatter all 
as thou hast done, and having not one sense or grain of Honour left, will yield the 
abandon’d body, thou hast rifl’d to every asking Fop” (219). Silvia’s innocence has, 
undoubtedly, left her vulnerable and open to Philander’s advances. However, Sylvia 
refuses to play the social pariah, and instead accepts her newfound identity, taking 
control of her circumstances. While her actions are not endorsed by the text, she is hardly 
chastised by the narrator, particularly when the novel closes.  
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 That the narrator is not critical of Sylvia, though, is not a simple either/or 
assertion. Gardiner notes that “Love Letters overtly condemns Sylvia and covertly 
admires her erotic successes: Behn is cheerfully, contradictorily of her devil’s party.”117 
The third part of Love Letters opens with a narratorial catalogue of Sylvia’s faults: 
[Y]et to render her Character impartially, she had also abundance of 
disagreeing Qualities mixt with her Perfections. She was Imperious and 
Proud, even to Insolence; Vain and Conceited even to Folly; she knew her 
Vertues and her Graces too well, and her Vices too little; she was very 
Opinionated and Obstinate, hard to be convinced of the falsest Argument, 
but very positive in her fancied Judgment: Abounding in her own Sense, 
and very critical on that of others: Censorious, and too apt to charge others 
with those Crimes to which she was her self addicted, or had been guilty 
of: Amorously inclin’d and indiscreet in the Management of her Amours, 
and constant rather from Pride and Shame than Inclination; fond of 
catching at every trifling Conquest, and lov’d the Triumph tho’ she hated 
the Slave. (257-258) 
This overt condemnation of Sylvia’s negative characteristics far outweighs the following 
assertion by the narrator that “she had Vertues too, that balanc’d her Vices” (258). 
Though the narrator similarly catalogues these virtues (she “lov’d Philander with a 
Passion, that nothing but his Ingratitude could have decay’d in her Heart”), Sylvia’s 
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faults quickly become the focus again. She is “Cunning [enough] to dissemble her 
Resentment the best she could to her generous Lover” (258).   
At the novel’s close, Behn leaves Sylvia with a very ambiguous fate. Though she 
and Brilliard become “the Talk and the Town, insomuch that the Governor not permitting 
her stay there, she was forced to remove for new Prey, and daily makes considerable 
Conquests where e’er she shows the Charmer” (439). Such an ending, with social 
judgment implied and narratorial commentary conspicuously absent, leaves opportunity 
to read Sylvia as a variety of female stereotypes. In his highly politicized reading of the 
novel, Wehrs finds Sylvia the ever-available whore, claiming that “by allowing neither 
practical judgment nor royalist principles to constrain her education, Silvia transforms 
herself into the sexual, feminine equivalent of a delegitimated throne, that every fool may 
aim at.”118 Wehrs’ attention to Silvia’s consciousness of her character seems to find more 
at fault with Silvia than with the social practices that encourage the formation of identity. 
Gardiner provides a dualistic reading of Sylvia. She notes that Sylvia “maintains her 
integrity through desire, a perfect conviction of her right to her own sexual and 
narcissistic pleasures,”119 but Gardiner also argues that the novel challenges the 
“traditional happy ending of the English novel” by “localiz[ing] the contradictions 
between gender and class that meet within its edifying bonds” while Brilljard ultimately 
“assumes for himself the sexual rights of patriarchal marriage” rather than remaining the 
cuckold Sylvia’s exploits have made him by becoming both her “confidante and 
pimp.”120  Ballaster finds Sylvia an “an anti-heroine, a survivor” who “adapts every 
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available resource to hand” for her advantage.121 Behn, she argues, uses the novel form as 
a “critique of women’s enslavement to a variety of fictions of feminine identity, and 
offers an escape route beyond retreat into silence and spurious claims to authenticity.”122 
Conversely, Dorrego reads “ironical discrepancy between the fate hoped for and by these 
characters and the one they actually get. For their part, Philander, Silvia, and Brilljard, 
who lead a conventionally objectionable life throughout the narrative, and are recurrently 
criticized by the narrator, are left unpunished. There is no poetic justice in this prose 
fiction whereas it is common in romance and most literature of those days.”123 These 
readings, which rarely take a middle ground, illustrate how easily Behn’s ambiguous 
endings can be read to different advantages, but this multiplicity in readings highlights 
the advantages of ambiguity for Behn. She nods to the social norms, providing social 
judgment of Sylvia, while allowing her to remain her own sexual agent.  
Yet, simply focusing on her ultimate (and intentionally ambiguous) fate at the 
novel’s close should be carefully read against other events in the novel, not simply as a 
moment of textual criticism or exaltation by the narrator. Before reading Sylvia’s 
ultimate fate, I would turn to her confrontation with Calista, her rival for Philander’s 
affections, at the convent. In this confrontation, Behn challenges readers’ assumptions 
about what constitutes prostitution and what constitutes virtue. Wehrs, reading Sylvia’s 
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transformation into man-eating whore following her abandonment by Philander, claims 
that  
[j]ust as Sylvia is apprehended as vulnerable to ‘typical’ patterns of 
masculine seduction, so she transforms herself into a ‘typical’ seducer. 
Her pursuit of Octavio […] is explained by the narrator in terms of a 
general law of psychology, ‘it being natural to women to desire conquests, 
though they hate the conquered; to glory in the triumph, though they 
despise the slave.’ Like Philander, she is progressively diminished through 
a succession of increasingly sordid affairs. 
124
 
By using the narrator’s explanation that women “naturally” desire conquests, Wehrs 
assumes Behn’s reliance on a particular masculine fantasy to villainize Sylvia, but 
Silvia’s “nature” is not something Behn endorses. As with the eroticization of Calista’s 
innocence, Wehrs’s reading reveals a particular masculine fantasy which has dangerous 
consequences for the seventeenth/eighteenth-century woman—consequences of which 
Behn is critical. The eroticized virgin, who in Behn’s novel is not desireless as she will 
become in Richardson, is in danger of the male predatory sexual ethos. Silvia was, at one 
point in the novel, the apparently innocent and virtuous Calista. Sylvia and Calista are 
two sides of the same coin: one, seduced and abandoned, becomes a nuanced version of 
the female rake Behn portrays on the stage, refusing the limitations of eighteenth-century 
femininity; the other, seduced and pregnant, “resolved never to quit the Solitude of the 
Cloysters,”125 her social withdrawal a resignation to standards of virtue.   
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 Behn’s attempt to balance the representation of her heroines is reinforced in the 
contrasts between Sylvia and Calista. Gardiner claims that, in this relationship, Behn 
subverts the virgin/whore dichotomy, something Behn continues to do in later fiction. Of 
Sylvia’s and Calista’s faceoff in the convent, Gardiner argues that “Calista is not the 
heroine but the ‘other woman,’ so that the stereotypying identifications between 
protagonist and virtuous woman fail,”126 but Behn sets up an essential difference between 
the two women early, a difference which blurs the boundaries between virgin and whore. 
Sylvia, abandoned by Philander, has acquiesced to revealing herself as a cheat and a jilt. 
Calista, conversely, is inexperienced, which initially inspires Octavio’s worry: Calista 
“not [having] learnt the little cunnings of her Sex, he guest by his own Soul that hers was 
soft and apt for impression, […] that she had a simple Innocence, that might betray a 
young Beauty under such circumstances” (178). In the end, he decides against preserving 
her, deciding that her “ruin has laid a foundation for my happiness” and will “secure my 
Empire over Silvia” (178). For Philander, her innocence, as Sylvia’s was in volume I, 
becomes erotic fuel:  
I told you before she had from her infancy been bred in a Monastery, kept 
from the sight of men, and knew no one art or subtilty of her Sex: But in 
the very purity of her innocence, she appear’d like the first born Maid in 
Paradice, generously giving her Soul away to the great Lord of all, the 
new form’d man, and nothing of her hearts dear thoughts did she reserve [. 
. .] Oh what an excellent thing a perfect Women is [sic], e’re man has 
taught her Arts to keep her Empire, by being himself inconstant? all I 
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cou’d ask of Love she freely gave, and told me every sentiment of her 
heart [. . .] so innocently she confest her passion that every work added 
new flames to mine, and made me raging mad. (236-7) 
The erotic potential of the innocent woman becomes ironic here, as Calista is already 
married to Lord Clarinau, where Sylvia was unmarried at the beginning of her affair with 
Philander. Calista’s status as a married woman implies a lack of chastity, counter to the 
representations of Calista as sexually innocent that both Octavio and Philander 
perpetuate. 
 When Sylvia arrives at the convent, her sudden (though temporary) sympathy for 
Calista, contrasted with Calista’s vindictiveness, reinforces the portrait of Sylvia as 
wronged woman and Calista as whore. When Sylvia first sees Calista, the narrator reveals 
that Calista so resembles her brother, Octavio, that Sylvia “was ready to faint at a sight so 
charming, and a form so angelic” and that “she found a majesty in her looks above all 
censure, that awed the jealous upbraider, and almost put her out of countenance; and with 
a rising blush she seemed ashamed of her errand” (314). Sylvia’s emotional range 
confounds her intent and she seems immobilized. Though she does not abandon her 
original purpose, “to reproach [Calista],” Sylvia does seem to temper it. When Calista 
urges her to speak, she tells Calista why she had come: 
I am the unfortunate, who am compelled by my hard fate to complain of 
the most charming woman that ever nature made; I thought, in my coming 
hither, I should have had no other Business but to have told you how false, 
how perjured a Lover I had; but at a sight so wondrous, I blame him no 
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more, (whom I find now compelled to love), but you, who have taken 
from me, by your charms, the only blessing Heaven had lent me. (314) 
Sylvia’s address to Calista is not without calculation and does, ultimately, chide Calista. 
However, in complementing her, Sylvia couches her complaint in innocuous flattery. 
Furthermore, she does not mention Philander by name, leaving it up to Calista to invoke 
their shared lover’s name. When Calista replies, she says that she will give over “the 
World to [Sivlia], so it allow [her] Philander. This she spoke with a little Malice, which 
call’d up all the Blushes in the fair Face of Silvia.” By having Calista be the one to speak 
Philander’s name and to do so maliciously, Behn softens Sylvia’s reproach and 
emphasizes Calista’s spite. Sylvia, in response, displays what appears to be a genuine 
blush, inspired not by sexual desires but by a perceived threat.
127
  Sylvia leaves letters 
revealing that Philander has exposed Calista and has continued courting Sylvia, but Behn 
has taken great care to distort, possibly erase, the distinctions between the virgin and the 
whore. By shifting the balance between the representation of virgin/whore, Behn leaves 
room for an ambiguous ending and concludes with Sylvia “forced to remove for new 
Prey, and daily makes considerable Conquests where e’er she shows the Charmer” (439). 
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II. The Fair Jilt 
While Sylvia spends the first volume of Love Letters struggling with her sense of 
shame to ultimately reject its internalization in volume II, The Fair Jilt begins with a 
heroine who has already rejected the internalization of shame as a control for her 
behavior.
128
 Miranda, a “galloping nun” who has taken only temporary vows, finds 
herself taken with Francisco, a new priest. Upon seeing him in church, Miranda’s “face 
was overspread with blushes of surprise; she beheld him steadfastly, and saw in his face 
all the charms of youth, wit, and beauty.”129 While the blush is assumed by the conduct 
manual to be a visual signal of a woman’s modesty, Miranda’s blush functions as an 
explicit signal of her sexual desire.
130
 Miranda’s surprise comes not from being caught 
gazing on the priest’s body but from her inability to control her desire for the priest. 
Filles-devotes like Miranda frequently received addresses and gifts from men of quality, 
and “to manage these gallantries, there is no sort of female arts they are not practiced in, 
no intrigues they are ignorant of, and no management of which they are not capable” 
(79). Miranda, “naturally amorous, but extremely inconstant,” “make[s] it her business to 
wound” but will not “give away that lovely person to the possession of one who could 
please it with so many” (80). Rather than signify a shame which would control her action, 
her blush signifies a sexual desire over which Miranda has little control.  
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Miranda, shamelessly, gazes on Francisco’s body, until he returns her blush: “She 
gazed upon him, while he bowed before her, and waited for her charity, till she perceived 
the lovely friar to blush and cast his eyes to the ground. This awakened her shame” (81). 
Like the blush which illustrates Miranda’s recognition of an uncontrollable desire, her 
sense of shame does not restrict her action. Instead, Miranda’s shame signals sexual 
compulsion:  
[S]he put her hand into her pocket and was a good while in searching for 
her purse, as if she thought nothing less than what she was about; at last, 
she drew it out, and gave him a pistol, but that with so much deliberation 
and leisure as easily betrayed the satisfaction she took in looking on him, 
while the good man, having received her bounty, after a very low 
obeisance, proceeded to the rest, and Miranda casting after him a look all 
languishing, as long as he remained in the church, departed with a sigh as 
soon as she saw him go out[.] (81) 
Though The Ladies Calling labels modesty “a Vertu of general Influence” which “steers 
every part of the outward frame,” Miranda lacks such control. 131  Her shame neither 
gives her opportunity to repress nor attempt to deny her sexual desire. Her shame, 
instead, compels her to indulge not only in self-pleasure but to indulge in public self-
pleasure in church. Additionally, she makes a show of her sexual attraction, “easily 
betray[ing] the satisfaction” the priest’s body makes available to her. Miranda’s final sigh 
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as the priest leaves the church signals the completion of sexual conquest and Miranda’s 
gratification.
132
 
 As shame does little to deter Miranda from desiring the priest, the priest’s status 
as a clerical figure does little to discourage her, either. In fact, his priesthood even 
encourages her desire. After learning of Francisco’s prior life as Prince Henrick, a young 
man who lost the woman he loved to his scheming brother, Miranda finds his religious 
status alluring and “looks on his present habit as some disguise proper for the stealths of 
love; some feigned put-on shape with the more security to approach a mistress and make 
himself happy” (87-88). Ideologically, Francisco’s priesthood should preclude her sexual 
desire for him, yet Miranda’s rejection of ideological control on her desires extends to 
Francisco. In imaging that his religious status acts as a cover for rather than an exclusion 
from sexual desire, Miranda assumes that desire is naturalized, that ideology cannot 
control it. His status as priest is not a prohibition but an invitation. She desires not 
because she cannot have him but because he has the perfect cover for an affair.  
In her fantasy, Miranda imagines that Francisco’s priestly attire does not negate 
Henrick’s sexuality but that it is always ever-present underneath the exterior rejection of 
that sexuality. Reminiscent of Philander’s eroticization of the virginal female bodies of 
Sylvia and Calista, Miranda eroticizes the non-priestly body of Henrick. She images that, 
without his priestly attire, “she has the lover in his proper beauty, the same he would have 
been if any other habit (though never so rich) were put off” and that in “her arms he loses 
all the friar and assumes all the prince.” Without the priestly attire, he can partake of 
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“thousand dalliances for which he youth was made: for love, for tender embraces, and all 
the happiness of life” (88). Francisco’s status as a priest creates a separation between his 
previous life as Henrick and his current life as Father Francisco, yet Miranda rejects this 
dichotomization of self, believing “Henrick [not Father Francisco] would be glad at least 
to quench that flame in himself by an amour with her, which was kindled by the young 
princess” (88). Miranda’s inability to accept the priest as off-limits based on his social 
standing overtly rejects ideological control over one’s sexual subjectivity.  
 If Miranda rejects an internalization of shame which limits her sexual subjectivity, 
it stands to reason that she also rejects the ideological precept that shame, external or 
internal, is reformative. When Miranda confesses her attraction to Francisco in the 
confessional and makes sexual advances toward him, he attempts to shame her: “Go, vain 
wanton, and repent, and mortify that blood which has so shamefully betrayed thee, and 
which will one day ruin both thy soul and body” (94).  In rebuking her, Francisco 
attempts to repress Miranda’s sexuality, using shame to reform her wantonness. His 
rebuke is an attempt to create a reformative sense of shame in her which would force her 
to deny her status as a sexual subject. However, the rebuke compels her to seek revenge 
for the prohibition, and she appeals to the sense of shame expected in her by others. 
Miranda does not repent her desire but punishes Francisco’s denial of her desire by 
crying out, “Help, help; a rape; help, help!” (95). Miranda’s cries draw the attention of 
the other priests who come to her rescue, yet it is a perceived sense of shame in 
Francisco, not Miranda, which lead the men to ultimately assume his guilt: “he bore with 
an humble, modest, blushing countenance all her accusations, which silent shame they 
mistook for evident signs of his guilt” (96). Instead of acting as an exterior force 
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controlling interior desires, shame becomes a weapon Miranda can wield against those 
who would shame her. As Miranda’s earlier recognition of shame signaled her sexual 
compulsion and the ability to provide herself sexual gratification, Miranda finds 
gratification in revenge predicated on Francisco’s shame as it leads to the presumption of 
his guilt. Once Francisco is sentenced, Miranda “cured of her love, was triumphing her in 
revenge, expecting and daily gaining new conquests” (97).  
Echoing Sylvia’s fate at the conclusion Love Letters, Miranda’s history has barely 
begun. Where Love Letters ends ambiguously, Miranda seems to play out the 
consequences of Sylvia’s fate, possessing an unnatural, even masculinized, predatory 
sexuality contrary the nature of female libertinism. Her desire shifts from sexual to 
monetary. When she learns of the arrival of Prince Tarquin, Miranda, intrigued by the 
local gossip, “fell in love with his very name” and “doted on the title, and had not cared 
whether the rest had been man or monkey” (98). Miranda plants herself in church “just 
over the prince, so that, if he would, he could not avoid looking full upon her. She had 
turned up her veil and all her face and shape appeared such, and so enchanting, […] and 
her beauty heightened with blushes” (99). Miranda’s use of the blush, like her earlier 
blushing, signals a desire but means something different for Tarquin than it does for 
Miranda. As John Gregory would later suggest in his A Father’s Legacy to his 
Daughters, a woman’s blush, as a signal of her modesty and guiltlessness, is her “most 
powerful charm” for which Nature “has forced us to love you.”133  The blush naturally 
attracts men to women, yet Gregory’s recognition of it as a charm seems to imply 
women’s calculation in deploying it, a calculation Miranda is all too ready to make.  
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Miranda, never averse to guerilla tactics, has exercised “good management and 
care,” in placing herself for Tarquin to see, and her display of her blush is no different. It 
is not, however, the only tool at her disposal. To woo Tarquin, Miranda puts on a show of 
modesty and shame designed to trap him. Once Miranda does catch Tarquin’s eye, she 
looks at him and “feign[s] so modest a shame, and cast[s] her eyes.” As she leaves the 
church, she passes him and “force[s] an innocent look, and a modest gratitude in her 
face.” Her approach seems a textbook example of Richard Allestree’s roughly 
contemporary description of the allure of feminine modesty:  
Yet when they have strain’d their Art to the highest pitch, an innocent 
Modesty, and native simplicity of Look, shall eclipse their Glaring 
Splendor, and triumph over their Artificial Handsomeness. On the other 
side, let a Woman be dek’d with all the embelishement of Art, nay, and 
care of Nature too; yet if boldness be to be read in her Face, it blots all the 
lines of beauty, is like a cloud over the Sun, intercepts the view of all that 
was otherwise Amiable, and renders it’s blackness the more observable, 
by being plac’d near somewhat that was apt to attract the eyes.134   
Allestree assumes innocent modesty is more alluring than a feigned modesty, but his use 
of “innocent” implies the naturalization of female modesty when contrasted with the 
artifice of female beauty, particularly in the assumption that false modesty can show 
through beauty. Miranda’s display of modesty, though, contradicts Allestree’s 
naturalization and, despite her reputation otherwise, she successfully entices Tarquin by 
assuming an air of modesty. Staves claims that “Behn’s representations of male desire for 
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courtesans in The Rover and in The Feign’d Courtizans remind her audiences that the 
idea that only female chastity can evoke male desire cannot be true. Behn’s male 
libertines typically insist that they prefer a mistress to a ‘dull wife.’” 135 Like Sylvia, 
though, Miranda is a more nuanced version of the women Behn stages, and her 
manipulations of modesty and shame illustrate that it is not only female chastity that 
attracts men, but the appearance of chastity. Tarquin, despite warnings about Miranda, 
succumbs to her seduction.
136
 Her modest displays so entice Tarquin that “he was wholly 
ravished and charmed” by her (99) and she  
had the art to wind herself about his heart, and make him unravel all his 
secrets, and then knew as well by feigned sighs and tears to make him 
disbelieve all. So that he had no faith but for her, and was wholly 
enchanted and bewitched by her. At last, […] he married this famous 
woman, possessed by so many great men and strangers before, while the 
world was pitying his shame and misfortunes. (99-100) 
Though he marries her, it is her ability to feign modesty and shame that attracts him to 
her. She has “strain’d [her] Art to its highest pitch” and come out on top. Furthermore, 
Miranda’s rejection of shame results not in her shame but Tarquin’s. Though he becomes 
the object of social shame, Miranda is not without her own social consequences. Miranda 
might now be a woman of quality, but her status does “not acquire ‘em [Tarquin and 
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Miranda] the world’s esteem; [the world] had an abhorrence for her former life, despised 
her, and for his espousing a woman so infamous, they despised him. So that though they 
admired, and gazed upon their equipage and glorious dress, they foresaw the ruin that 
attended it and paid her quality very little respect” (100).  
 Not only does Miranda possess a sexual desire which crosses the line between 
natural and unnatural, feminine and masculine, she develops a seemingly masculine 
financial desire once she becomes her sister Alcidiana’s guardian. Alcidiana, who has 
been wooed by many men who have all been turned away because of Miranda’s desire 
for her sister’s fortune, falls in love with a count and wants to marry him.  Miranda, 
having spent a much of Alcidiana’s fortune, plots to kill her sister to avoid discovery. She 
assigns the task to her page, Van Brune, who poisons Alcidiana, though she survives. 
After his arrest, he confesses and implicates Miranda. He is hanged and Miranda is forced 
to stand under the gibbet where he hangs with an “inscription in large letters upon her 
back and breast of the cause why, where she was to stand from ten in the morning to 
twelve” (105-06). Once Miranda is released, Alcidiana demands her inheritance be 
returned to her and Tarquin is placed under guard. Because he is unable to pay “bail or 
security […], he was obliged at his own expense to maintain officers in his house” (107). 
Miranda, anxious over her inability to produce the money to secure Tarquin’s bail, 
becomes genuinely distraught over Tarquin’s fate and “if ever she shed Tears which she 
did not dissemble, it was upon this Occasion” (107). Though she seems to understand the 
severity of their situation, her concern is less for Tarquin than it is for material loss: “But 
she, who was not now so in love with Tarquin, as she was with the Prince, nor so fond of 
the Man, as his Titles, and of Glory, foresaw the total Ruin of the last, if not prevented, 
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by avoiding the payment of this great Sum” (107). Because Alcidiana still stands between 
Miranda and her complete control of the fortune, Miranda’s inability to separate morality 
from necessity clouds her ability to see responsibility and she places the blame for his 
misfortune squarely on the shoulders of her sister, a misfortune she can only get out of 
“by the Death of Alcidiana: and therefore, […] she cried out She could not live, unless 
Alcidiana dy’d. This Alcidiana […] who has been the Author of my Shame” (107). 
Miranda’s villainization of her sister, though, does not complete a villainous 
characterization of Miranda.  
As Behn complicates the representation of Calista as innocent lover in Love 
Letters, she complicates the portrait of Alcidiana as innocent victim. Alcidiana has 
become the target of the ire of Van Brune’s family. Miranda receives letters from them 
threatening Alcidiana’s life. Instead of preventing Van Brune’s death, she attends his 
execution in full health, acquiring an “abundance of enemies on that account, because she 
might have saved him if she had pleased, but on the contrary she was a spectator, and in 
full health and vigour at his execution, and people were not so much concerned for her at 
this report as they would have been” (109). Of the opposition between Miranda and 
Alcidiana, Pearson argues that The Fair Jilt “emphasizes not the guilt of the attempted 
murderers and the innocence of the victim, but their essential goodness and her cruelty 
[…] The tale reveals the guilt of the innocent, the innocence of the guilty; and this 
problematizing of guilt and innocence works covertly on behalf of the guilty Miranda.” 
137
 While this “problematization” certainly shifts the balance to Miranda’s favor, I would 
place pressure on the claim that it emphasizes Miranda’s “essential goodness.” By calling 
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into question Alcidiana’s moral qualities, Behn blurs the distinctions between the 
persecuted innocent and the opportunistic whore.
 138
  
 Not only does Behn distort the virgin/whore dichotomy in The Fair Jilt as she 
does in Love Letters, she leaves Miranda with a similarly ambiguous ending, though one 
which does not leave Miranda as “free” as Sylvia’s ending does. When The Fair Jilt 
ends, Miranda and Tarquin go to Holland to live with Tarquin’s father.  She is penitent, 
praises Heaven “for having given her these afflictions, that have reclaimed her, and 
brought her to as perfect a state of happiness as this troublesome world can afford” (119). 
Pearson argues that the narrator, like many of Behn’s narrators, at once both moralizes 
and mocks moralizing.
139
 In the case of The Fair Jilt, Behn creates distance between 
herself and Miranda’s escape from punishment by attributing the knowledge that she is 
penitent to gossip: “the narrator offers a moral interpretation, but only tentatively, with 
none of the rich circumstantial detail found elsewhere in the novella, and she disclaims 
knowledge or responsibility for this part of her narrative, reporting only what ‘They 
say…’”140 Though I have argued that Miranda carries out the fate of Sylvia, both of 
whom are, at one point or another, free to make new conquests, Behn’s ambiguity and 
distance from the fate of Miranda emphasize not the outcome each woman faces but the 
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circumstances which create her subjectivity, her awareness of her sexuality, her ability to 
navigate a system aimed at limiting her sphere of action. As Pearson notes, Miranda’s 
fate lacks the “rich circumstantial detail” present in the rest of the novella and detracts 
from Miranda’s willing exile in Holland. Her fate is not important. Though Pearson 
argues that “Behn’s narrators are torn between their desire to endorse the moral system 
that confines them and their sympathy with the female characters who rebel against it,”141 
I argue that it is less a struggle to endorse the system than it is a struggle to navigate it, a 
struggle Behn shares with her female heroines. By distancing herself from Miranda’s 
fate, Behn gestures toward a system which expects the immoral woman to either be 
punished or to genuinely repent but also provides her heroine with the potential freedom 
within that system to govern herself.  
 
III.  The History of the Nun 
Where Sylvia and Miranda seemingly escape punishment for their deeds, The History 
of the Nun’s Isabella is executed for the murder of not one but two husbands. Isabella, 
sent to live in a convent at a young age after her mother’s death, falls in love with the 
handsome Henault. Isabella leaves the convent to marry Henault who, in a bid to win 
back his father’s esteem, joins the war against the Turks and is reportedly killed in battle. 
Isabella learns of her husband’s fate from Villenoys, a suitor she had rejected because of 
her vows. Villenoys woos her, and after an appropriate period of mourning, Isabella 
agrees to marry him. Though they live happily “for the space of five Years, and Time 
(and perpetual Obligations from Villenoys, who was the most indulgent and indearing 
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Man in the World) had almost worn out of her Heart the Thoughts of Henault,”142 their 
happiness is soon destroyed when Henault “returns” from the dead, having lived the last 
few years as a prisoner of war sold into slavery. Confused and frightened, Isabella 
decides, rather than risk her reputation in revealing her bigamy, that “the murder [of 
Henault is] the least evil” and smothers him in his sleep (183). Villenoys returns from his 
hunting trip to learn that Isabella’s first husband is dead and, “resolving to save Isabella's 
Honour, which was the only Misfortune to come,” he agrees to dump the body in the 
river (185). Isabella, “with thoughts all black and hellish” and “embolden'd by one 
wickedness,” stitches the sack covering Henault’s body to Villenoys’s coat and, when 
Villenoys tosses the body into the river, he is carried along with it and drowns (185, 186). 
Though she is initially above suspicion, Isabella is ultimately discovered and convicted of 
her crimes. The finality of Isabella’s execution contrasts with the ambiguous freedom 
rewarded to Sylvia and Miranda, women whose crimes are just as morally reprehensible 
as Isabella’s. Isabella’s execution seems particularly harsh when, of the three women, she 
is the only one who seems to express genuine guilt and remorse.
143
 If The Fair Jilt plays 
out the consequences of Love Letters through a woman who embodies desires 
inappropriate for women in her rejection of internal shame and her privilege of money 
over sexual desire, The History of the Nun offers an alternative to both, exploring what 
happens when a desiring woman cannot overcome the internalization of shame and guilt. 
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 The History of the Nun, Oroonoko and Other Writings, ed. Paul Salzman, (Oxford UP: 
Oxford, 1994), 179. All subsequent references are from this edition and cited 
parenthetically. 
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 Pearson claims that “Isabella’s capacity for guilt and her willingness to take full moral 
responsibility for her own actions are sings of her human subjectivity” (237). “The 
History of The History of the Nun,” (Re)Reading Aphra Behn: History, Theory, and 
Criticism, ed. Heidi Hutner (Charlottesville: UP of Virginia, 1993), 234-252.  
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As a child in the convent, Isabella achieves a great deal of notoriety both inside and 
outside the convent walls. She becomes “the dear loved favourite of the whole house” 
and “was a great source of entertainment to them all.” The women teach her whatever 
arts they excel in (dancing, singing, and foreign language among others) “all [which] 
joined to complete the mind and body of this beautiful young girl, who […] took to these 
virtues and excelled in all.” Her talent in these arts makes her fit to entertain “great men 
and ladies and strangers of any nation at the grate” and her grace and wit becomes well-
known. In fact, she is so fine a young devotee that she is capable not only of entertaining 
great people but she is capable of instilling a sense of shame in others: “ladies brought 
their children to shame ’em into good fashion and manners with looking on the lovely 
Isabella” (142).  
Isabella breaks the hearts of many potential suitors when she agrees to take on the life 
of a nun as a young woman and her conduct establishes her as a woman who has 
internalized the virtuous expectations of a woman in her position. Among Isabella’s 
potential suitors is her eventual second husband, the young Villenoys who, upon 
Isabella’s taking orders, becomes fevered with his love for her. Though she exchanges 
letters with Villenoys, her letters betray no moral ambiguity. Her letters “absolutely 
forbad him to love her; […] incited him to follow Glory, the Mistress that could noblest 
reward him. […S]he, for her part, had fixed her mind on Heaven, and no earthly thought 
should bring it down; but she should ever retain for him all sisterly respect” (145-146). 
Villenoys continues “writing daily to her, but received no more Answers from her, she 
already accusing her self of having done too much, for a Maid in her Circumstances” 
(146). Though the letters Philander and Sylvia write serve, as Ballaster claims, to incite 
76 
 
each other’s desire and illustrate Sylvia’s struggle with virtue and shame, Isabella’s act of 
writing attempts to assuage Villenoys’ desire and assert her virtuous control over herself.  
Isabella, however, is not immune to her own internal struggles with virtue and shame. 
After she has taken her orders, she learns that Villenoys’ is dying for her and his family 
pleads with her not to “enclose herself in a nunnery” (146). Isabella is moved to tears for 
Villenoys but insists that her tears only indicate her grief over her part in Villenoys’ 
anguish: “She believed it was for her sins of curiosity, and going beyond the walls of the 
monastery to wander after the Vanities of the foolish world” and “fears she might, by 
something in her looks, have enticed his heart.”  She confesses “when she found her heart 
to grow a little more than usually tender when she thought on him, she believed it a crime 
that ought to be checked by a virtue, such as she pretended to profess.”  She vows a 
“severe Penance on her body, for the mischiefs her eyes had done him” (147).   Isabella’s 
guilt over Villenoys’ languishment contrasts sharply with Sylvia’s anticipation of 
breaking the moral code:  “Oh Philander, I find I am fond of being undone” (Love 
Letters, 49). While the possibility of losing her virtue excites Sylvia, Isabella consistently 
recalls her virtue in order to control herself. In insisting on virtuous control, Isabella 
becomes not the “fair, cruel Nun” to whom Villenoys resolves to no longer write letters 
but the “most exemplary devout . . . giving such rare Examples to all the Nuns that were 
less Devout, that her Life was a Proverb, and a President that her name becomes 
synonymous with piety” (148).  
Though she successfully manages the Villenoys affair, Isabella struggles with desire 
for Henault, the brother of Katteriena, a fellow nun, but finds neither public nor private 
shame a sufficient control for her desires. Her attraction to Henault is so strong that she 
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becomes melancholy and finally confesses her love for Henault when Katteriena shows 
her a picture of her brother. Seeing his picture so changes her demeanor that Katteriena 
asks her why the image is “so offensive.”  Katteriena’s acknowledgement of the change 
in Isabella’s demeanor creates a strong sense of shame in Isabella which she is unable to 
control: “she was confounded with shame and the more she strove to hide it the more it 
disordered her, so that she (blushing extremely) hung down her head, sighed, and 
confessed all by her looks” (151).  Isabella’s blush, coupled with her downturned head, 
indicate a genuine sense of shame which is properly internalized and reflective of her 
piety.  
Though Isabella claims to be embarrassed by seeing the image of a man in her 
chambers, Katteriena recognizes the external signs of desire in Isabella’s face: “I believe 
that paleness and those blushes proceed from some other cause than the nicety of seeing 
the picture of a man in your chamber” (151). Katteriena recognizes not only Isabella’s 
desire for Henault but also the shame and guilt associated with improper desire, much 
like Sylvia’s “guilty blushing face” (Love Letters, 63). Katteriena attempts to console 
Isabella by confessing that she, too, was once in love. The account of her affair with 
Arnaldo, her father’s page does little to console Isabella; instead, it causes her to 
recognize that what she feels is, indeed, love, but that that love comes with shame: “No 
more, no more […] thou blow’st my flame by thy soft words, and mak’st me know my 
weakness and my shame. I love! I love! And feel those differing passions” (152). 
Katteriena’s tale increases Isabella’s desire, much like Sylvia’s and Philander’s letters 
serve to increase each other’s desire, and Isabella is forced to recognize the impropriety 
of that desire is in direct opposition to her piety. Her confession, though, not only 
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recognizes her desire’s impropriety but also emphasizes her internalization of shame. 
Because Isabella’s confinement prevents, at this point, public shame for her desire, her 
shame comes from within. Katteriena indicates no sense of shame from her passion for 
her lover, Arnaldo, until after Isabella asks her the remedy for love: “They say 
possession’s one, but that to me seems a riddle; absence, they say, another, and that was 
mine, for Arnaldo having by chance lost one of my billets, discovered the amour, and was 
sent to travel and myself forced into this monastery, where at last time convinced me I 
had loved below my quality, and that shamed me into holy orders” (153). Because 
Katteriena’s shame is a result of the class difference between her and Arnaldo, her tale 
cannot effectively reproduce shame in Isabella. Isabella’s shame must come from the 
internalization of codes of female morality, particularly because of her status as a pious 
example.  
Though the shame Isabella feels is internalized, there are very public consequences 
for her desire. Isabella tells Katteriena that Henault has “ruin[ed] all the glory I have 
achieved, even above my sex, for piety of life and the observation of all virtues” (153). 
Though Isabella’s love is not public knowledge, her insistence that her love has ruined 
her glory indicates the potential her desire has to ruin her reputation. She resolves to see 
him no more in order to cure herself of her love.  Her vow to never see him, however, 
cannot negate her desire. In fact, in forbidding herself, she only increases her desire: “the 
more she concealed her flame, the more violently it raged, which she strove in vain by 
prayers, and those recourses of solitude to lessen. All this did but augment the pain, and 
was oil to the fire, so that she now could hope that nothing but death would put an end to 
her griefs and her infamy” (154). Now that she has removed herself from Henault’s 
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presence, madness becomes a greater danger: “she found life could not long support 
itself, but would either reduce her to madness and so render her a hated object of scorn to 
the censuring world, or force her hand to commit a murder upon herself” (155). She 
discovers it is “impossible to cure her despair” and all “her fervent and continual prayers, 
her mortifications […], all her acts of devotion” not enough to “abate one spark of this 
shameful fever of love that was destroying her within” (155). Katteriena’s absence from 
Arnaldo may have been enough to shame her into her orders and away from loving a man 
beneath her social standing, but for Isabella, the increase in desire in the absence of her 
beloved illustrates that her desire cannot be controlled. 
Not only is her desire beyond her control, Isabella must struggle with the urge to 
fulfill that desire. Henault recognizes the natural qualities of Isabella’s desire when he 
tells Katteriena that “naturally […] maids are curious and vain and, however divine the 
mortal mind of the fair Isabella may be, it bears the tincture of mortal woman” (156). 
Henault implies that, although Isabella’s piety demands she repress her desire for him, 
her natural curiosity will win out in the end. Unbeknownst to Henault and Katteriena, 
Isabella’s curiosity has already won out and has driven her to seek out Henault. Isabella 
has been listening to their conversation from the stairway and learns that Henault loves 
her. In knowing her love is returned, Isabella is able to gain control over her seemingly 
out-of-control desire:  
[S]he knew she could dissemble her own passion and make him the first 
aggressor […]. This thought restores her so great a part of her peace of 
mind, that she resolved to see him, and to dissemble with Katteriena so far 
as to make her believe she had subdued that passion she was really 
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ashamed to own. She now, with her woman’s skill, begins to practise an 
art she never before understood and has recourse to cunning and resolves 
to seem to reassume her former repose. (157) 
Where Isabella’s absence from Henault caused her distress and prevented her from 
controlling her excessive passions in private, the knowledge that he returns her love gives 
her the ability to exhibit public control. Though she is “really ashamed” to confess she 
still loves, shame does not prevent her from loving. Though she has properly internalized 
female shame, her pious reputation does not mitigate her “woman’s skill.” Knowing her 
love is returned converts Isabella from a pious and virtuous nun to a desiring female, one 
who employs cunning and art in order to fulfill her desires. However, she is neither the 
Sylvia nor the Miranda model: unlike Philander, Henault “loved not debauch, as [men] 
usually did” (149). Isabella is never relentlessly pursued by the hyper-sexualized 
womanizer. Nor is she the hyper-sexualized, predatory Miranda, who uses feigned 
modesty and shame as a tool of seduction. Isabella’s piety is genuine; her aim is not 
seduction and conquest but requited love, and her sense of virtue provides her with the 
means of controlling and keeping her desire private. 
 With Isabella’s desire publicly under control, the burden of shame shifts from Isabella 
to Henault. Katteriena insists that, if Isabella faces public ridicule, Henault is responsible: 
“if you will be content with the friendship of this young lady and so behave yourself that 
we may find no longer the lover in the friend, we shall resume our former conversation 
and live with you as we ought; otherwise, your presence will continually banish her from 
the grate and, in time, make both her you love, and yourself, a town-discourse” (160). If 
Henault is unable to give up his love for Isabella, it is his love, not Isabella’s, which will 
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make her the center of town gossip. Not only will Henault bear the responsibility for 
making Isabella grist for the gossip mill, but he is also subject to the control of external 
shame. Katteriena threatens to expose him to their father, “a man of temper so very 
precise that should he believe his son should have a thought of love to a virgin vowed to 
Heaven, he would abandon him to shame and eternal poverty by disinheriting him of all 
he could” (160). Henault is unconcerned with the threat of fatherly and public shame. He 
“was not without his thoughts, but did not consider in the right place,” concerned, 
instead, with how “to establish himself as he was before with Isabella” (160, 161). He 
decides, much like Isabella decides, to “dissemble patience” in the hopes that he might 
get the chance to speak to Isabella himself and does not return to the convent for several 
days. Katteriena’s admonishment recognizes that men can be publicly shamed like 
women but that their shame comes from a different place. If Henault’s love for Isabella is 
discovered, it threatens not to “ruin [his] glory,” like it would Isabella’s, but his financial 
prospects. The threat of future financial ruin does nothing to abate his desire, though it 
should, and he and Isabella will begin their marriage with no money. He pretends, like 
Isabella, to harbor no more passion for her and bides his time.  
 Though both Isabella and Henault possess inappropriate desire and they both face the 
potential of shame, neither one’s desire is effectively controlled by the potential for 
shame.  In fact, when Henault finally returns to the convent to see Isabella, each is 
overwhelmed with emotion by being in the other’s presence:  
Who can guess the confusion of these two lovers, who wished, yet feared, 
to know each other’s thoughts? She trembling with a dismal apprehension 
that he loved no more; and he almost dying with fear that she should 
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upbraid him with his presumption, so that both being possessed with equal 
sentiments of love, fear, and shame, they both stood with dejected looks 
and hearts that heaved with stifled sighs. (162) 
Like Isabella’s earlier struggles with shame, the shame the lovers experience here is 
purely internal, motivated by the other’s presence and the fear that each other’s love will 
not be returned. When Isabella confesses to Henault that she does, indeed, love him, she 
tells him that her vow has made her “so miserable to have fallen thus low as to have 
confessed [her] shame” (163). Though her confession recognizes the relationship 
between her status as a nun and her shame, that she must confess it emphasizes its 
internal nature. To this point, Isabella has faced only internal shame rather than an 
application of shame from public exposure, a shame which Isabella might or might not 
feel. When Henault suggests that they run away, Isabella admits that she could “fall to so 
wretched a degree of infamy and reprobation” (164) by breaking her vows and running 
away with her lover but does not go so far as to identify the repercussions as “shame.” If 
shame is internal, the public consequences stop short of instilling shame though they 
certainly threaten to tarnish her reputation.  
 Though she has successfully negotiated her internalized shame this far, Isabella’s 
shame begins to straddle the boundary between internal and external becoming more 
difficult to control once Heanult returns from the dead. His mere presence is enough to 
invoke her very private and internal shame: “Shame and confusion filled her soul and she 
was not able to lift her eyes up to consider [his] face” (181). As Katteriena warned 
Henault in the convent, he has become the one responsible for bringing shame to Isabella: 
“She finds, by his return, she is not only exposed to all the shame imaginable, to all the 
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upbraiding on his part when he shall know she is married to another, but all the fury and 
rage of Villenoys, and the scorn of the town, who will looks on her as an adulteress” 
(181). Though she recognizes the public repercussions of having two husbands, her 
shame seems to be generated internally and directly related to Henault, not by the threat 
of social or public consequences.
144
 The narrator’s use of “shame” implies that social 
judgments are separate from internalized self-awareness. Though Isabella recognizes 
there are consequences outside her private sphere, the narrator’s very careful arrangement 
of the consequences highlights the internal nature of Isabella’s shame. She realizes not 
that she will face public shame but that she is “exposed to all the shame imaginable.” 
This sense of shame is not only generated in Isabella’s imagination but is directly 
connected to her awareness that Henault will upbraid her. While Henault’s upbraiding is 
obviously external, it all occurs, in this passage, within Isabella’s imagination. 
Furthermore, the potential “fury and rage of Villenoys” and the threat of being labeled an 
adulteress by the town are carefully and distinctly separated by the narrator from her 
imaginable shame and Henault’s upbraiding. Isabella’s awareness of the consequences of 
having two very alive husbands recognizes that shame can occur on multiple levels and 
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that, to some degree, shame requires an external agent. For Isabella, this external agent 
comes in the form of an imagined upbraiding by Henault.
145
  
 Isabella’s actions, however, are explained through a complicated discourse between 
her internal shame and the public consequence, a discourse which requires one to accept 
a certain standard of female behavior and which exposes the lack of options Isabella has. 
Once one accepts unquestioningly the standards of female morality, one’s sphere of 
action is instantly limited. Isabella’s only options once she has come to terms with 
Henault’s return are suicide or murder because she cannot, according to the model of the 
“good girl,” live with two husbands. Isabella’s contemplation of suicide results from the 
desire to “rid herself of the infamy that she saw must inevitably fall upon her.” Because 
Isabella has internalized the “good girl” identity, she is compelled by the threat of 
infamy. Though infamy is the result of shame,
146
 Isabella is not compelled by public 
expectations of female behavior but by her internalization of those expectations. If the 
threat of infamy were merely sufficient to control female behavior, Sylvia and Miranda 
would have had dramatically different stories. While Sylvia and Miranda consciously 
flout convention, Isabella struggles with the varying degrees of shame that she could 
experience, shame that she continually imagines befalling her but never actually does. 
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 Craft argues that Isabella realizes “that both men will unite in blaming her, making her 
the scapegoat for their mutual jealousies […] so, the narrator imples, she smothers 
Henault before he can smother her” (827). Though not explicit, Craft’s assertion that 
Isabella smothers Henault before he can smother her implies that Isabella acts to avoid 
the shame associated with her bigamy. “Reworking Male Models: Aphra Behn’s The 
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 The OED definition emphasizes its relationship to public identity: “Evil fame or 
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 Her decision to kill Henault provides no satisfying outcomes, either, and further limits 
her options to act.
147
 To kill him means “she should run mad,” but not to kill him means 
“she should be frantic with the shames and miseries that would befall her” of having two 
husbands (186). Once she smothers Henault, she does run mad, swooning “with the 
horror of the deed”(184), “fancies the phantom of her dead lord pursues her,” and 
imagines a knock at the door to be “officers of justice and that ten thousand tortures and 
wracks are fastening on her to make her confess the horrid murder” (185). Her guilt, a 
genuine emotion on her part, drives her nearly mad and, once she confesses to Villenoys 
what she has done, she realizes that she has no other course of action but to kill him, as 
well: “She imagined that could she live after a deed so black, Villenoys would be eternal 
reproaching her, if not with his tongue” (186). Isabella’s attempt to imagine life after 
Heanult’s murder illustrates an awareness of the intricate discourses of shame which 
circulate around her pious identity. As she plays out the possible outcomes in her 
imagination, she conflates the external and internal forces which create shame. She 
imagines the external reproaches from Villenoys’ tongue, as she similarly imagined 
Henault’s upbraiding, but she also imagines reproaches from Villenoys’ heart, which rely 
on an imagined loss of affection and an internal awareness of her own perceptions of 
Villenoys’ love. Isabella’s heightened internalization of shame fails to reform her, much 
like Francisco’s attempt to externally shame Miranda fails to reform her. Miranda 
responds by seeking revenge, but Isabella, having internalized “good girl” sensibilities, 
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sees no simple way out. The threat of being shamed by Villenoys leads Isabella to one 
conclusion: she must kill him, too: “emboldened by one wickedness, she was the readier 
for another, and another of such a nature has, in my opinion, far less excuse than the first” 
(186). Her shame and guilt originate from an internal perception of imagined external 
consequences, consequences she never actually faces. Isabella, a perfect example of 
piety, acts not on public perception of what a “good girl” is but based on an 
internalization of the “good girl” identity. This internalization of what it means to be a 
good girl has so severely limited Isabella’s options that the only way to deal with her 
incredible circumstances is to commit double-murder. 
 Once the two bodies are discovered and Isabella finally confesses to her crimes, the 
narrative, much like The Fair Jilt, hurries to its close and the narrator leaves her analysis 
of Isabella’s psychological state, an awareness of the heroine’s fragility which the 
narrator has previously taken great pains to portray. The narrator, instead, employs a 
similar “they say” model as the narrator does in The Fair Jilt’s closing and describes the 
difficulty the public has reconciling the “good girl” with the “murderess of two husbands 
(both beloved) in one night” (189): “The whole world stood amazed at this, who knew 
who like a holy and charitable life, and how dearly and well she had lived with her 
husbands” (190). In recounting the public reaction to Isabella’s crimes, Behn creates 
distance from the narrator and the public moral reaction.
148
 In asserting the public’s 
disbelief, the narrator implies that nothing less should be expected when one assumes 
such a pious identity, however genuine it might be. The narrator never implies that 
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Isabella’s piety is a rouse and even reinforces her extreme piety during her trial, 
imprisonment, and execution by seeming to erase all sense of shame from Isabella. 
Though “everyone bewailed her misfortune, […] she alone was the only person that was 
not afflicted for herself. She was tried and condemned to lose her head, which sentence 
she joyfully received and said Heaven and her judges were too merciful to her and that 
her sins had deserved much more” (190). It is in prison that Isabella seems the least 
confined and most happy: “she was always at prayers and very cheerful and easy” (190).  
 If the social rules that governed the behavior of the “good girl” are too severely 
limiting for Isabella in the exterior world, her imprisonment, however, brief, becomes 
liberation from that confinement.
149
 It is in confinement that Isabella can truly be the 
pious “good girl,” but this is precisely the problem which Behn criticizes: Isabella’s 
problem is one in which an internalized sense of shame limits her sphere of action. 
Unlike Sylvia and Miranda, Isabella cannot govern herself. Her internal shame holds her 
prisoner and her literal confinement in prison rewards that shame. Isabella “joyfully 
receive[s]” her sentence and finds happiness there. On the morning of her execution, she 
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her the more” (Nun 189). Isabella, compelled by her guilt, chooses confession and, 
indirectly, her confinement.  
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appears “very majestic and charming and [with] a face so surprising fair, where no 
languishment of fear appeared, but all cheerful as a bride” and gives a speech warning 
against breaking one’s vows. Her image before her execution emphasizes the fact that the 
only possible outcome as the “good girl” that she tries so hard to be is a tragic 
martyrdom. The beautiful Isabella who willingly kneels before the executioner dies for 
her piety but also because of it. The narrator’s matter-of-fact presentation of the public 
reaction to her crimes and death (the narrator closes with “she was generally lamented 
and honorably buried”) carry with it a critical angle. Isabella’s extreme piety prevents her 
from understanding the dire nature of her situation. Her pious nature and sense of shame 
prevent her from realizing the injustice of not only her execution but her limited choices, 
as well. Instead, her punishment becomes one of the few pleasures in her short, 
exemplary life. As a woman who has internalized the naturalization of the good girl, 
confinement becomes a better option for Isabella than anything she has been offered as 
her previous choices have always resulted in disaster. Confinement is the only sphere in 
which Isabella’s genuine piety can be appropriately maintained.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
 With The History of the Nun, Behn makes a bold assertion in period inundated with 
conduct manuals which argue that adherence to cultural norms are not only liberating for 
women but natural.
150
 In all three works, Behn calls attention to the constructedness of 
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 Marilyn L. Williamson’s response to issues of social controls, female sexuality, and 
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sexuality [but] the story is artistically flawed because Behn masks her favorite theme of 
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these naturalized norms and exposes the ways in which these expectations confine 
women. Her amatory fiction works out this problem only to understand that, in the end, 
there are no positive outcomes. When women outright reject these governing norms, 
chaos ensues. Sylvia and Miranda create disorder around them and Miranda, especially, 
seems to thrive on that disorder. Sylvia is exiled because of her inability to behave as a 
“good girl” and Miranda becomes increasingly lawless, framing a priest for rape and 
plotting her sister’s murder. When women internalize the norms, their sphere of action is 
so limited that ethical action, at least for the unconfined woman, becomes impossible.
151
  
 Though Sylvia, Miranda, and Isabella all constitute types of female behavior, and 
though these types differ dramatically from author to author, Behn deploys types much 
differently than male authors deploy types. Richardson’s Pamela, for example, presents 
three very different types of women in Pamela, Sally Godfrey, and Lady Davers, but all 
are incredibly simplified portraits of women who need not negotiate their desires and 
constructed normative female behavior as Richardson does not question the norm. When 
women behave poorly in Richardson, there are clear consequences for their actions. In 
Behn, however, what appears to be incomprehensible immoral action is the product of 
women trying to negotiate their own desires and the normative modes of female behavior. 
Though Sylvia, Miranda, and Isabella each embody a female type, their behavior exposes 
the inconsistencies and hypocrisies in a discourse which naturalizes female modesty and 
shame. Behn’s fiction blurs the lines between moral and immoral behavior, and in her 
                                                                                                                                                 
[…] Love-Letters and the moral themes that she had tried to graft onto them.” Raising 
Their Voices: British Women Writers, 1650-1750 (Detroit: Wayne State UP, 1990), 216.  
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 Hobby notes Behn’s “blunt assumption of female impotence in the public world of 
law-making” in The History of the Nun and Behn’s insistence that “through the actions of 
her heroines[…], female choices were few and nasty” (100).  
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narrator’s refusals to pass explicit judgment, Love Letters, The Fair Jilt, and The History 
of the Nun relentlessly deconstruct of what it means to be a whore and a good girl. 
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Chapter 2: 
Eliza Haywood and the Progress of the Amatory Heroine 
 
Of Eliza Hawyood’s fiction, Sophriana in Clara Reeve’s The Progress of 
Romance declares, “May her first writings be forgotten, and the last survive to do her 
honour!”152 Until recently, Sophriana’s decree about the fate of Haywood’s fiction has 
seemed true: her later “moral” fiction eclipsed her early amatory fiction until its recovery 
by feminist scholars in the last twenty years.
153
 Recent trends in Haywood studies have 
successfully revised our literary and biographical understanding of one of the eighteenth 
century’s most prolific writers.154 Paula Backscheider explores “The Story” of 
Haywood’s career—that her later fiction marks a not a genuine reform but a strategic 
reinvention of the author to take advantage of the literary market’s turn toward 
moralism—and accounts for Haywood’s role in the novel’s history by analyzing her 
formal experiments and their cultural significance.
155
 Patrick Spedding’s extensive 
bibliographic research has reshaped our knowledge of Haywood’s prolific publishing 
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history.
156
 The last decade has seen an incredible number of publications which treat 
Haywood extensively and from a variety of critical lenses.
157
 While Haywood studies has 
moved passed the all-too-simple representation of Haywood as two different authors, one 
the immoral authoress of Pope’s The Dunciad who stands with “two babes of love close 
clinging to her waist”158 and the other the penitent woman writer who “devoted the 
remainder of her life and labours to the service of virtue,”159 we have yet to explore fully 
the consequences of this antiquated portrait of Haywood’s later fiction.  In this chapter, I 
move from the premise set out in the introduction that Haywood’s early fiction resists 
neat placement into generic categories and, instead, tests the limits of eighteenth-century 
feminine ideals.  While Behn plays with these ideals in her fiction to expose the arbitrary 
nature of social and moral codes, her fiction cannot offer a successful model for the 
female sexual subject.  Her heroines and their adventures remain stuck in the space 
between the romance novel and the conduct manual.  Haywood’s fiction, however, offers 
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 Reeve, 125 
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a model of the heroine who has moved out of that space between genres and into a 
generic space that offers up new possibilities for the female sexual subject.  
Published within three years of each other, Haywood’s Lasselia, or the Self-
Abandoned (1723), Fantomina, or Love in a Maze, (1725) The City Jilt, or the Alderman 
Turn’d Beau (1726) provide three very different portraits of women navigating sexuality, 
internalized honor, and their public reputations; in these novels, Haywood struggles with 
the intellectual and historical development of the female sexual subject that occupies 
Behn’s fiction.  Deceptively formulaic, Haywood’s early fiction turns a critical eye 
towards women’s social position that necessitates a multifaceted approach.  On the one 
hand, Lasselia follows a very typical seduction narrative
160
 in which Haywood seemingly 
endorses the dominant belief that women who do not safeguard their virtue should be 
exiled from polite society, while The City Jilt offers a fantastical revision of the seduction 
narrative, providing a vicarious revenge tale that allows its heroine to participate in the 
complicated and highly gendered financial and contractual discourse of eighteenth-
century society.
161
  Fantomina, however, rejects both these narrative trends and, while 
not realistic in the way that Richardson’s Pamela purports to be, exposes the 
contradictions within the very real ideologies of internalized virtue and public reputation.  
While both Fantomina and Glicera see some degree of success in managing their desires 
and reputations, Lasselia fares little better than Behn’s heroines, echoing Isabella’s 
struggle to reconcile idealized virtue with sexual desire.  Haywood, unsatisfied with the 
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 Ballaster argues that the Behn’s, Haywood’s, and Manley’s fiction rely on French 
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French heroic romance” as “‘feminine’ modes of literary production and consumption” 
(Seductive Forms 42-43). 
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limitations Behn’s heroines face, provides new models of female subjectivity which 
break away from the helplessly doomed women of Love-Letters, The Fair Jilt, and The 
History of the Nun, and over the course of these three novellas, Haywood offers up more 
liberating, even if fantastical, models of the female sexual subject than those that Behn 
offers.
162
 
Though contemporary criticism has reshaped Haywood’s reputation, her 
adherence to or rejection of dominant ideological assumptions remains a subject of 
debate.  Feminist recoveries of Haywood from the 1980s to the late 1990s argue that 
Haywood’s fiction celebrates the unchecked pursuit of sexual pleasure.  Others, like 
Alexander Pettit, challenge this approach to her fiction, painting a much more 
conservative portrait of her fiction.
163
 Pettit cites Catherine Craft’s argument that 
Fantomina’s removal to a convent allows her to join “‘a community of women’” at the 
story’s close which serves as a “‘continuation of …female society’” (153).  Pettit, 
instead, argues that “claims [like Craft’s] neglect Haywood’s own sense of women’s 
responsibility, specifically her belief that ‘victimage’ is not the action of patriarchy 
against inert young women but the consequence of wrong-headedness among young 
women in the first place” (146).  He argues that Haywood recognizes “the necessity of 
‘rules’ and ‘customs’ as safeguards against feminine error” and that Haywood’s fictions 
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 While it is reasonable to argue that Helena in Behn’s The Rover is a liberating portrait 
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 “Our Fictions and Haywood’s Fictions,” Talking Forward, Talking Back: Critical 
Dialogues with the Enlightenment, eds. Kevin L. Cope and Rüdiger Ahrens, (New York: 
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advocate women conform to the expectations of polite society to avoid punishment.
164
 
While Pettit’s approach is much more nuanced than early recoverist arguments which 
argue for unilateral rejection of patriarchal systems in Haywood’s texts, I disagree with 
his conclusion that Haywood endorses what he calls a “tenacious gendered fatalism that 
Behn subverts: the belief that the sexual rebellion of the adolescent female ensures 
punishment rather than inviting correction or, more ambitiously, legitimation.”165 Pettit’s 
reading of Haywood’s amatory fiction as an endorsement of patriarchal morality treats 
her fiction as though it were a body of conventional seduction tales deployed uncritically.  
In adopting these modes, Haywood twists the limits of conventionality to criticize not the 
loss of reputation through amorous behavior but women’s mismanagement of 
reputations.  Rather than being forced to choose between willfully moderating their 
desires in accordance with social expectation or face drastic (even fatal) consequences, as 
Pettit argues, Haywood’s women must learn to moderate their public reputations while 
indulging their private desires.  While some women come to that realization earlier than 
others, the texts are less about the consequences of adolescent sexual rebellion than they 
are about how to manage the spheres of action available to them.
166
 The difference 
between Behn’s heroines and Haywood’s heroines is not in one author’s subversion and 
the other’s endorsement of “tenacious gendered fatalism.” If Behn calls attention to the 
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165
 Pettit, 165. 
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 In this regard, my argument bears some similarities to Ballaster’s claim that “[b]y 
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arbitrary nature of naturalized female characteristics, Haywood accepts these arbitrary 
constructions as an unavoidable condition of living in a patrilineal system but provides 
alternative narratives of women successfully managing private desire and public 
reputation by redefining female morality for themselves.   
 
     I. The Mechanics of Shame 
Before reading the various ways in which Haywood’s heroines redefine virtuous 
and moral behavior for themselves, I turn to two modern critical discussions of morality 
and subjectivity in Haywood’s work: Helen Thompson’s Ingenuous Subjection and 
Joseph Drury’s “Haywood’s Thinking Machines” to reframe the moral context in which 
Haywood’s heroines operate.  In her book, Thompson argues that the female subject in 
the domestic novel uses her position as an ingenuously subject wife to create political 
agency,
167
 and defines a woman’s “ingenuous practice [as] a person’s reconciliation of 
mechanical passion and virtuous will.”168 Thompson’s argument that a woman practices 
ingenuous subjection by reconciling mechanical passion and virtuous will is important as 
it reveals the complexities of eighteenth-century “feminism”: the compliant female 
subject “exposes the persistent arbitrariness of contractarian men’s conjugal authority.” It 
is in this exposure that Thompson locates “the eighteenth-century domestic novel’s 
‘feminism’: not in the necessity of feminine resistance, but in wives who might, 
sometimes despite their best efforts, extend Hobbes’s egalitarian person into domestic 
modernity.”169 Though Thompson discusses some of Behn’s and Haywood’s early 
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amatory fiction, her primary focus, particularly in part two of her study, is on post-
Richardsonian fiction: Haywood’s Miss Betsy Thoughtless and Charlotte Lennox’s The 
Female Quixote, yet her argument illustrates the significance of feminine survival in 
eighteenth-century fiction.  While the strategy does not produce the same type of female 
sexual subject of interest for my study, Thompson provides just one example of the ways 
in which women, when resistance is impossible, survive oppressive masculinist ideology. 
Drury’s essay builds on claims that Haywood’s characters behave mechanistically 
but not moralistically by arguing that “Haywood’s mechanical fiction also privileges the 
intensity and complexity of female consciousness produced in the material experiences of 
subjection over the straight arrow of masculine desire.”170 Based on this analysis of 
female consciousness, Drury identifies Haywood’s work as exemplary of a “dialectical 
development of the novel’s distinctive interior spaces, in which the heroine’s resisting 
consciousness challenges both the amoral determinism simulated by libertine machines 
and the amoral model of the novel with which they had become identified.”171 
Haywood’s women possess a heightened sense of passion, creating in them a heroic 
quality above and beyond that of men, and Drury argues that women’s (and men’s) 
mechanistic behavior in matters of love and lust is above moral condemnation.
172
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 Drury notes that Locke, in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, allowed for 
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 Together, Thompson’s and Drury’s arguments provide a context for Haywood’s 
fiction which presupposes, first, that her heroines are not limited by expectations of 
feminine virtue but are rather afforded a much broader sphere of action than Behn’s 
heroines, as I argued in the previous chapter.  Second, this context offers an alternative 
moral context for female sexual action.
173
 Building upon Thompson and Drury, then, I 
argue that Haywood’s amatory women work within the conventional expectations of 
female virtue not as a means of resistance but as a means of existence.  If these modes of 
behavior are unavoidable conditions of life in a male-dominated sphere, Haywood’s 
women move beyond deferential internalization and outright rejection to finding ways in 
which to navigate limitlessly an intrinsically limiting system.  In the transition from 
Lasselia to Fantomina to The City Jilt, Haywood progressively moves further away from 
the Behnian model of female sexual subjectivity which is inevitably shut down by the end 
of Behn’s novels.  Haywood’s heroines illustrate her progress toward a female subject 
who simultaneously recognizes her social position but understands how to navigate the 
limitations arbitrarily imposed upon that position without ruining her reputation.  In 
negotiating such a complicated system, Haywood’s women might behave outside our 
“moral sympathies” but they must also confront what it means to be virtuous and redefine 
“virtue” for themselves.   
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      II. Haywood’s Sexual Conservatism in Lasselia 
In Haywood’s 1724 novella Lasselia, or the Self-Abandoned, a young woman, 
orphaned and under the guardianship of her aunt, lives and is educated as “necessary to 
accomplish a Maid of Quality for Conversations such as were suitable to her Character” 
at the French court.
174
 While there, the King pursues her relentlessly; she resists but must 
face the persecution of her jealous aunt who happens to be the King’s lover.  In order to 
preserve her reputation in her aunt’s eyes, Lasselia exiles herself from the court to the 
countryside where she meets and quickly falls in love with the handsome but already 
married Monsieur de l’Amye.  Lasselia fights her attraction until she can resist no longer 
and she and de l’Amye run away together.  In a not-so-fortuitous coincidence, de 
l’Amye’s jilted lover, Madamoiselle Douxmourie, recognizes him and exposes the affair 
to his wife.  Madam de l’Amye and several friends, including the de Valiers who took the 
self-exiled Lasselia in, discover the two lovers in bed.  Madam de l’Amye offers her 
forgiveness in exchange for Lasselia’s promise that she “immediately retire into a 
Monastery” as insurance that Lasselia can wrong her no more.  The once virtuous, now 
fallen, Lasselia agrees, and in the convent, “was wean’d from those sensual Delights she 
had before too much indulg’d herself in, and became an Example of Piety even to those 
who never had swerv’d from it” (80).  Lasselia’s story concludes with punishment, 
gradual persuasion toward repentance, and re-elevation to the position of virtuous role 
model.  While her seduction, exposure, and punishment are conventional elements in a 
cautionary seduction tale, Lasselia does not serve up the conventional warnings to guard 
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one’s virtue by being diligently celibate; rather, Lasselia warns against carrying on an 
affair without actively managing one’s reputation.175  
 While at court, Lasselia displays an admirable sense of virtue, particularly in light 
of the economic advantages that come along with being the King’s mistress.  When the 
King makes clear his attraction to Lasselia, she resists, “maintain[ing] that cool Reserve, 
that Majesty of Modesty, which all Women, tho’ in the lowest Rank of Life, owe so 
much to themselves to wear even to the highest, when their Virtue is assaulted” (6-7).  
Her resistance is unsurprising, though, as the narrator has already categorized her 
pleasure in male company as “a cold Respect, or, at most, a bare liking of their 
Company.” She is so removed from romantic excesses that she never “imagine[d] she 
should ever be brought to entertain any other Notions of that uneasy Passion […] that it 
was all Chimera” (4-5).  Because Lasselia is unswayed by the prospect of love, she is 
able genuinely to resist the King.  He, however, is undeterred and imagines her virtue as 
nothing more than performance, as a pretense motivated by fear of retribution from her 
aunt: “he consider’d her Refusals only as the Result of what she might fear from the 
Indignation of her Aunt Madam de Montespan.” The King’s belief in the pretense of 
Lasselia’s virtue encourages him to try a new approach, bribery: “if she pleased, she had 
it in her power to be greater than the Person she at present had a Dependance on, and to 
make her an Offer of a very fine Castle near the River Sein for her residence.”  The King 
treats Lasselia’s virtue with a commodity to be bought and, even though she refuses, his 
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gentleman reminds her of “the Advantages there were in being Mistress to a King.” 
Despite what might have been an enticing offer for previous mistresses, Lasselia “was not 
to be moved, nor had Grandeur any Charms when it was to be purchas’d at a Rate so dear 
as loss of Virtue” (7).   No amount of money is worth the loss of Lasselia’s idealized 
virtue.   
Despite Lasselia’s unassailable conduct, her exchanges with the King do not go 
unnoticed and when her aunt receives word that he has been wooing her niece, Lasselia 
must face the fact that successfully preserving her private virtue does not preclude a 
tarnished reputation: “[Her aunt] upbraided the innocent Lasselia with Falshood and 
Ingratitude, and vow’d a Vengeance suitable to the Cause; and it was to no purpose for a 
long time, that the other endeavour’d to clear herself from these Aspersions.  Rage is 
always deaf” (8).  Lasselia’s protests of innocence fail to alleviate her aunt’s suspicions—
Madame de Montespan doubts the virtuous restraint Lasselia has so genuinely deployed.  
Lasselia’s virtue, intact, cannot sufficiently ward off her aunt’s suspicions.  In Lasselia’s 
confrontation between internalized virtue and public reputation, Haywood dramatizes the 
dilemma women face in a male-centric world, anticipating a directive issued by Rousseau 
regarding women’s virtuous conduct: 
Thus it is not enough that a wife should be faithful; her husband, along 
with his friends and neighbours, must believe in her fidelity; she must be 
modest, devoted, retiring; she should have the witness not only of a good 
conscience, but of a good reputation. In a word, if a father must love his 
children, he must be able to respect their mother. For these reasons it is not 
enough that the woman should be chaste, she must preserve her reputation 
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and her good name. From these principles there arises not only a moral 
difference between the sexes, but also a fresh motive for duty and 
propriety, which prescribes to women in particular the most scrupulous 
attention to their conduct, their manners, their behaviour.
176
 
I quote at length to illustrate the complexity of Rousseau’s definitions of virtue and 
reputation and of Lasselia’s dilemma.  Though Lasselia highly regards her virtue, she has 
failed to manage the damage that the King’s advances have done to her reputation.  It 
matters not that she has resisted his attempts to woo her; what matters now is that her 
aunt suspects her: “She could scare believe, there was a Possibility of for ever resisting 
the Address of a Monarch so every way agreeable, […] But if there were, the Attempt 
was enough” (9).  Even if one can resist the King’s advances, Madam de Montespan 
believes that, eventually, Lasselia will have to give in to a man as (economically) 
irresistible as the King, no matter how virtuous she is.   
 Knowing her presence to be a discomfort to her aunt, Lasselia offers a solution 
that seems at once to ease her aunt’s pain and to preserve her virtuous image.  She 
willingly removes herself from court—“the only thing I can do to contribute to your 
Peace, is, to take away the Cause; and by this voluntary Doom I pass on myself, may 
have the hope you will pardon a Crime which is involuntary”—and offers to retire to the 
country where her friend Madamoiselle de Valier lives (10).  Lasselia’s exile follows the 
pattern of Behn’s heroines—Sylvia, Miranda, and Isabella all face exile—but where 
Sylvia and Miranda are exiled by others as punishment, Isabella and Lasselia choose 
exile.  Isabella exiles herself in her chambers while Villenoys is away hunting, receiving 
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“no visits, not even the ladies’, so absolutely she devoted herself to her husband” (Nun 
179).  However, Isabella’s self-exile fails to preserve her from the return of a dead 
husband, and Lasselia’s self-exile is, similarly, risky.   
In choosing exile, Lasselia gives up any autonomy, effectively abandoning herself 
to the whims of a jealous woman, a practice which becomes a pattern in her exile.  
Jealous women abound in Lasselia, and the country suffers no shortage.  After arriving at 
the de Valier’s, Lasselia and her hosts are playing cards at Madam de l’Amye’s when 
Monsieur de l’Amye returns.  The card game stops and his wife greets him “as was 
suitable to his great Merit, and long Absence” (14).  De l’Amye greets the rest of the 
company, and as he greets Lasselia, “three Drops of Blood fell from his Nose, which 
stain’d a white Handkerchief she happen’d to have in her hand.” The entire company 
laughs when de Valier says that the incident could be an “Omen of a future Union 
between him and the young Lady” were it not for de l’Amye already being married.  His 
wife, however, finds little amusing in the joke: “the Jest was not so agreeable to 
Madamoiselle de l’Amye as they, perhaps imagined; being naturally pretty much 
addicted to Jealousy, these kinds of Discourses gave her an Uneasiness which she was 
not able to disguise” (14-15).  De Valier tries to put her at ease, but “the Poison had too 
great an Influence to be easily expell’d, she knew her husband to be of a Disposition 
amorous enough, and the charms of Lasselia were too prevailing not to make her think 
there was a Probability, that what had been spoke in Raillery, might one Day prove too 
true in Earnest” (15).  Though Lasselia’s virtue intervenes and she “resolv’d never to 
make a Visit there again,” she lacks an understanding of the codes which require she 
actively manage her desire (17).  Her most basic understanding of her honor is predicated 
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on what appears to be a one-way attraction.  Unaware that de l’Amye finds her attractive, 
she finds “the greatest Security she cou’d have for her Honour, was the Insensibility de 
l’Amye seem’d to have of her Charms” (20).  While an unrequited love would certainly 
preserve Lasselia from the loss of her honor, the honor which she believes safe is her 
virginity, not her reputation.  In fact, because she imagines he does not return her 
passions, she indulges in the fantasy that he does: she “believ’d she might, without a 
Crime, indulge herself in those Felicities which at present appear’d so innoncent” and 
“wou’d frequently sooth Imagination with a Belief he lov’d her: and in giving way to 
these destructive Tendernesses, Fancy took the Part of Passion, in Dreams, wou’d 
represent him to her, dissolving, melting in amorous Languishments—Nor were her 
sleeping Thoughts the only ones that err’d this way” (20).  The narrator acknowledges 
that “at her guarded hours, Honour was her chiefest Aim” and that she only allows herself 
to imagine de l’Amye returns her love because of her confidence in “continuing Mistress 
of her Resolution.” Yet, her obsession with the physical qualities of her desire and honor 
set her up to fall: “how little do they know the Hazard they run, who depend on their own 
Strength alone for Protection.  Love is a subtle, and a watchful Deceiver, and directs the 
Votary he designs to bless, to make the Attach when the Fair is least capable of 
Resistance” (21).  Lasselia’s reliance on her own virtue depends on two types of power: 
her own sense of emotional fortitude as an internalized manifestation of virtue and her 
ability to resist physically any sexual advances that de l’Amye might make as a socially-
mandated performative virtue.  However, in allowing herself to fantasize about giving her 
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physical body over to her passions, Lasselia relinquishes any performative power and is 
predisposed to catastrophe.
177
  
 Haywood collapses the internalized and performative qualities of virtue when a 
quaint “Country-Fellow” delivers a letter from de l’Amye to Lasselia.  Believing the 
country messenger to be genuine, Lasselia lets down her guard, and when she recognizes 
the handwriting as de l’Amye’s, she begins “blushing with Shame, then [becomes] pale 
with Fear” and opens the letter.  Her performance of desire intensifies as she reads de 
l’Amye’s passionate letter:  
alternate Joy and Shame, Surprize and Fear, and sometimes a Start of 
virtuous Pride and Indignation, sparkled in her Eyes—a thousand different 
Passions succeeded one another in their turns—all too fierce to be 
restrain’d, and too sudden to admit Disguise.  But, alas! she took no care 
to do it; she suspected not that she has a dangerous Observer in the Person 
who deliver’d her the Letter; nor ‘tis possible, in the Confusion she was in, 
remember’d any body was near her—Again she attempted to read over the 
Lines, but had not power; the strange Disorder of her fluttering Heart, 
depriving the Blood of its usual Circulation, all her Limbs forgot their 
Function, and she sunk fainting on the Bank.  (23) 
Reading de l’Amye’s letter, Lasselia experiences an overwhelming series of physical 
consequences.  She tries to control her body but her passions can neither be restrained nor 
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 In taking her as his mistress, Schofield argues, de l’Amye “reduce[s] Lasselia to a 
mere sexual object used to gratify his own appetites, but he has also taken away her 
feminine selfhood.” See “‘Descending Angels’: Salubrious Sluts and Pretty Prostitutes in 
Haywood’s Fiction” Fetter’d or Free: British Women Novelists, 1670-1815, (Athens, 
OH: Ohio UP, 1986), 196.   
106 
 
disguised.
178
 Faced with de l’Amye’s declaration, Lasselia loses not only her physical 
control but her emotional control, as well.  In collapsing the physical and the emotional, 
the performative and the internalized, Lasselia’s body becomes a site of unpremeditated 
performance.
179
 Lasselia assumes the messenger to be a genuine country messenger, not 
her beloved de l’Amye.  His disguise creates the illusion of privacy and Lasselia, 
assuming there is no threat in his presence, gives into the performative display of her 
passion, arousing de l’Amye’s desire for her.  He throws off his disguise and, through “a 
Thousand Liberties,” tells her how happy he is that she returns his attractions.  Her 
impulsivity gives de l’Amye the power to view and her sexuality is defined in terms of 
his desire.
180
  
In giving de l’Amye the power to view her and to define her sexuality in relation 
to his, Lasselia begins the process of relinquishing her autonomy to her lover, a process 
which will have dire consequences. Though the threat of public exposure prevents de 
l’Amye from “the utmost Gratification of his Wishes,” knowing that someone might 
interrupt them, he secures “a promise from her to make him fully blest the next 
Opportunity should offer” (24-25).  The narrator admits that Lasselia’s “early 
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 For Oakleaf, Lasselia’s blood indicates an overabundance of passion which she cannot 
control: “[c]irculating or hesitating, blood defies decorous containment, overwhelming 
the formerly self-possessed heroine’s ‘cool Reserve, [and] Majesty of Modesty,’” an 
instance in which “Lasselia’s blood betrays her” (491). 
179
 Emily Anderson argues that Haywood, in Fantomina and Miss Betsy Thoughtless, 
exposes the problems of unpremeditated actions: “[Fantomina’s] initial experiences 
demonstrate to her and to the reader the ways in which a woman’s impulsive behavior 
can undo her own performance” (4).  In losing control over the performance of desire, 
Lasselia gives up her ability to preserve her reputation: “The effective expression of 
Fantomina’s desire must occur within a carefully planned performance, as 
unpremeditated, spontaneous behavior does not anticipate or enable repetition” (4).In  
180
 Fantomina revises this moment when she invents her alias after her rape.  See 
Anderson, 4-5.   
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Condescension” might “be of so great Prejudice to her Character, that it will take off the 
Pity which is really due to the Misfortunes it brought her; and I have nothing to alledge in 
her Behalf but that the long Suppression of a Passion which she had always consider’d as 
fruitless was now on a sudden let loose, was beyond the Power of Reason to restrain” 
(25).  In excusing Lasselia’s submission to passion as a the result of a lengthy 
suppression of desire, Haywood not only condemns Lasselia’s suppression of desire but 
also her reliance on the strength of her virtue which has stripped her of her ability to 
manage not only her body but will her virtuous reputation.   
 In giving into unpremeditated performance, Lasselia becomes the self-abandoned 
woman of the novella’s title.  In fact, Haywood introduces a letter written by Lasselia to 
de l’Amye as one “writ by a Woman in Love to Madness, and one who had abandon’d all 
things for her Passion” (25).  Though she “reproach’d herself for suffering the Secret of 
her Soul to be so easily discover’d,” Lasselia cannot turn back: “she now had gone too far 
in the fatal Labyrinth of heedless Passion, to know how to retreat” (28).  The labyrinth 
evokes images of Lasselia as lost, confused, without guidance, surrendering herself to a 
passion that cares little for the consequences to reputation.  Wandering in such a labyrinth 
confuses Lasselia so much that, rather than taking care to preserve her reputation, she, 
instead, becomes wrongly fixated on preserving de l’Amye’s perception of her, a private 
image that will ultimately be powerless in preventing her public ruin: “She fear’d the 
easy Attainment of his Wishes, wou’d, in a little time make her seem cheap in his 
Esteem—and such an Apprehension was a Dagger to her Soul; she resovl’d, therefore, 
that in spite of the Promise she had made him, to delay the Performance of it and put him 
off till Time, Assiduity, and some further Proofs of his Sincerity, should render her 
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yielding more the Effect of Gratitude than Inclination” (28).  Lasselia’s fear of losing de 
l’Amye’s esteem replaces the threat of public shame as her motivation for delaying de 
l’Amye’s gratification.  
Lasselia’s conflation of her reputation with the identity created by de l’Amye of 
her leads to an inability to distinguish between two equally disastrous situations and 
creates the conditions under which her previously genuine virtuous resistance becomes 
merely a performance.  It is, however, a performance which Lasselia does not think 
through and, instead, becomes a performance which others inscribe onto her. After 
having lost the King’s favor in Lasselia’s absence, Madam de Montespan implores her 
niece to return to court in the hopes redeeming herself in the King’s eyes.  Lasselia 
appeals to the de Valiers for guidance in “avoid[ing] a Danger [posed by the King’s 
advances] which so imminently threaten’d her Virtue.” Unaware that Lasselia has already 
compromised her virtue in her affair with de l’Amye, the de Valiers “cou’d not enough 
extol her Bravery” to prefer “an innocent Obscurity” to the “guilty Greatness” of being 
the King’s mistress.  Though she asks for their assistance in preserving her from Madam 
de Montespan’s dangerous request, she only appears virtuous, possessing “a 
Consciousness of not meriting what they said” but “waving all that might remind her how 
really Criminal she was, while she appear’d all Virtue” (31).  Lasselia’s performance of 
virtue in front of the de Valiers is a very different performance from Fantomina’s, which 
I will discuss later.  Fantomina consciously creates multiple identities which allow her to 
maintain the appearance of virtue, even in the eyes of Beauplaisir with whom she has 
behaved less-than-virtuously.  Lasselia, on the other hand, does not consciously set out to 
create a virtuous image.   She simply fails to put into place any means of preserving her 
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reputation.   She allows others to create that reputation for her, and in allowing others to 
misinterpret her virtuous fortitude, she gives up all control of her reputation.  Lasselia 
allows the de Valiers to assume she plans to take refuge in a monastery.  The de Valiers 
help her disguise herself; Monsieur de Valier leads her away from their home and leaves 
her alone on the road.  Lasselia’s passive efforts at managing her sexuality and reputation 
constitute negligent mismanagement.  She attempts to preserve her reputation at the 
expense of the King’s desire, preventing his desire from prematurely ending her affair 
with de l’Amye, when she should be concerned with the potential the de l’Amye affair 
has to ruin her reputation.   
These misdirected efforts at preserving her reputation lead Lasselia to leave this 
management up to de l’Amye, a strategy which turns out to be yet another fatal mistake.  
After de Valier leaves Lasselia at the side of the road, Haywood quickly reveals how ill-
equipped Lasselia is to manage herself and her reputation.  For the first time, she appears 
to recognize the gravity of her situation, keeping away from the road, afraid that she 
might be recognized even though she’s disguised.  Eventually, she finds a shelter in the 
fields and hides through the night there.  When she ventures out the next day, she spies a 
man on horseback, and consumed with terror, she tries to run away but gets caught up in 
some twigs and falls.  The man, who turns out to be de l’Amye, sees the accident and 
comes to help her.  De l’Amye takes her to an inn where he believes she will be safe and 
Lasselia puts her trust in his ability to protect her.  Here, Haywood draws attention to the 
potential complications in trusting someone else, particularly a male lover, with 
safeguarding a woman’s reputation, blaming love for one’s naïve trust: “Love is ever 
credulous, and inspires so good an Opinion of the darling Object, that it is not without 
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great difficulty the Heart which harbours it, can be brought to believe any thing to the 
prejudice of what it wishes, even where there is the greatest ground for Suspicion” (42).  
For Haywood, one of love’s greatest consequences is that it clouds judgment, and by 
placing her faith in de l’Amye, Lasselia runs a great risk.  To trust him now leaves 
Lasselia vulnerable to losing all protection “when he [has] nothing more to obtain” in 
their relationship: “he might retain as little regard for the Person who so generously gave 
him all, as his Sex ordinarily do” and putting herself into his protection “was but a 
Chance […] she shou’d not fall into the most miserable Circumstance to which a fond 
believing Woman can possibly be subjected” (42).  Lasselia, though, happens to be lucky 
as de l’Amye turns out to be an exemplary man, certainly not representative of his sex at 
large, and taking greater care than she does to preserve her reputation: “To the End of his 
Life he lov’d her with an undiminsh’d Ardour—was strictly careful of her Reputation, 
while there was a Possibility of preserving it” (42).  Certainly, de l’Amye cannot be 
blamed for the loss of concern over her reputation after their liaison is exposed; his 
conduct to that point seems irreproachable.  Yet, Lasselia has rather naively handed over 
complete control of her reputation to one who has significantly less investment in 
preserving it than she does.   
While at the inn, Lasselia and de l’Amye have an unfortunate run-in with 
Madamoiselle Douxmourie while walking in the fields near the inn at night.  Douxmourie 
manages to conceal herself from the lovers.  Douxmourie recognizes de l’Amye and, 
being acquainted with his wife, as well, realizes that de l’Amye is carrying on an affair.  
Lasselia hides her face with a handkerchief, but she has, rather carelessly, “long ago 
thrown off her Pilgrim’s habit” (70).  Aware that they run the risk of being exposed, de 
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l’Amye and Lasselia spend the night deciding where to go.  Meanwhile, Madame de 
l’Amye arrives at the inn having been called there by Douxmourie, bringing the de 
Valiers with her, and they all wait outside the lovers’ room.  Believing it safest to leave 
before daybreak, de l’Amye opens the door to begin preparing for their departure and 
opens himself and Lasselia to ruin; even though their ruin is inevitable, he stays true to 
his promise to protect her:  
[H]e had Presence enough of Mind to run towards the Bed, where he 
thought to defend his dear Lasselia from their View, or die to expiate the 
Disgrace she must suffer for his sake; but that unfortunate Lady, hearing a 
Noise, had rais’d herself in her bed to see what ’twas: which when she did, 
Surprize, and Shame, and Fear, took away her Senses so far, as to deprive 
her of any Thought in what manner she shou’d conceal herself; and sat 
still, stupid and motionless, expos’d to every body in the Room.  (77) 
His commitment to preserving her honor, though, fails miserably, and when she sits up in 
bed, Lasselia becomes solely responsible for her exposure.  Lasselia has allowed love to 
cloud her judgment, has carelessly trusted her reputation to someone else, has thrown off 
her disguise, and as a result, sits exposed in the bed she shares with her lover.   
 While their affair’s exposure has consequences for them both, the nature of those 
consequences differs, revealing the very different contexts in which de l’Amye and 
Lasselia circulate.  In the confrontation between de l’Amye’s affair and the small social 
circle that has invaded the bedroom, de l’Amye chooses to return to reintegrate himself 
into polite soceity.  He quickly reconciles with his wife, resigned to giving up Lasselia 
only because he fears that Madam de Montespan will learn of their affair and prevent his 
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seeing Lasselia again.  This reconciliation implies that private action has little 
consequence for men’s public reputation.  In fact, though de l’Amye must give up 
Lasselia, his relationship with his wife benefits: “he was indebted to his Wife for almost 
every thing he was possess’d of; her Love, her Faithfulness to him, her Good-nature, her 
condescending Temper, making an Allowance for that one Foible, Jealously, won so far 
on his Gratitude” (79).  De l’Amye does owe all he owns to his wife.  A young widow, 
Madam de l’Amye was “vastly rich” and it is her wealth that “paid off the Mortgages of 
the Estate which was to descend to him” (67).  Without her money, de l’Amye would 
have been permanently exiled from polite society and only by reconciling with her can he 
maintain it.   
 Lasselia, however, faces permanent exclusion from polite society.  Taking 
advantage of a softening in Madam de l’Amye’s anger and jealousy in response to 
Lasselia’s visible anguish over the affair’s discovery, de Valier convinces Madam de 
l’Amye to handle the affair privately in order to avoid public exposure for them all.  She 
agrees but on the condition that Lasselia take refuge in a monastery.  Though Lasselia’s 
affair has been exposed, Madam de l’Amye’s desire to maintain social appearances 
seemingly secures Lasselia’s reputation at large.  Haywood provides no indication that 
Lasselia’s ruin extends any further than the confines of the bedroom.  In the convent, 
Lasselia is “wean’d from those sensual Delights, she had before too much indulg’d 
herself in” (80).  The consequence, then, becomes not only permanent exile from polite 
society but the removal of passion.  This consequence, though, is not the result of 
Lasselia’s indulgences in passionate excesses but the result of abandoning the concern for 
 113 
 
her reputation. Without a sound reputation, the eighteenth-century woman finds herself 
unable to survive in polite society. 
 
     III. The Strength of Fantomina’s Virtue 
In Lasselia, Haywood is forced to grapple with the generic limitations inherited 
from Behn. Though Behn allows her heroines to act outside bounds of moral 
expectations, she runs up against the generic constraints that demand her heroines pay the 
consequences. Lasselia, distinctly French both in generic convention and its setting, 
demands that the heroine pay a similar price for her bad behavior, though her bad 
behavior is not her failure to safeguard her chastity but rather her reputation.
181
 While 
Haywood resists the traditional confines of the genre, she finds herself the author and her 
heroine at an impasse that form alone cannot solve. In Fantomina, Haywood begins 
experimenting with genre, moving on from the Behnian and French models, testing the 
limits of something distinctly English both in place and in its social, rather than political, 
critique.
182
  
It is not until Fantomina’s “severely virtuous” and disapproving mother appears at 
the end of Eliza Haywood’s Fantomina, or Love in a Maze, that a female character 
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 Among the various forms of French romance, Ballaster identifies the chronique 
scandaleuse, or the scandal chronicle, which narrated the “sexual intrigues of the French 
aristocracy” with a “directly political and often incendiary purpose” (Seductive Forms 
56) and featuring power-hungry, lust-driven women like Madame de Montespan and 
aristocratic men as “duplicitous villain[s], seducing and corrupting innocent ladies” (60).  
182
 Ballaster, Seductive Forms 154. In “Women and the Rise of the Novel,” Ballaster 
notes that Behn, Manley, and Haywood often portrayed “Whig politicians [… and their] 
activities as dangerous seducers plotting to destroy female sexual innocence are 
equivalent to their design upon the English state.” In Fantomina, however, Haywood 
leaves behind this model in favor of a model in which the heroine obtains the “power of 
scripting in [her] own person” (203). Women and Literature in Britain, 1700-1800, ed. 
Vivien Jones (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000), 197-216. 
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expresses a genuine sense of shame.  When Fantomina begins to experience “those 
Pangs, which none in her Condition are exempt from,” her mother believes her daughter 
is dying and orders “her to be carried Home in a Chair.” A doctor comes to treat her and, 
recognizing her condition for what it is, reveals it to her mother: “Never was 
Astonishment and Horror greater than that which seiz’d the Soul of this afflicted Parent at 
these Words: She could not for a Time believe the Truth [but] was at length convinc’d of 
it --- All the Pity and Tenderness she had been for some Moment before possess’d of, 
now vanish’d, and were succeeded by an adequate Shame and Indignation.”183 In the 
throes of her daughter’s labor, Fantomina’s mother is overcome by a sense of shame one 
might expect from Fantomina, ruined by Beauplaisir and about to give birth as proof of 
their trysts.  Her mother’s discovery of her compromised virtue does not engage 
Fantomina’s shame, though, something she has taken great care to manage both publicly 
and privately.  She has performed shame in the initial stages of her romance with 
Beauplaisir, but her performance in effort to garner his constancy. At various moments in 
their romance, Fantomina performs shame, particularly in her initial seductions, but her 
performance does not necessarily mean disingenuousness.
184
 Fantomina’s performance 
also indicates a genuinely (and ingenuously) internalized belief in shame, modesty, and 
virtue which Fantomina must reconcile with her desiring self.  Through Fantomina’s 
performance, Haywood confirms not only the need to perform various female behavioral 
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 Eliza Haywood, Fantomina and Other Works, Eds. Alexader Pettit, Maragret Case 
Croskery, and Anne C. Patchias, (Peterborough, ON: Broadview, 2004), 69. All 
subsequent references are from this edition and cited parenthetically. 
184
 My argument is indebted to Anderson’s argument about Fantomina’s performance: 
“the moment of performance [is] a moment of expression—a chance for the woman to 
achieve an external representation of an internal emotion.  By using performance in this 
manner, Haywood links the actress and her role: the emotion she has planned to display is 
not feigned” (3).   
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tropes but also validates the ability to internalize specific behavioral expectations.  
Fantomina’s masquerading illustrates her deep understanding of the role of women in 
eighteenth-century society.  Her myriad disguises acknowledge that an eighteenth-
century lady of quality was not allowed the social freedom of the prostitute or the widow.   
That Fantomina dons these disguises allows her to act within expectations of her position 
as a “young lady of Distinguished birth” while simultaneously disregarding the arbitrary 
sexual standards of behavior (41).  While The History of the Nun’s Isabella internalizes 
notions of shame, modesty, and virtue to her peril, Fantomina’s internalization of the 
same modes of female behavior provide her with a space to act.
185
  
Fantomina’s disguises afford her a freedom that her “real” identity cannot 
provide, a premise parsed out in critical discourse of Haywood’s use of the 
masquerade,
186
 but because Fantomina has yet to shed patrilineal notions of the protective 
power of virtue, she is exposed to the dangers of male sexuality. As a “young lady of 
Distinguished birth,” she is aware that “her Quality and reputed Virtue kept him from 
using her with that Freedom she now expected he wou’d do” (42).  As the prostitute, 
however, she can express her desire and finds an outlet to express “a Turn of Wit, and a 
genteel Manner in her Raillery, beyond what is frequently to be found among those 
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 Anderson argues “[b]y repeating performances, the heroine creates the space to assert 
and reassert the fact of female desire.” Fantomina’s use of various disguises proves “the 
sincerity of her desire for Beauplaisir” (Anderson, 3-4). 
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 See Margaret Case Croskery, “Masquing Desire: The Politics of Passion in Eliza 
Hayood’s Fantomina,” The Passionate Fictions of Eliza Haywood: Essays on Her Life 
and Work, Eds.  Kirsten T.  Saxton and Rebecca P.  Bocchicchio, (Lexington: UP of 
Kentucky, 2000), 69-94; Catherine Craft-Fairchild, Masquerade and Gender: Disguise 
and Female Identity in Eighteenth-Century Fictions by Women, (University Park: 
Pennsylvania State UP, 1993); and Ballaster, Seductive Forms, 188.   
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Wretches.”187 Her virtue-less costume makes available to her “a vast deal of Pleasure in 
conversing with him in this free and unrestrain’d manner” (43).  Once she has lost the 
mask of virtue, Fantomina finds space to act more freely; however, despite her virtue-less 
guise, Fantomina still adheres to a definition of virtue instilled by patrilineal privilege.  
Though she is resolved to entertain Beauplaisir as a prostitute “whatever the 
Consequence” (45), she is entirely unprepared for the implications of her disguise.  Not 
only can she “neither assure herself [how to proceed or how to get away from him], nor 
whither or not in the last Extremity she wou’d do so” (45), she also, as naively as 
Lasselia does, believes in the power of virtue to preserve her: “She depended on the 
Strength of her Virtue, to bear her safe thro’ Tryals more dangerous than she 
apprehended this to be, and never having been address’d by him as Lady, --was resolv’d 
to receive his Devoirs as a Town Mistress” (44).  In fact, her fantasy of the liaison’s 
outcome further illustrates her naïveté in sexual relations.  She conceives of “a world of 
Satisfaction” available to her and “in observing the Surprise he would be in to find 
himself refused by a Woman, who he supposed granted her Favours without Exception” 
(44).  Her fantasy that she can successfully refuse the man she has seduced is entirely 
dependent on her internalization of a virtue expected to disrupt the libertine prerogative.  
Fantomina’s belief in the power of her virtue to preserve her from Beauplaisir’s illicit 
advances is reminiscent of advice in The Ladies Calling on modesty: “Such an authority 
there is in Vertu, that where ‘tis eminent, ‘tis apt to controll all loose desires, and he must 
not be only lustful but sacrilegious, that attempts to violate such a Sanctuary.”188 Because 
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 Croskery claims that Fantomina’s “masks reveal aspects of her own identity [which 
allow her to act] upon desires with which she could not otherwise identify” (86).   
188
 Ricahrd Allestree, The ladies calling in two parts, (Oxford, 1720), 20. 
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she has internalized a conduct manual definition of virtue, Fantomina believes in the 
power of her virtue to control not only her desires but Beauplaisir’s as well. 
Unfortunately, Fantomina must quickly learn that her virtue has little power, not 
only over Beauplaisier who rapes the naïve “prostitute”, but over her own identity: 
“Shock’d, however, at the Apprehension of really losing her Honour, she struggled all 
she could, and was just going to reveal [her identity] when the Thoughts of the Liberty he 
had taken with her, and those he still continued to prosecute, prevented her, with 
representing the Danger of being expos’d, and the whole Affair made a Theme for 
publick Ridicule” (46).  While her disguise gives her certain freedom in action,189 it limits 
her ability to preserve her sense of virtue by preventing her from confessing her true 
identity.  To admit her true identity would mean admitting a lack of virtue and exposing 
herself not only to the physical threat posed to her virtue by Beauplaisir but also to social 
ridicule.  She cannot invoke virtue to preserve herself from Beauplaisir’s attack.  The 
identity she has constructed to protect herself from the public ruin of her reputation 
simultaneously prevents her from invoking her virtuous reputation as a shield.  If she 
reveals her identity, she will preserve her virtue but lose her reputation.  The threat of 
public scorn results not in moderating her behavior but in the loss of her internalized 
virtue.
190
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 Ballaster, 188.   
190
 Though he does not parse out distinctions between private virtue and public shame, 
Jonathan Brody Kraminck reads this scene as a disparity between consent and action: “If 
the young lady attempts to postpone her consent by revealing the deception, she can do so 
only up to a point, since she has already committed acts (the conversation and the 
allowing of ‘liberties’) that would bring with them ‘the Danger of being exposed, and 
[having] the whole Affair made a Theme for publick Ridicule’” (463). “Locke, Haywood, 
and Consent,” ELH 72 (2005), 453-470. 
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The questions of honor in Fantomina play out the consequences of two ideals of 
feminine modesty.  First, Fantomina tests the power John Gregory ascribes to virginity in 
A Father’s Legacy to his Daughters.  On indelicate conversations: “Virgin purity is of 
that delicate nature, that it cannot hear certain things without contamination.  It is always 
in your power to avoid these.  No man, but a brute or a fool, will insult a woman with 
conversation which he sees gives her pain; nor will he dare to do it, if she resent the 
injury with a becoming spirit.—There is a dignity in conscious Virtue which is able to 
awe the most shameless and abandoned of men.”191 While on the one hand, Fantomina 
has already engaged in indelicate conversations which potentially contaminate her virtue, 
Gregory’s advice assumes something very dangerous which becomes Fantomina’s 
reality:
192
 that the power of her virginity is such that it should inspire a sense of awe in 
predatory male by simply naming it.  Fantomina invokes the power of her virginity to 
save her but it is not enough to deter Beauplaisir: “he little regarded, or if he had, would 
have been far from obliging him to desist” (46).  Her exterior appearance invalidates her 
internalized morality. 
The second ideal that Haywood tests is Rousseau’s distinction between a man’s 
reputation and a woman’s public reputation and private honor.  Though Lasselia failed to 
manage successfully private virtue and public reputation, Rousseau’s dinstinction 
between virtue and reputation is a distinction not entirely lost on Fantomina.  She has, 
after all, secured lodgings “to which she […] she might invite [Beauplaisir], without 
running any Risque, either of her Virtue or Reputation” (45).  However, Fantomina’s 
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assumption that she can simultaneously preserve her virtue and reputation is faulty; she 
cannot preserve both.  In order to preserve one, she must sacrifice the other.
193
 The 
problem Fantomina is forced to confront (and that Haywood makes explicit) in her 
liaison with Beauplaisir is not the ability of her virtue to protect her but the fact that her 
virtue is powerless if her reputation is ruined.  In choosing to maintain her disguise, 
Fantomina adheres to the privileged position Rousseau ascribes to reputation.  To expose 
her desires to Beauplaisir risks the infamy Rousseau cautions women against and would 
negate the internalized sense of virtue she would maintain in resisting Beauplaisir’s 
sexual advances.  Fantomina must choose which is more important to preserve: her virtue 
or her reputation.  In Fantomina’s decision to choose reputation over virtue, Haywood 
exposes the contradictions of the idealized virtuous woman, a contradiction that 
Rousseau, later, takes to be the natural condition of the eighteenth-century woman.   
Though her decision seemingly endorses Rousseau’s argument that appearing 
virtuous carries more weight than being virtuous, Fantomina must still reconcile the 
differences between the two and must come to terms with the fact that Beauplaisir 
interprets her public appearance as prostitute as more genuine than the virtue that 
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Fantomina claims she possesses in private, assuming that “by the Beginning of her 
Conduct […] that in the End she would be in Reality, the thing she so artfully had 
counterfeited” (48).  Beauplaisir assumes private or internalized ideas of honor are 
evident in self-representation and laughs at Fantomina’s professions of virtue.  Though 
she is distraught, he is perplexed by her emotional anguish.  Her displays of modesty, 
virtue, and shame are entirely irrelevant.  Beauplaisir’s inability to “imagine for what 
Reason a Woman, who, if she intended not to be a Mistress, had counterfeited the Part of 
one, and taken on so much Pains to engage him, should lament a Consequence which she 
could not expect, and till the last Test seem’d inclinable to grant” emphasizes the 
incompatibility between her internalized sense of virtue and her (presumed) public 
reputation (46-47).  Beauplaisir’s inability to recognize Fantomina as a complex 
emotional subject highlights the fact that interior virtue is inconsequential if the exterior 
portrays a lack of virtue.  Ultimately, virtue is so much more than moral conviction.  
Because the exterior belies the interior, Haywood’s definition of virtue is much more 
complicated than the conduct manual would have it. 
Yet, Fantomina has not yet overthrown conduct manual understandings of virtue, 
understandings which cannot preserve her honor in Haywood’s world.  When Beauplaisir 
offers money to assuage the slight, Fantomina still believes in the power of the 
persecuted heroine and, in a moment of emotional excess, invokes her private virtue 
rather than public reptuation: “he pulled out of his Pocket a Purse of Gold, entreating her 
to accept of that as an Earnest of what he intended to do for her […] This treatment made 
her quite forget the Part she had assum’d, and throwing it from her with an Air of 
Disdain, Is this a Reward […] for Condescentions, such as I have yielded to?—Can all 
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the Wealth you are possess’d of, make a Reparation for my Loss of Honour?” (47).  
Fantomina’s use of “Condescentions” belie her virtueless appearance and indicate a sense 
of moral superiority over Beauplaisir, despite having decided her public reputation is of 
more value than private virtue.  She depicts her actions as blameless and ascribes to 
Beauplaisir the responsibility for the repercussions which can only be repaired by his 
constancy, an approach which Glicera rejects in The City Jilt: “your Love alone can 
compensate for the Shame you have involved me in” (City Jilt 47).  However, despite her 
virtuous invocations, Beauplaisir is unmoved.  Her virtue cannot reform him.
194
 Instead 
of repenting the rape, Beauplaisir sees Fantomina’s virtuous tirade as an opportunity to 
find out her true identity.  Realizing that revealing too much would put her at public risk, 
she gives him a phony history, “resolving, if he boasted of this Affair, he should not have 
it in his Power to touch her Character” (48).   Fantomina seems to have recognized his 
inability to distinguish between her public reputation and private virtue and, once again, 
chooses to preserve her public reputation.
195
  
Fantomina’s initial encounter with Beauplaisir draws attention to the dangerous 
division between public reputation and private virtue present a woman in eighteenth-
century society.  Additionally, Beauplaisir’s belief that her behavior ensures the 
truthfulness of her prostitute disguise draws attention to another problem with 
representations of modesty, virtue, and shame as naturalized female characteristics.  
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While in Anti-Pamela, Haywood, as Ruth Bernard Yeazell claims, “effectively 
forclose[s] the possibility of female innocence” in Syrena’s ability to perform virtue,196 
Fantomina assumes that genuine innocence (or, more appropriately, naïveté) poses untold 
risks for the female subject.  In Fantomina, the performance of immodesty seems more 
dangerous than the performances of modesty Syrena Tricksey engages in.
197
 Her naïveté 
in donning the prostitute’s costume results in her rape, and yet it provides her the means 
of preserving her public reputation.  It also affords her the ability to manage Beauplaisir’s 
desires.  Not only does she maintain his constancy by creating for him the impression of 
inconstancy, she takes control of the way in which he accesses her body.  In Bath 
disguised as a country girl, she has “no Apprehensions of any Amorous Violence, but 
where she wish’d to find it” (52).  Though innocent, Fantomina learns how to manage not 
only her desire but also Beauplaisir’s from her unfortunate experience.    
Ultimately, Fantomina exposes the irony of managing one’s public reputation and 
the pinnacle of management occurs when Beauplaisir fails to recognize the virtuous 
unmasked lady as the same woman as the prostitute Fantomina, the Widow Bloomer, the 
country maid Celia, and Incognita: “’tis difficult to determine, if Beauplaisir, or the Lady, 
were most surpris’d at what they heard; he, that he should have been blinded so often by 
her Artifices; or she, that so young a Creature should have the skill to make use of them” 
(70).  Beauplaisir’s and the Lady’s shock comments on the fundamental irony of the 
eighteenth-century female subject: reputation, not virtue, is the result of pure 
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performance.  Because, as Rousseau argues, a woman’s honor depends on her reputation, 
a woman can disregard her private honor but remain publicly virtuous, and it is this 
bifurcation between virtue and reputation in Rousseau that enables Fantomina’s actions, 
which work in opposition to Rousseau’s directive.  Rousseau wants to prevent the loss of 
virtue and reputation, but in Fantomina, Haywood discovers the means of manipulating 
the rules of conduct.  Fantomina’s disguises create the space for her performances of 
sexual desire and maintain her ability to perform virtue outside her disguises. In this way, 
Fantomina reveals there is no referent, no signification for virtue, only the performance 
of.  No matter her private desires, a woman can be virtuous as long as her performance 
reinforces a reputation that reflects virtue.   
 
     IV. The City Jilt and Fantasies of Male (Dis)Possession and Female (Self-)Possession 
If Fantomina reveals the disjunction between virtue and reputation, exposing the 
performative qualities of virtue, The City Jilt dispenses with concerns over the conduct 
manual’s representations of honor, shame, and reputation in favor of examining the 
gendered qualities of these virtuous principles. Much like Fantomina, Glicera in 
Haywood’s 1726 novel The City Jilt becomes pregnant after an affair with Melladore.  
Unlike Fantomia, however, whose pregnancy marked the end of her story, Glicera’s story 
has only just begun.  Upon learning of her pregnancy, Melladore refuses to uphold his 
passionate promises of marriage on the grounds that it “was not consistent with his 
Circumstances to take a Wife without a Portion.”198 In succumbing to Melladore’s sexual 
advances, Glicera has given up any currency she might have had in the marriage market, 
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making herself a worthless commodity.  Glicera upbraids Melladore for rejecting her; he 
listens “with an Indifference the most stabbing to a Lover’s Soul” and casually takes his 
leave of her (9).  Recognizing the precarious position she is in, Glicera seeks revenge 
against Melladore and succeeds in stripping him of his land and money by seducing the 
alderman Grubgard who controls Melladore’s estate.  By chronicling not Glicera’s fall 
but Glicera’s manipulation of her sexual desirability to outwit both Melladore and the 
Grubgard, Haywood revises the traditional seduction plot and redefines the gendered 
terms of courtship and possession, giving her heroine the power to instill shame on her 
suitors.
199
 
Glicera’s progress from naïve lover to vengeful seductress parallels Syvlia’s 
progress in Behn’s Love-Letters from passive victim to calculating seductress and 
challenges the representation of women as naturally vindictive.  During their courtship, 
Glicera attempts to be the exemplary romantic heroine.
200
 She is “one of the most lovely 
and accomplished Women of the Age” and she and Melladore “with equal Ardour, equal 
Languishment did both long for the Minute which was to crown their Loves, —the 
impatient Youth with fierce and vigorous Wishes burn’d, the tender Maid in soft Desires 
dissolv’d” (2).  She fails to understand, however, that her worth is not determined by the 
strength of desire but by the desire returned to her.  Rather naively, she trusts in 
Melladore’s “Love and Constancy” when her father’s death leaves her with no money, 
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making her vulnerable to Melladore’s advances, as Syrena’s naivete in Anti-Pamela 
makes her vulnerable to Vardine’s advances which I will discuss in the following chapter.  
When Glicera reveals her pregnancy to Melladore, his refusal to marry her changes her 
disposition: “Mild, and gentle as he had ever found Glicera, he now perceived her Soul 
could change as well as his had done.  Never was Rage carried to a greater height than 
hers—she seem’d all Fury—and distracted with her Wrongs, beholding the cruel Author 
of them rather exulting than any way compassionating her Misery” (9).  And when she 
learns that Melladore has moved on, marrying Helena, an heiress whose father has 
recently died, leaving her with a large inheritance, Glicera is initially despondent but, as 
she recovers her health, “the Memory of her Wrongs, however, left her not a Moment, 
and by degrees settled so implacable a hatred in her Nature, not only to Melladore but to 
that whole undoing Sex, that she never rejoic’d so much as when she heard of the 
Misfortunes of any of them” (20).  Haywood explains Glicera’s transition in clear 
psychological terms as unrequited, excessive passion transforms itself into rage.  She has 
been so damaged that she cannot forget what Melladore has done, and though Haywood 
seems to naturalize this transition, her word choice implies that the change in Glicera’s 
nature is anything but natural; it is, rather, something “fixed in her heart” by Melladore 
and his rejection of her.
201
 Her shift to calculating seductress is marked by the emotional 
impact of Melladore’s rejection of her in favor of another woman and Haywood refuses 
to criticize Glicera when she is nothing more than the victim of a social system which 
refuses to provide for her.
202
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Haywood admits that some “may have shar’d the same fate with poor Glicera 
[…] abandoned by the Perfidy of an ungrateful Lover to Shame, to late Repentance, and 
never-ending Griefs” and that it is these women who understand Glicera’s pain, not the 
“happy Insensible, or the untempted Fair” who might say that Glicera’s “Misfortune was 
no more than what her Folly merited.” In this warning, Haywood specifically genders her 
audience and, then, establishes oppositional conditions dividing her audience by their 
internalized psychological response, a response inherently divided according to a 
woman’s experience or inexperience.  If Glicera’s tale is at all intended to be cautionary, 
it is a caution for these latter types, types Haywood envisions as specifically gendered 
and inexperienced, who should “take care to fortify their Minds with Virtue, or they will 
but vainly depend on the Force of their own Resolution to defend them from the same 
Fate [Glicera] mourn’d” (10).  This warning, Kirsten T. Saxton argues, advocates virtue 
not as a means to “heavenly reward or abstract principle, but is a necessary precaution in 
a world in which yielding to sexual desire may lead to a very concrete loss of social and 
economic standing.”203  The pressure she places on Haywood’s use of the word “virtue” 
draws attention to the tensions between resistance of conventional morality and existence 
within a repressive system.  Haywood’s insistence that women fortify their minds with 
virtue simultaneously acknowledges the importance of playing by conventional 
morality’s rules by advocating virtue and challenges the source of that virtue.  It is not 
about the sexual body but about strategic and intellectual management of conventional 
morality.   While Lasselia resists conventional morality, indulging in a torrid affair with 
de l’Amye and passively allowing others to manage her reputation for her, both 
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Fantomina and Glicera not only recognize that they are breaking the rules but work hard 
to maintain control over their self-representation.  However, Fantomina and Glicera are 
only capable of managing their self-representation successfully after they have 
experienced a threat to their virtue.  Lasselia’s inability adequately manage herself stems 
from the fact that she has yet to experience true social shame.  This is the condition of the 
eighteenth-century woman: one does not know how best to manage one’s reputation until 
that reputation has been threatened.  Lasselia’s reputation is never clearly in danger until 
the novel’s end. Her inexperience forces her to jeopardize her reputation but she never 
reaps the benefits of learning from her experience, leaving her vulnerable to shameful 
exposure.  
This warning redefines what it means to be virtuous by exposing the limitations of 
traditional conceptions of “virtue,” preserving oneself from sexual experience.  In fact, 
resolution is insufficient in preserving one from lecherous advances.  In Haywood’s 
construction, “virtue” is not necessarily attendant on the seemingly pure and inherently 
self-righteous but is a learned attribute.  Women who rely on a conventional construction 
of virtuous resolve find themselves, as Glicera does, vulnerable to men’s advances.  
When she learns that her wealthy father had “little more than would serve to defray the 
Expences of his Funeral, and pay the Debts he had contracted,” Glicera “frankly let 
[Melladore] know that her Love and Virtue were her only Dower” (5), and yet, love and 
virtue cannot preserve her from becoming the “Victim of his lawless Flame” (7).  Glicera 
banks on (pun intended) the virtues of her love, but because she deploys virtue within the 
accepted confines of conventional morality, she falls.  Through this fall, Haywood 
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criticizes not her naïve heroine but the morality which prevents her from successfully 
managing desire and social consequences.   
Once Glicera discovers she’s pregnant, the narrator comments that Glicera “had 
not the least hope of receiving any Reparation for the Shame to which [Melladore] had 
reduced her” (8).  Though we know Melladore has no intention of marrying Glicera, the 
use of “reparation” emphasizes Glicera’s financial predicament.  Haywood does not 
advocate marriage as a means of redeeming a woman from social scorn.  In fact, 
Melldore becomes the mouthpiece for criticizing the virtues of matrimony as a system 
which “obliges the Pair once united by those Tyes to wear a Show of Love” (17).  In her 
pleas for Melladore to uphold his promise to marry her, Glicera has yet to discard the 
expectations of conventional morality, and her naïveté begs the question, can there be 
sufficient reparation for shame?  In a letter to Melladore, Glicera acknowledges the 
gravity of her loss— “My Innocence, my Reputation, and my Peace of Mind by thee 
destroy’d, no more to be retrieved!” (12)—and like Behn’s Isabella, sees death as the 
only means of saving her from “Shame, Reproach, and never-ending Woe” (13).  
Recognizing the limitations within the system for her vengeance, Glicera leaves it to 
“Heaven [to] revenge my Wrongs, tho’ it denies the power to The Miserable Glicera” 
(15).   
But Glicera’s seduction and fall from conventional virtue are only the beginning 
of her history.  As Miranda in The Fair Jilt seemingly plays out the consequences of 
Sylvia’s exile at the close of Love Letters, Glicera’s desire for revenge revises 
Fantomina’s ending.  Glicera is unable to perceptively manage the predominant moral 
codes as Fantomina so astutely does, but where Fantomina insists that money cannot 
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repair the loss of her honor, only Beauplaisier’s constancy; Glicera insists on money as a 
means to assuage the wrongs committed against her.  Her ultimate accumulation of 
Melladore’s fortune provides her with a self-possession unavailable to Fantomina who, in 
order to prevent the loss of her reputation, must give in to her mother’s demand that she 
join a monastery.  While Haywood opposes public reputation and internalized virtue in 
Fantomina, she dispenses with concerns over either in The City Jilt in favor of exploring 
the recourses available to the persecuted heroine and revises the vengeful seductress 
Behn explores in both Love Letters and The Fair Jilt.   
Glicera’s desire for and attainment of revenge parallels Sylvia’s desire to ruin 
Philander, and yet Haywood does not acknowledge Glicera’s faults as Behn does.  In 
fact, when Melladore does marry, he marries Helena, who the narrator notes is “infinitely 
inferior to [Glicera] in every Perfection both of Mind and Body” (20).  I have argued that 
Behn complicates her representations of Calista as innocent lover in Love Letters and 
Alcidiana as innocent victim in The Fair Jilt through the first’s status as a married 
woman and the second’s silent complicity in the execution of an innocent man, blurring 
the lines between innocent lover and female victim.  Haywood, though, resists blurring 
the boundaries and, despite “despising the whole [male] Sex,” Glicera’s actions are less 
appalling than Sylvia’s, who takes advantage of Octavio’s genuine affection after 
Philander’s rejection.  Haywood’s narrative carefully avoids lengthy descriptions of 
Glicera’s conquests, reducing her efforts to nothing more than accepting “their Treats and 
Presents, smil’d on all, tho’ never so Old or Disagreeable; nor indeed was it a greater 
Task, to feign a Tenderness for the most Ugly than the Loveliest of Mankind—for all 
alike were hateful to her Thoughts” (21).  In these initial seductions, Haywood makes no 
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mention of the exchange of sexual favors for material goods and Glicera’s seduction of 
Grubgard similarly excludes actual intercourse (he’s too ridiculous for the narrator and 
Glicera to even think that sex is a possibility), a female fantasy that she can entertain 
financial proposals without sexually compromising herself.   
In fact, Grubgard’s ridiculous characterization belongs to a female fantasy that not 
only dispossesses men financially and sexually but also redefines courtship in favor of 
female agency, advancing the fantasy that women can control their reputation and their 
position as object.
204
 If courtship, for men, depends on the economic opportunities of a 
suitable marriage, it is essential that Glicera understand courtship as economic 
opportunity.  Though she knows that her affair with Melladore means she cannot “make 
her Fortune by Marriage” (20), she recognizes that her body still has value as a 
commodity, redefining the nature of courtship and sexuality.
205
  Glicera’s pursuit of 
financial revenge allows Haywood to tip the gendered discourse of shame and desire in 
women’s favor.   Certainly, the public consequences of Glicera’s affair with Melladore 
cannot be ignored, and Glicera does experience some shame: though “she had not the 
least hope,” she seeks “Reparation for the Shame to which he had reduced her” (8), feels 
the “sharpest Stings of late Repentance” (8), and pleads with Melladore to preserve her 
unborn child’s “helpless Innocence from Shame and Want” (11).  Haywood, however, 
seems to gloss over those social and emotional consequences.  After her miscarriage, 
Glicera abandons emotional excess in favor of accumulation, a shift which redefines 
Glicera’s desire as culturally masculine and opens up the possibility for her to dispossess 
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the male body represented by the estate.  Pursuing the dispossession of the landed male 
body, shame becomes a consequence for men who fail to control their desires.  Predatory 
male sexuality becomes worthy of punishment and Glicera does not have to wait long for 
Melladore feel the force of punishment.  His marriage to Helena results in his financial 
ruin, and in a gender reversal, she leaves Melladore penniless.  Not only is Hellena 
revealed to be illegitimate and, therefore, not entitled to her father’s fortune, she 
aggressively spends Melladore’s money.  He is forced to mortgage what he has left, and 
though the shame feared by men is financial, Melladore’s financial shame is a direct 
consequence of his mismanagement of his sexual desire, a behavior normally punished in 
sexually excessive women, not men.  In losing his fortune to Grubgard, Melladore finds 
himself in a position very similar to the one in which he left Glicera.   
Glicera’s seduction of Grubgard in an attempt to gain control of Melladore’s 
estate further subverts the gendered expectations of desire and allows for female 
appropriation of masculine rhetoric.  Possessing Melladore’s fortune makes Grubgard 
equally vulnerable, reducing him to play the part of the seduced woman to Glicera’s 
masculine financial desires.  In this feminized role, Grubgard is susceptible to the 
masculine rhetoric usually wielded as a tool of seduction.  Glicera does not seduce him 
rhetorically, leaving it to her friend Laphelia’s “Wit, and the power she had of deceiving 
handsomely” (43).  Glicera leaves Grubgard and Laphelia alone at cards and Grubgard 
reveals “the Troubles of his Mind” to her.  Laphelia tells him that “Fortune has put in 
your power the only Means to gain Glicera’s Favour” (44).  Of course, Laphelia means a 
literal fortune, but Grubgard finds her rhetoric confusing, accusing her of speaking in 
riddles.  Glicera’s plan necessitates a redefinition of courtship/love according to the male 
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sexual/financial ethos, and in his new subject position, Grubgard cannot understand the 
exact terms Laphelia offers.   
When he understands that the terms of possessing Glicera’s body are to give up 
possession of Melladore’s fortune, Grubgard’s resistance to the terms Laphelia offers 
reveal the privilege that money gives men in sexual matters.  When Laphelia threatens to 
tell Glicera confirm for Glicera that his love for her is phony, Grubgard defends his 
desire, claiming he has “spar’d no Expence either of Time or Money to convince her” of 
his desires.  According to Grubgard’s masculine sexual/financial ethos, he has made a 
considerable investment in Glicera’s body and expects returns on his investment in her 
acquiescence to his sexual desires. Laphelia objects to Grubgard’s insistence that 
financial investment secures his right to Glicera’s body, and she appropriates the 
masculine rhetoric of Exchange Alley to criticize the collapse of masculine desire and 
economic exchange. When Grubgard agrees to give up Melladore’s fortune to Glicera if 
she will “put [him] into possession of her Charms” (47),  Laphelia’s rhetoric becomes 
more aggressive: “For shame, Alderman, recant what you have said.—I wonder how you 
could forget yourself and her so far, as to be guilty of such a Thought: —you talk as if 
you were in Change Alley, where they chaffer one Transfer for another.—Is such a 
Woman as Glicera to be had by way of Bargain?” (48).  Though her proposal that he 
relinquish Melladore’s fortune depends on the male commodification of the female body, 
Laphelia shames him for expecting sex in exchange for Melladore’s fortune.  
 When Glicera does “win” possession of Melladore’s fortune, Grubgard tries to 
exact (physical) payment for the (financial) favor, but she refuses, equating masculine 
sexual practices as a breach of proper social conduct: “It is not in the power of the 
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loveliest, wittiest, and most engaging of all your Sex, to tempt me to an Act of Shame” 
(53).  The “Act of Shame” that Glicera refers to, however, is not the actual act of sexual 
intercourse but sacrificing her autonomy to masculine libertine desire.  While she has 
used her body to gain financial independence, she stops short of treating her body as 
object, refusing to endorse Grubgard’s expectations of sex in exchange for money. 
Instead, she manages the conditions under which her body operates on the market.
206
  In 
repossessing her body and rejecting Grubgard’s rhetoric, Glicera redefines both female 
and libertine ideals of virtue and shame in economic, rather than moral, terms.
207
 
 
     V.  Conclusion 
The progression of Hawyood’s heroines from the seduced innocent to the jilted 
woman seeking retribution signals a shift in the representation of the amatory heroine.  
These new models of female subjectivity break away from the Behnian model, a model, 
though critical of the ideological constraints imposed on the female subject, resigned to 
the gendered fatalism Pettit claims Behn subverts.  While Behn’s models exposes the 
inconsistencies inherent in the virtuous models championed by conduct manuals as 
liberating, her heroines find only chaos whether they internalize or outwardly reject the 
attributes of a “good” girl.  Punishment remains inevitable.   
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Lasselia, Fantomina, and The City Jilt illustrate Haywood’s attempt to critically 
manage not only a limiting system but also to narrate a female subject’s successful 
management of that system, the key to which is taking control of one’s reputation. 
Lasselia repeatedly gives up control of her reputation, allowing misinterpretations of her 
intentions and others to manage her image for her. Fantomina’s liaison with Beauplaisir 
reveals the problems with a system that requires a woman privilege her reputation over 
her virtue: reputation may be of the utmost concern, but a woman cannot understand how 
best to preserve her reputation until her virtue has been tested, often “lost” in the process. 
It isn’t until Fantomina loses her honor to Beauplaisir that she learns the how to preserve 
her reputation.   In disguising herself, Fantomina maintains the control that Lasselia 
resigns, carefully crafting self-representations that run counter to her true identity and 
provide her with the means of indulging her “wild and incoherent” desires (44).  As 
Incognita, she is able to give into Beauplaisir “without even a Shew of Reluctance” (65). 
In controlling her self-representation, Fantomina not only controls her reputation and her 
desire, but her lover’s desires, as well.  Her performances keep “him always raving, wild, 
impatient, longing, dying” (65). Though Fantomina’s initial encounter with Beauplaisir 
results in her rape, Haywood begins experimenting with the idea that women cannot 
successfully manage their reputation unless they have lost their virtue.  In The City Jilt, 
Haywood continues to experiment with this predicament that threatens the eighteenth-
century woman.  Like Fantomina, Glicera learns from the consequences of her naïveté, 
managing the commodification of her body to secure her financial independence.  Both 
Fantomina and Glicera succeed where Behn’s heroines and Lasselia fail by engaging 
performances of virtue, modesty, and shame.  Of the two, Glicera seems most successful.  
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And while she may not be the most favorable model of female subjectivity, Haywood 
continues to use this model to explore the limits of virtue, shame, and modesty. The next 
chapter analyzes Haywood’s criticism of these limits in light of the publication of Pamela 
and the beginning of Haywood’s “reformed” period. 
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Chapter 3: 
“A shame-faced simplicity”: The (Un)Production of Shame in Pamela, Shamela, and 
Anti-Pamela 
 
 
In 1755, Samuel Richardson published A Collection of the Moral and Instructive 
Sentiments maxims, cautions, and reflexions, contained in the histories of Pamela, 
Clarissa, and Sir Charles Grandison a “General Index both of Maxims and of References 
. . . offered to the public in one pocket volume.”208 This over 400 page “pocket volume” 
distills Richardson’s best known works into short maxims followed by references to 
volume and page number from the corresponding work where the reader may find the 
maxim in action. Intended to placate readers who “are desirous of fixing in their minds 
those maxims which deserve notice distinct from the story that first introduced them,” A 
Collection “separate[s] [the moral advice] from that chain of engaging incidents that will 
sometimes steal the most fixed attention from its pursuit of serious truth.”209 One 
particular gem from Pamela claims, “Shame is a fitter, and, generally, a more effectual 
punishment for a child, than beating.”210 A sentiment from Clarissa declares, “Would 
every one give Praise and Dispraise only where due, shame, if not principle, would mend 
the world.”211 Though both maxims direct readers to illustrative narrative moments, the 
maxims have a much larger significance for each novel and Richardson’s body of work 
than it might seem. Rather than encouraging virtue by virtuous example, these maxims 
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underscore the novels’ attempts make shame a key technology in controlling wayward 
thoughts and actions. Rather than setting Pamela apart as an exemplar of female virtue, 
Pamela makes apparent the paradoxical relationship between virtue and shame in 
constructing female morality. The result, then, is a novelistic discourse that, rather than 
exalting high standards of female virtue, highlights the fluidity within contemporary 
conceptions of female morality.  
To explore this discourse, I turn to two anti-Pamelist satires: Henry Fielding’s 
Shamela and Eliza Haywood’s Anti-Pamela. In what might be the most well-known 
scene from Henry Fielding’s Shamela, Shamela Andrews pinches her cheeks to fake a 
virginal blush at her and Squire Booby’s wedding supper, a move which encourages his 
sexual desire for her: “My husband was extreamly eager and impatient to have Supper 
removed.” 212 Haywood’s Syrena Tricksey similarly performs virtue, but her 
performances highlight the tenuous position of the eighteenth-century woman: virtuous 
performances are essential to survival but such performances are dependent on a 
woman’s sexual desire and experience and the knowledge that she must (shamefully) 
disavow that desire and experience. Shamela (and by implication, Pamela) is inherently 
without virtue, shame, or modesty. For Haywood, Syrena’s development into a woman of 
questionable morals depends on a complicated set of ideological expectations found in 
both Richardson and Fielding. Anti-Pamela, much like Haywood’s earlier amatory 
fiction, criticizes the masculinist fantasies of the inherently “good girl” in Pamela and of 
the maliciously manipulative whore in Shamela, and attempts to explain, but not 
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condone, Syrena’s performance of virtue.  Anti-Pamela recognizes in the relationship 
between Vardine and Syerna that the disingenuous woman Fielding satirizes is a product 
of the dangerous rhetoric of the Richardsonian virtuous woman. Second, Syrena’s 
subsequent sexual exploits posit disingenuous behavior as a means of survival, a means 
of preserving one’s self from public shame.  
In opposing Anti-Pamela to both Pamela and Shamela, this essay refocuses the 
ideological questions of the moral novel from a debate between Fielding and Richardson 
over class anxieties and feminine “vartue” to an opposition between Haywood and the 
gendered assumptions inherent in the Richardson-Fielding debate. While the traditional 
debate sustains itself bilaterally, this essay reconfigures the anti-Pamela debate as 
triangulated, replacing the Richardson-Fielding rivalry, one that possesses what Allen 
Michie identifies as a “tidy simplicity,” with the complicated triangulation of these 
writers with Haywood.
213
  Anti-Pamela, in conversation with both Pamela and Shamela, 
reveals as a construct what we have internalized as the established ideology of the novel: 
an ideology which manufactures an internalized sense of shame to mythologize and 
legitimate the sexually desirable yet seemingly desire-less “virtuous woman.”214 
                                                 
213
 Richardson and Fielding: The Dynamics of a Critical Rivalry, (Lewisburg: Bucknell 
U. Press, 1999), 13.  Michie looks not at the content of the rivalry but at the historical and 
critical construction of that rivalry. He points out that most literary histories identify 
either Richardson or Fielding as the root of the novel’s genealogy and that “sub-genres 
and narrative styles [tend to be lumped] into ‘opposing’ camps” based on the terms set up 
by these novelists (14).  
214
 Pamela represents an ideal of the “passionless” woman frequently advocated as a 
means of handling male sexuality. Astell’s monastic retirement and desire to cultivate 
women’s interior spirituality as opposed to their exterior beauty is one manifestation of 
this female type. Karen Harvey notes that the “the desiring, appetitive early-modern 
woman was replaced by her prudish, passive and constrained nineteenth-century 
successor. Affectionate but asexual, this less lusty woman was a counterpart to the newly 
domesticated middle-class woman in the home.” Reading Sex in the Eighteenth Century: 
 139 
 
Together, Richardson’s Pamela, Fielding’s Shamela, and Haywood’s Anti-Pamela 
illustrate a shift in constructions of female morality, privileging not virtue but shame. 
Pamela’s power comes not from her ability to preserve her “virtue” but from her ability 
to use her shame to instill shame in Mr. B: Richardson’s virtuous woman, a proper 
female subject, does feel the requisite shame that polices her knowledge/recognition of 
her own desires but she also creates shame in those around her. While Fielding and 
Haywood criticize from very different vantage points the Richardsonian virtuous woman, 
they both recognize the problems inherent in naturalizing feminine virtue, modesty, and 
shame. This essay suggests that Haywood’s Anti-Pamela exposes and disrupts the 
assumed boundaries between virtue and shame, rejecting both the shamed, sexually 
naïve, and inherently vulnerable heroine in Pamela
215
 and the shameless whore in 
Shamela to critique the ways in which Richardson and Fielding—whatever their 
ideological differences—endorse conventional gender roles. 
 
I. The Anti-Pamela Debate  
The anti-Pamela debate, as it has been understood by scholars focusing on the 
relationship between Richardson and Fielding, centers on anxieties over class boundaries 
and the ability, or threat, of the lower classes to transcend them. Ultimately, Shamela 
                                                                                                                                                 
Bodies and Gender in English Erotic Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2004), 4. See 
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reflects Fielding’s anxieties over class mobility.216 Parson Oliver articulates these 
anxieties when warning Tickletext that reading Pamela will have disastrous effects on 
servant-maids or heirs to estates:  “The Instruction which it conveys to Servant-Maids, is, 
I think, very plainly this, To look out for their Masters as sharp as they can. The 
Consequences of which will be, besides Neglect of their Business, and the using all 
manner of Means to come at Ornaments of their Persons, that if the Master is not a Fool, 
they will be debauched by him; and if he is a Fool, they will marry him. Neither of 
which, I apprehend, my good Friend, we desire should be the Case of our Sons” (239-40). 
While Parson Oliver couches his argument under the pretense that servant-maids could be 
debauched by an opportunistic master, the real threat is to the ideology of partilineal 
inheritance. Though Fielding criticizes the potential of Pamela to encourage the upward 
mobility of servant-maids, Richardson is not without his own class anxieties.
217
 
The private relationship between Pamela and Mr. B can have grave consequences, 
and part of the function of shame in Pamela is to preserve the public and private 
reputations of both servant and master. For Richardson, a proper sense of shame for 
servant classes can protect a master from damaging gossip in which his servants might 
engage. The need for masters to maintain appropriate distance from their servants is a 
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common theme in A Collection Moral and Instructive Sentiments “[b]ecause of the 
danger of gossip to the reputation of the master,”218 ironically echoing the kind of 
sentiments Fielding puts in the mouth of Parson Oliver. Mr. B’s discovery of Pamela 
scribbling away as the novel opens addresses the problem of the letter-writing servant by 
creating a sense of shame in Pamela for her writing. Pamela tells her parents that, when 
Mr. B discovers her, she is “scared out of [her] senses” and hides the letter. She defends 
herself saying, “I said, in my Fright, Pray your Honour, forgive me!—Only to my Father 
and Mother.” Mr. B assures her that he is not angry. Pamela’s reaction to being caught in 
the act by Mr. B illustrates two important components of shame: first, her shame, quite 
simply, stems from the fact that she has been caught by Mr. B in the middle of 
“something dishonouring,” writing letters which could expose her master to social scorn. 
Second, the fright she experiences comes from, as Elias argues, the “fear of social 
degradation or, more generally, of other people’s gestures of superiority.” In other words, 
her fear is an external signifier of her internal shame and the threat of public shame to 
which Mr. B might subject her. In this moment, Pamela has recognized herself as inferior 
to Mr. B. Pamela’s recognition of her inferiority is complicated as Richardson’s 
representation of his heroine establishes her as Mr. B’s moral superior, though she never 
feels superior. It is Pamela’s unfamiliarity with proper behavior of those above her 
station, however, that instill her shame. The posthumously published 1801 edition even 
includes a warning against this type of behavior: “though you ought to be wary what tales 
you send out of a family.” Of this warning, Dussinger emphasizes the shame that might 
befall Pamela’s master: “In light of the cautionary advice in the Collection of Moral and 
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Instructive Sentiments …we may assume that here Richardson sympathizes with Mr B.’s 
predicament of losing his reputation through his servant-girl’s reports.”219 Though 
Dussinger implies that the shame would fall on Mr. B if Pamela’s letters were too 
revealing, the scene instills a sense of shame in women who might disclose too much in 
personal communication. Richardson provides this maxim from Pamela about the 
keeping of private letters, advice that ironically seems to encourage deceit: “A prudent 
woman will not preserve such letters and papers, however innocent, as she cares not her 
husband should see, lest any doubts, in case of his survivorship, should arise from them 
of her conduct, when she is no more, and which the papers themselves do not fully 
explain.”220 While Mr. B’s reputation is at stake if Pamela’s letters were to fall into the 
wrong hands, Pamela’s letter writing makes her vulnerable to posthumous shame, in this 
case, a sense of shame that would cast doubt about her chastity. While Mr. B’s actions 
are clearly of a sexual nature, her letter writing implies that indiscrete sexual conduct and 
shame is much worse for Pamela than Mr. B’s actions.221  
But in addition to protecting the public reputation of the master from the servant 
girl’s transgression of public and private boundaries, shame has the power to transform 
men as well as women. Throughout the first volume of the novel, the virtuous Pamela is 
subject to the vulgar sexual advances of her master, but her virtuous resistance not only 
proves her moral worth (which justifies her economic worth as B.’s wife), it makes Mr. B 
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worthy of her. In fact, her resistance seems to exemplify a maxim from Grandison: “If 
women would discourage immodest men, shame, if not principle, would amend them.”222 
When Pamela discovers Mr. B had planned to deceive her into marriage and confronts 
him, he tells her, “when I further considered your unsullied virtue, and reflected upon the 
trials you had undergone, and the troubles I had involved you in, I was resolved, though I 
doubted not succeeding in this last part, to overcome myself.”223 Once married, he 
confesses, “if the riches of your mind, and your unblemished virtue, be set against my 
fortune . . . I shall not think I can possibly deserve you, till, after your sweet example, my 
future life shall become as nearly blameless as your’s.”224  Pamela’s virtuous behavior 
has made her deserving of marrying above her social class, but rather than simply 
providing her with the reward of marriage, her virtue transforms her husband. It 
encourages his self-reflection and leads to a desire to repent, or “overcome” himself, and 
results in his imitation of her virtue in constructing a “blameless” life. Pamela finds her 
reward not only in a marriage above her station but in shaming her husband into behaving 
in a way that compliments her virtue. 
 
II. Economic Autonomy and A Present for a Servant-Maid  
In one of the few articles that treats seriously both Fielding’s and Haywood’s 
satirical takes on Pamela, Scarlett Bowen frames her analysis of Anti-Pamela in the same 
class anxieties of Shamela. She argues that antipamelists “fear that behind [a servant-
girl’s] gentlewomanly façade lurks a laboring woman’s motives and desires for economic 
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enfranchisement” and that the depiction of the servant girl in both Anti-Pamela and 
Shamela is rooted in this fear of a servant girl’s monetary lust. 225 Though the servant girl 
had the power to manage her own money,
 Bowen argues that both Fielding’s and 
Haywood’s representations of the Pamela figure indicate an anxiety over her financial 
power.
226
  While Bowen convincingly argues that recognizing the ability of a servant-girl 
to improve her financial position demonstrates her power, Haywood’s Anti-Pamela must 
be understood on its own terms outside of the masculinist interests represented by the 
Richardsonian and Fielding paradigms and, therefore, must be read as more than parody. 
Instead of reflecting the class anxieties that Fielding criticizes in Shamela, Anti-Pamela 
recognizes the dangers of a novel like Pamela in perpetuating the notion of the virtuous 
and sexually-desirable but desireless heroine.  
Anti-Pamela, though, is not the only post-Richardson text in which Haywood 
attempts to expose the idealized “good” servant woman. Her 1743 A Present for a 
Servant-Maid presents the servant-maid with a set of rules intended to “mak[e] every 
Mistress of a Family perfectly contented, and every Servant-Maid both happy and 
beloved,” with the hope that the young woman who read the rules will “find it so much 
her Interest, as well as her Duty, to behave in a contrary Manner from what too many for 
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some Years have done.”227 Published only two years after Anti-Pamela, A Present for a 
Servant-Maid needs to be read in conjunction with the earlier text to garner a more 
nuanced picture of Haywood’s attitude toward the working-class woman. While some 
scholars have deemed Anti-Pamela a conservative text and the Haywood who publishes 
after Pamela a “reformed” writer, A Present for a Servant-Maid illustrates the 
continuation of Haywood’s long-standing concern with the exploitation of disadvantaged 
women.
228
 
Haywood’s warning in the preface focuses on the potential of the master to 
corrupt those in his employ: “It is not to be wondered at, that in an Age abounding with 
Luxury, and overrun with Pride, Servants should be in general so bad, that it is become 
one of our Calamities not to be able to live without them: Corruption, tho’ it begins at the 
Head, ceases not its Progress till it reaches the most inferior parts, and it is high Time to 
endeavor a Cure of so growing an Evil.”229 Haywood’s assertion that corruption begins at 
“the Head” refers both to the head or mind of the servant and to the master. A corrupt 
master breeds corrupt servants, and the servants’ corruption often becomes necessary for 
survival in a corrupt household. Haywood continues with a “caution against bad houses,” 
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noting that in a corrupt house “Temptations of all Kinds are offered her; she is not treated 
as a Servant but a Guest.”230 In fact, Haywood seems to describe conditions similar to 
those faced by Pamela following her mistress’s death: “her Country Habit is immediately 
stripp’d off, and a gay modish one put on in the Stead; and then the design’d Victim, 
willing or unwilling, is exposed to Sale to the first leud Supporter of her Mistress’s 
Grandeur that comes to the House: if she refuses the shameful Business for which she 
was hired, and prefers the Preservation of her Virtue to all the Promises can be made her, 
which way can she escape? She is immediately confined, close watched, threatened, and 
at last forced to Compliance.”231 Though Pamela is not sold into prostitution as the 
generic servant in Haywood’s hypothetical example is, she is flattered by Mr. B’s 
attentions and the gifts of her mistress’s clothes, pursued sexually and confined. She is 
forbidden contact with her parents and faces constant threats to her safety from Mr. B and 
Mrs. Jewkes. Richardson’s preoccupation with Pamela’s “preservation of her virtue,” 
however, stands in stark contrast to Haywood’s warning to this “innocent young 
creature.” Where Richardson “rewards” Pamela with marriage to her pursuer, Haywood 
sees a restricted set of negative outcomes. The persecuted servant girl becomes “by a 
continued Prostitution withered in her Bloom, she becomes despised, no longer affords 
any Advantage to the Wretch who betrayed her, and is turned out to Infamy and Beggary, 
perhaps with the most loathsome of all Diseases.”232 Though Haywood avoids using 
“shame” here, to be despised and subjected to infamy indicates the power of shame as a 
social consequence. Where Richardson argues that an experienced, worldly woman such 
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as Sally Godfrey is destined to fall and an object of shame, Haywood implies that the 
innocent, virtuous woman is even more vulnerable to victimization and the attendant 
social shame; the potential that her master has to corrupt her because of her innocence is 
a greater threat to her than explicit warnings that might corrupt her innocence.  
In addition to the warnings regarding potential corruption, Haywood provides 
encouragement to servants to resist their master’s sexual pursuit, and while it seems that 
Pamela follows this rule, Haywood predicts a quite different result. As a servant, a young 
woman is excessively available to her master and “obliged to attend him at any Hour, and 
at any Place he is pleased to call” her, but her resistance “is less to be expected in [her] 
Station, [her] persevering may, perhaps, in Time, oblige him to desist, and acknowledge 
[she has] more Reason than himself.”233 In her analysis of Haywood’s Anti-Pamela, 
Bowen claims that the servant woman’s ability to take advantage of a friendly job market 
leads to anxious representations of the money-grubbing servant woman: “Fielding and 
Haywood in presenting servant women whose only goal is to entice a wealthy man into 
marriage, seek to disavow and divert attention away from this economic self-
sufficiency.”234 Though Bowen does not make a direct connection, it would seem that 
this reading could be extended to A Present for a Servant-Maid. However, Haywood’s 
evident sympathies for persecuted or disadvantaged heroines in her earlier amatory 
fiction extend into her post-Richardsonian fiction, and these sympathies lie behind her 
advice in A Present for a Servant-Maid.
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Much of Haywood’s advice recognizes the autonomy available to a servant 
woman, an autonomy which seems unavailable to Pamela. Though Bowen claims the 
anti-Pamelists lacked tolerance for the servant woman’s “capacity for verbal defiance,” a 
tactic which Pamela deploys to her advantage,
236
 Haywood’s warnings against this 
approach recognize the precarious position of a servant in the household. In A Present for 
a Servant-Maid, Haywood warns against the “Giving pert or saucy Answers” to one’s 
mistress: because “to defend yourself by a saucy Reply, gives her a real Occasion of 
Offence, justifies her ill Humour, and perhaps will be more severely resented by her than 
the Fault she accused you of would be, had you been guilty of it.”237 She does, though, 
encourage servants, if their masters are persistent in their sexual pursuits, “to go directly 
out of his House: He will not insist on your forfeiting a Month’s Wages for his own Sake, 
for fear you should declare the Cause of your quitting his Service; and if he should be 
even so harden’d in Vice as to have no regard for his Character in this Point, it is much 
better you should lose a Month’s Wages, than continue a Moment longer in the Power of 
such a one.”238 That Haywood recommends servants relinquish their positions both 
denies the assumed rights a master has to their bodies as sexual property and provides 
servants with a viable means of self-management to resist exploitation.  Haywood finds 
space for the servant girl to use shame as a tool to preserve her own physical and 
economic autonomy. Her master’s “regard for his character,” or his fear of shame, gives 
                                                                                                                                                 
Fantomina, and Charlotte Lennox’s The Female Quixote.” The Modern Language 
Review. Oct. 1991. 86(4): 821-838.  Lasselia’s affair with de l’Amye, in Lasselia, is 
discovered by his wife. Mde. de l’Amye promises forgiveness if Lasselia promises to 
leave her husband alone. Lasselia agrees and joins a nunnery.  
236
 Bowen, 265. For a discussion of Pamela’s sauciness, see particularly pages 265-267. 
237
 Present, 21. 
238
 Present, 46. 
 149 
 
her the leverage to not only leave his employ but to retain her month’s wages. 
Furthermore, we must imagine that servant who leaves her master’s house will have to 
find employment elsewhere. If we read this as coded dissent against the established social 
order, as Haywood’s fiction has often been read, the recommendation to “go directly out 
of his House” assumes an economic agency of servants rather than reinforces the 
representation of the servant maid an economic threat. By preserving economic agency 
for the servant girl, Haywood draws attention to the economic implications of shame. 
Ironically, though, it is not female shame that holds economic possibilities for women but 
male shame, a trope also found in Anti-Pamela, which I will discuss in detail in the 
following section.  
 
III. Rereading Haywood and Fielding 
When Shamela pinches her cheeks to create a modest blush, Fielding calls 
attention satirically to an education in female modesty that teaches women to mask their 
sexual knowledge. Instead of satirizing the training of young girls in modesty, Haywood 
criticizes the cultivation of vanity in young girls and the “too great Indulgence and false 
Tenderness of their Parents.”239 While both novelists place blame on the ways in which 
women are educated, each calls attention to a different problem. Fielding distrusts this 
education in virtue, an education which simultaneously hypersexualizes both male and 
female and encourages the manipulative potential of women’s delaying male sexual 
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(Toronto: Broadview, 2004).  56-7. All subsequent references are from this edition and 
cited parenthetically. 
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gratification.
240
 Both the courtship manual and Pamela advocate a virtuous education 
which creates and encourages disingenuous behavior. Haywood also sees female 
education and training as problematic, but rather than criticizing Syrena’s ability to “fake 
it,” she suggests that Syrena’s early naïveté is responsible for her fall. Syrena’s 
inexperience, like Pamela’s, cannot protect her from Vardine’s advances, contrary to 
Gregory’s declaration that a woman’s “ingenuous modesty . . . is a natural protection 
from the familiarities of men.”241 By emphasizing the potential of the innocent woman to 
be victimized, Haywood questions Richardson’s paradigm of “virtue rewarded.” While 
Fielding focuses on the manipulative potential of the deceptively virtuous woman, 
Haywood exposes the sexual dangers faced by a virtuous woman. In doing so, she 
criticizes the ideology behind the Richardsonian heroine, and acknowledges the need for 
eighteenth-century women to be aware of the social repercussions of relying solely on 
virtue to preserve them from the dangers of predatory male sexuality. 
To be certain, Shamela and Anti-Pamela share some common satirical targets and 
comments. Both Shamela and Syrena Tricksey are masters of performing virtue. In the 
second letter of the novella, Shamela writes her mother about Booby’s flattering her by 
telling her she was a favorite of her mistress, his mother, as he takes her by the hand.  
Shamela writes that she “pretended to be shy,” as any good coquette would do. When he 
kisses her, she pretends to be angry (243). Similarly, Syrena’s ability to excel “the most 
experienc’d Actresses on the Stage” is not innate but carefully cultivated to “deceive and 
betray all those whom her Beauty should allure” (55). However, the construction of the 
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two women’s ability to perform virtue is dramatically different. Shamela begins with the 
heroine already in Booby’s service, her manipulations of him already in motion. She is 
already a fallen woman and her fall is a part of the consequences of her maternal 
education. Haywood’s Syrena, conversely, is in the process of her social/sexual 
education, an education predicated on the need to learn to perform virtue to preserve her 
from predatory desires.  
Haywood argues that pretending virtue is not, as Fielding’s characterization of 
Shamela suggests, “owing to [the] Inclinations [of women, but to the] too great 
Indulgence and false Tenderness of their Parents; who flattering themselves that by 
breeding them like Gentlewomen, and setting them forth to the utmost of their Abilities, 
and often beyond, they shall be able to make their Fortune by Marriage; give them Ideas 
no way to their Advantage” (56-7).  Haywood condemns the problematic marriage 
market which places emphasis on the monetary value of a good match and the false hope 
of class mobility for a servant-girl through marriage that Pamela depicts.  Instead of 
Fielding’s anxiety that Pamela scandalously encourages servant maids to see their 
Masters as suitable husbands, Haywood focuses her attention on the social values that 
perpetuate women’s self-interested, calculating self-representations as modest or 
“shamefaced”242  to critique a economically-obsessed marriage market that encourages 
women (virtuous women included) to recognize the marketability of their blushes 
manipulate the system through performances of virtue.  
Haywood’s criticism of the marital prospects of servant-girls only skims the 
surface of Anti-Pamela’s ideological concerns. Haywood probes the ideological precepts 
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which necessitate the performance of virtue. Vardine’s rape of Syrena teaches her that 
performing virtue is the only way in which she can maintain her public reputation. Her 
relationship with Vardine is the only time she exhibits a genuine manifestation of shame 
because her innocent assumptions lead to her victimization. Yet, despite her shame, 
Syrena quickly learns that, in order to preserve herself from further victimization, she 
must scheme in order to survive. That Syrena learns that manipulating lovers has 
monetary rewards allows Haywood to criticize the premise of Richardsonian 
moralizing—the virtuous woman (or the over-idealized servant girl) will triumph. In 
Haywood’s ideologically realistic world, the virtuous woman is simply a potential victim 
and her only means for survival, economically and morally, is to reject internalizing the 
masculinst fantasies of the desirable virgin and act the part—she learns to mime the 
performance of modesty.
243
  
Haywood’s descriptions of Syrena’s parentage and her childhood propensities to 
act the part of the virtuous woman suggest that her training sets her up to be victimized. 
Like Shamela, Syrena is born to a woman of questionable reputation. Yet, it is not her 
pretend virtue which is a problem but her training in vanity. Syrena is taught the “Art of 
Decoying” from her mother. She is a natural and is trained to “deceive and betray all 
those whom her Beauty should allure” (54).  Her victimization at the hands of Vardine 
shifts the focus of the criticism from her mother’s attempts to “train” her to the 
masculinst fantasy which requires these virtuous performances. For Syrena, the vain 
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pleasure she takes in Vardine’s addresses works to her disadvantage. She finds 
“something pleasingly amusing in being address’d by a Man that admires One . . . Thus 
Vanity, Self-Conceit and Avarice, tempt her to despise the Admonitions of her crafty 
Mother and make her resolve to act henceforward of herself” (71). Haywood criticizes 
the social training of girls by arguing that indulging of their vanities make them 
susceptible to inappropriate and dangerous sexual advances. By teaching her daughter to 
believe that she can make an economically advantageous marriage, Mrs. Tricksey fails to 
prepare her daughter for the realities of sexual politics.  
It is this pleasure in praise that sets Syrena up for her fall at Vardine’s hands. Mrs. 
Tricksey warns Syrena of the “Folly of Women who suffer themselves to be seduced by 
fine Speeches only” (73). Despite her mother’s warnings, though, Syrena finds herself 
susceptible, with grim consequences, to Vardine’s persuasions. During a prearranged 
meeting at St. James Park, they are caught in the rain. Appealing to her awareness of 
public virtue, he takes advantage of his good luck and convinces her to take shelter with 
him indoors: “Nothing could have happened more lucky for Vardine’s Designs: he had 
now a very plausible Pretense for persuading her to go into a Room.—It would be a piece 
of strange Affectation, said he, to chuse to stand in a Place where we are exposed to the 
View of every body; (and you see how many People pass) rather than go with a Man who 
loves you, and whose every Action you may command” (74). When they have been 
inside for some time drinking, Vardine asks Syrena if it is not preferable to be inside 
rather than “strolling the Streets, as if no House would have us” (74). Vardine’s appeals 
to shame recognize shame as a seemingly innocuous mechanism of social control, 
curtailing one’s bad public behaviors.   
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Syrena’s sense of shame, however, has not been fully assuaged. She confesses 
that being inside the tavern is better “if it were not for the Scandal.” Though Vardine 
assures her that there need not be any scandal “unless we tell it ourselves,” Syrena admits 
that she is “ashamed to know I am here myself” (74). Despite the security the privacy 
affords them, Syrena, nonetheless, still feels shame. In recognizing Syrena’s shame, 
Haywood recognizes that shame is not only a mechanism of social control but also a tool 
of masculine seduction. Syrena’s attempts to manage her public reputation result in real 
danger and genuine shame as opposed to self-consciously performed shame. Vardine’s 
advances become more and more forward, as he presents her with stockings he has 
already tried to give her before and grabs at her leg. Finally, Syrena can no longer resist 
as she begins “to grow confused, and she lost all Memory of the Place, or Danger she was 
in” and becomes Vardine’s victim (76). Though her  consent (or lack thereof) is not made 
explicit, Hawyood’s language indicates a woman under siege, and implies rape: Syrena is 
“bombarded . . . so fast with Speeches from Plays” that eventually “the Town [Syrena’s 
body] was wholly” Vardine’s (76). Despite her mastery of the “art of Decoying,” Syrena 
is not exempt from the experience of genuine shame and emotional anguish: “the 
momentary Rapture over, the Power of Reflection return’d to this unhappy ruin’d Girl—
she reproach’d him and herself;—she wept;—she exclaim’d” (76).244 Where Shamela (as 
the model of the “bad girl”) can counterfeit the outward signs of modesty, shame, and 
virtue despite her literal shamelessness, Syrena’s later ability to counterfeit modesty does 
not negate her capacity to feel genuine shame. Her shame, though, does not stem from 
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 Though “rapture” could indicate that Syrena took some pleasure in her sexual liaison 
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social consequences but from her loss of autonomy in Vardine’s very dangerous 
company. Syrena’s internalized notions of shame make her vulnerable to Vardine’s 
predatory advances. In capitulating to the threat of social shame, Syrena, shamefully, 
gives up control of her sexuality to Vardine’s desires.  
Syrena’s internalization of shame has predisposed her to victimization at 
Vardine’s hands and Haywood recognizes the very real threat the loss of her chastity 
poses to her reputation. Syrena must act fast to preserve her reputation and any autonomy 
left her over her body and desires. It is a danger which seems not to threaten Shamela. 
Though Mr. Booby ultimately catches Shamela in bed with Parson Williams, her 
punishment is relegated to a postscript in the final letter from Tickletext to Oliver. While 
Shamela has relentlessly pursued greed in her seduction of Booby, Syrena begins 
pursuing financial gain as a consequence of seduction. Realizing the precarious position 
she is in, decides that she must carefully manage her situation by seeking financial 
security: she “resolved to be entirely secret in the Matter, and get as much as she could 
from him, in recompence for what he had robb’d her of” (77). Her astute awareness of the 
need for compensation recognizes the economic needs of a woman in her position. 
Vardine gives her a metal box Syrena compliments (she, rather naively, believes it to be 
real gold) and he reluctantly gives her money when she manages to convince him that her 
mother is in debt and that, on her way to pay the debt, she was the victim of a pickpocket. 
Her success in financially manipulating him results in her thinking “it impossible for 
Mankind to refuse her any thing” (81). In seeking financial recompense, Syrena regains 
the autonomy over her body and desires and is able to maintain her independence, a 
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strategy which she uses to her advantage again.  By retaining her autonomy, Syrena 
preserves herself from the shame of both losing her reputation and living in poverty. 
It is precisely these lessons that allow Syrena to manage carefully her 
relationships in the Sir Thomas household, a situation which underscores not only the 
necessity of women’s performing virtue, modesty, and shame but also the importance of 
managing public reputations for both men and women. While in the service of an elderly 
gentlewoman, Syrena is pursued by both the woman’s son, Sir Thomas, and Sir Thomas’s 
son, Mr. L—. After fending off their advances, Syrena finally gives in to Mr. L—, only to 
frame him for rape in order to extort money from the family (a modus operandi gleaned 
from her “little conversation” with Vardine).  Her plot is unsuccessful, though, and she is 
found out when a letter from her mother detailing their scheme ends up in the hands of 
Sir Thomas and his family.  Though she is exposed to Sir Thomas’s family and loses any 
prospect of financial gain, she avoids public exposure because the family wants to spare 
Sir Thomas and Mr. L— the public embarrassment of having propositioned a servant girl.   
While her financial punishment allows Haywood a means of criticizing her 
deceptions, Syrena is not the only character subject to criticism.  This episode illustrates 
that the need to maintain the appearance of one’s virtue is not only a feminine interest but 
a masculine one as well.  Sir Thomas and his family need to maintain their public 
reputation, and as a result, they reinforce Syrena’s false construction of virtue.  By 
covering up their own breach of social boundaries, they help Syrena preserve her false 
reputation. But more than merely reinforcing a woman’s ability to deceive, Haywood 
uses Sir Thomas’ and Mr. L—‘s expectations of Syrena’s sexual availability to argue that 
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masculinist social norms not only encourage women to perform virtue but to get their 
revenge where they can take it:  
“How false and weak, therefore, is that Notion which some Men have, that 
they may do any thing with a Woman, but marry her, and that nothing but 
a Wife can make them unhappy; when, in reality, there are often more 
Disquiets, more Perplexities, more Dangers, attend the Prosecution of an 
unlawful Amour, than can be met with, even with the worst of Wives; for 
if a Woman cannot be sincere in a State where ‘tis her Interest to be so; 
what can be expected from her in one where ‘tis her Interest to deceive: 
Besides, the Artifices practiced to gain the Sex at first, gives them a kind 
of Pretense for Retaliation afterward; and Men frequently find to their 
Cost, they but too well know how to be even with them.” (118)  
Ultimately, Haywood criticizes with a heavier hand the dominant masculine sexual 
expectations that construct women as objects of male pleasure. The source of the problem 
for Haywood is not the feigned virtue of Shamela Andrews but male inconstancy and 
artifice used to encourage women to deceive when it is in their interest. Men, like 
women, engage in acts of deception, and the deceptions that women employ are simply 
retaliations against male behavior which seeks to take advantage of vulnerable women. 
Unlike Fielding, Haywood exposes a system which creates no guiltless players.   
Haywood pushes the relationship between male and female deceit one step further 
in the Syrena’s brief affair with Lord R—. Though Syrena’s manipulations of her first 
lover Vardine teach her to “Glory in the Power of her Beauty and Invention, [and think] it 
impossible for mankind to refuse her anything,” and while she manages to cut her losses 
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in the Sir Thomas debacle, her adventures with Lord R— are less successful. The 
morning after their tryst, Lord R—tries to give her ten Guineas, and Syrena, an expert at 
feigning virtue, pretends to be offended, claiming that she indulged her desires because of 
love. She does, however, take the money when Lord R—calls it a token of his affection, 
taking the time to point out that she is no prostitute. When she does not hear from Lord 
R—, Syrena takes it upon herself to visit his lodgings.  Lord R— is shocked to see her 
and upbraids her: “I never receive Visits from your Sex, unless those who are known to 
be nearly related to me” (149).  Syrena bursts into tears, rages, and eventually swoons, 
when Lord R—calls out her behavior for what it is.  Haywood defends his actions to her 
readers who might think a woman who has obliged a man as Syrena has deserves better 
treatment: “he had before met with Women of Syrena’s stamp;--that he had for some her 
Years of his Life devoted himself so much to Gallantry, that he was perfectly acquainted 
with every little Art put in Practice by those, whose Business it is to ensnare; and had 
more than once been imposed upon by the Pretense of a violent Affection, which make 
him not only presently discern but likewise abhor those studied and counterfeited 
Tendernesses” (150). While it may seem that Haywood justifies Lord R—’s behavior and 
condemns Syrena’s, she reaches the same judgment she did in the Sir Thomas affair: 
though it has been in Syrena’s interest to deceive, Haywood acknowledges that deception 
is in the interest of both parties. Lord R—pretends devotion to Syrena upon parting to 
minimize the cost of having lost interest in her. Unfortunately, for Syrena, she is unable 
to recognize that she is not the only one playing the game and that Lord R— is 
shameless. While the Sir Thomas affair maintains Syrena’s false virtue, the Lord R—
affair argues that social expectations create a feedback loop between manufactured virtue 
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and consumer skepticism. Together, Syrena’s affairs with Sir Thomas and Lord R— 
illustrate that men simultaneously expect women to be virtuous and suspect them of 
deception.  In turn, the Shamela construction of women as inherently dangerous and 
deceitful becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy in Haywood. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
Johnson’s definitions of “virtue” highlight the power that virtue has for Pamela 
and at the anxieties present in Fielding’s Shamela over the power virtue (or “virtue,” as it 
were) might lend a servant girl in seducing her master. However, Johnson’s definitions 
also break open the possibilities present in Haywood. Though Fielding sees the power of 
virtue as socially threatening, drawing a fine line between virtue and shame, Haywood 
understands virtue and shame as inseparable components of female morality. Anti-
Pamela, in this respect, divests virtue of its power, arguing that a woman cannot know 
virtue until she has experienced shame.  While it would be an oversimplification to insist 
that the popularity of Pamela accounts for this shift in the representation of female 
morality, it illustrates an important point about the novel’s relationship to the 
internalization of feminine shame. Pamela privileges virtue and domesticity but also 
discourses of shame. A virtuous woman is one whose sense of virtue naturally produces 
the mechanisms of shame (the evidence of one’s modesty) that Gregory and Allestree 
describe. This discourse of shame still depends on the virtuous woman but not the 
virtuous woman who leads by example. Rather, the Richardsonian virtuous woman 
performs a kind of shame which instills shame in the predatory men around her. This 
kind of virtuous woman does not emerge in isolation in Pamela but, rather, in a 
triangulated dialogue between Richardson, Fielding, and Haywood.  
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In both the novel and the conduct book, the insistence on natural female modesty 
and virtue creates tension between instinctive female behavior and the need to reinforce 
that instinct in women, as Yeazell notes: “the very existence of the literature testifies to 
the belief that the ‘instinct’ must be elaborately codified and endlessly discussed: 
woman’s ‘natural’ modesty must be strenuously cultivated, the argument goes, lest both 
sexes fall victim to her ‘natural’ lust.” 245  The insistence that women are naturally 
virtuous and modest draws attention to the fact that women must constantly manufacture 
a natural virtue and modesty in accordance with the social rules. This acceptance of the 
blush as genuine, unaffected, and evidence of the innate modesty of women both in the 
courtship manual and in Pamela becomes the basis of Fielding’s and Haywood’s 
critiques in as much as each of these anti-Pamelists recognizes the role that socialization 
plays in creating female modesty.  
Adding Haywood’s Anti-Pamela to the debate over the virtuous woman enables 
us to understand how both Fielding and Richardson reinforce problematic notions of 
gender. Fielding and Haywood recognize Shamela’s and Syrena’s ability to perform the 
virtuous woman, but the two authors attribute the performance to different circumstances 
and come to dramatically different judgments about the female characters. Each woman 
has mastered the performance of virtue, yet Haywood provides a set of circumstances 
which sympathetically illustrates a woman’s need to feign virtue and modesty. Fielding, 
conversely, portrays a naturally deceitful woman already steeped in the culture of 
performance. While each is an apt criticism of the problems in Pamela, these 
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representations can still be understood in gendered terms. While Shamela presents the 
typical “bad girl” who can counterfeit external signs of shame and modesty despite being 
(literally) shameless, Haywood’s Anti-Pamela argues that the ability to feign modesty 
and shame does not negate a woman’s ability to feel shame but constitutes an essential 
skill for the eighteenth-century woman’s survival in a harsh world. In Haywood’s world, 
this survival tactic is not something a woman naturally possesses but is something she 
learns by exposure and not necessarily or solely through her maternal education. Though 
Pamela is so innocent that her parents must warn her that B’s advances are inappropriate 
and Shamela is already so corrupt that it can only be part of her natural predisposition, 
Syrena’s performance is necessary and its necessity is learned as a result of her 
vulnerability.  
Rather than ushering in a domestic novel featuring a virtuous woman as its 
heroine, these three novels recognize, in varying degrees, the instability of virtue and 
modesty in the ongoing construction of femininity. For Richardson, shame, 
paradoxically, is both a natural capacity and an internalized ideology aimed at 
desexualizing the sexually desirable, but desire-less, heroine. The Richardsonian virtuous 
woman maintains her virtue despite incessant assaults upon it and can provoke shame in 
those around her. Where Richardson emphasizes shame as a natural and internalized 
characteristic, in Fielding and Haywood, the performance of shame in and of itself 
suggests a self-consciousness that already indicates an interestedness in appearing 
virtuous. Both Fielding and Haywood go to great lengths to point out that shame and 
virtue are performative and not innate feminine characteristics. For Fielding, the 
Richardsonian virtuous woman becomes a disingenuous woman without shame invested 
162 
 
in profiting off of her virtuous reputation. In Haywood, however, the performance of 
shame is an invaluable talent possessed by both men and women as a means of 
preventing public humiliation and maintaining one’s reputation. 
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Chapter 4: 
Shame and the Moral Novel in Charlotte Lennox’s The Female Quixote 
 
“[W]hat a Set of Wretches [ . . .] have we—to make the Behn’s, the Manley’s, 
and the Heywood’s, look white.  From the same injured, disgraced, profaned Sex, 
let us be favoured with the Antidote to these Womens Poison.”246 
 -Samuel Richardson, Letter to Sarah Chapone, 6 December 1750 
 
When Arabella, the avid consumer of romance novels in Charlotte Lennox’s The 
Female Quixote, believes she is about to be the victim of an abduction, she jumps into the 
Thames in an effort to save herself. She is rescued but falls very ill, confined to bed while 
suffering from a fever. Her physical illness subsides, but she still suffers from “a violent 
Distemper” from which “there seem’d very little Probability of her Recovery.”247 In an 
effort to cure her from her illness, a “Pious and Learned Doctor” (366)248 recommends 
that she read “an admirable writer of our own time, [who] has found the way to convey 
the most solid instructions, the noblest sentiments, and the most exalted piety, in the 
pleasing dress of a novel” (377).249 Though she does not read Clarissa by the novel’s 
close, it serves as a sort of talisman against her previously bad reading.
250
 The simple 
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 Possessing but not reading Richardson’s novels was not uncommon in the eighteenth-
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recommendation eventually causes Arabella to reconsider her taste for “senseless 
Fictions” (374) and she finally consents to marry her cousin, Glanville, the suitor her 
father had identified as the only means of preserving her inheritance.  This final scene, 
however, has proved problematic for many critics whether they read the novel as 
subversive of eighteenth-century gender ideology or conservatively by privileging 
Arabella’s appropriate marriage to Glanville.251  By focusing on the marriage, these 
                                                                                                                                                 
does concede that an individual could already “own or have access to” volumes they did 
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Letitia Barbauld, (London, 1804), lviii. 
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resolution of contractual modernity’s marriage plot.” Thompson argues that Arabella’s 
final decision to marry her cousin Glanville constitutes a moment in which Arabella 
“freely” chooses to submit to paternalistic authority. See Ingenuous Subjection: 
Compliance and Power in the Eighteenth-Century Domestic Novel (Philadelphia: U of 
Pennsylvania P, 2000), 169. 
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readings ignore the novel’s most pivotal scene: Arabella’s debate with the doctor and his 
prescriptive recommendation of Samuel Richardson’s Clarissa,252 a debate and cure 
which result, as Gardiner argues, in Arabella’s shame and encourage her submission to 
male privilege.
253
 By criticizing Arabella’s reading (and the effects of it) and in offering 
Richardson’s Clarissa as appropriate reading material, the doctor asks that we reread her 
earlier infatuation with romance as instances of madness. However, rather than treat 
Arabella’s imaginative inventions as a version of feminine power,254 I argue that Lennox 
treats the doctor’s moralistic prescription ironically. The doctor’s introduction of 
Richardson motivates the deployment of a moralistic ending which presupposes an 
ideology that assumes that whatever women read will determine their behavior. Rather 
than offering Richardson as authoritative and instructive reading for women, The Female 
Quixote satirizes the notion that women lose their critical faculties when they read 
romances and thereby challenges the efficacy of the moralizing “antidote” to reform its 
female audience through a sanitized version of romance. Lennox, thus, emphasizes the 
moralizing novel’s reliance on punishing female independence as opposed to exalting 
female virtue.
255
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 This claim builds upon Gardiner’s assertion that “The Female Quixote [is] not as a 
romance, but [. . .] as a form of literary criticism” (1). Where Gardiner sees The Female 
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In considering The Female Quixote as commentary on the moralizing novel’s 
process of “sanitizing,” this essay builds upon what William Warner calls “overwriting,” 
a process in which the moralizing novel internalizes and repeats the immoralities inherent 
in the novels of Aphra Behn, Delarivier Manley, and Eliza Haywood, appropriating them 
to justify the status of the novel as moral literature.
256
 In this light, while Richardson 
purports to have banished the immoralities within amatory fiction, he actually overwrites 
them in Pamela and Clarissa and uses them to his advantage. However, Warner’s term 
assumes that the process of elevating the novel is teleological, one in which amatory 
fiction is, essentially, swallowed by the domestic novel. As Richardson overwrites the 
conventions of amatory fiction for his means, Lennox appropriates Richardson’s 
overwriting for her means.
257
 The Female Quixote is neither amatory nor is it a 
replacement for amatory. It is neither “domestic” nor exclusively an orthodox quixotic 
tale.
258
 It is neither simply pro-romance nor anti-romance. The Female Quixote is a 
satirical novel critical not of romance and the amatory, but instead, one which exposes 
the ideological shaming of women upon which the success of the moralizing novel 
depends. In this respect, The Female Quixote comments ironically on the process of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Quixote as “expos[ing] the primarily economic motivation behind the eighteenth-century 
literary profession’s attempts to devalue romance for certain groups of writers and 
readers” (9), this argument positions The Female Quixote as an ideological argument 
against moralizing fiction rather than economic one.  
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shaming Arabella out of her romantic reading practices. In having Arabella read French 
romances as opposed to Behn, Haywood, and Manley, Lennox provides an acceptable 
explicit target to appease moralists which, then, stands in an analogous position for the 
amatory novels that the institutionalized novel tries to supplant.
259
  
As Richardson overwrites amatory fiction, the doctor tries to overwrite the 
romances that Arabella has read. The success of the doctor’s cure introduces Arabella to 
shame, an emotion which has not yet affected her behavior and appears absent in the 
narrator’s treatment of her reading. When she is left to reflect upon the error of her ways, 
she realizes, for the first time, “the Absurdity of her past Behaviour, and the Contempt 
and Ridicule to which [. . .] she had exposed herself” (383). However, the narrator’s 
comments on the results of her cure stand in stark contrast to earlier assessments of her 
reading. Where the doctor derides her reading, calling her books “senseless Fictions,” the 
narrator appears to reserve this sort of harsh judgment, instead providing insight into the 
appeal that romances hold for the young Arabella and highlighting her susceptibility to 
their influences. The books that once belonged to Arabella’s mother and “soften[ed] a 
Solitude which [her mother] found very disagreeable” provide Arabella the same 
comfort:  
The surprising Adventures with which they were filled, proved a most 
pleasing Entertainment to a young Lady, who was wholly secluded from 
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the World; who had no other diversion, but ranging like a Nymph through 
Gardens, or, to say better, the Woods and Lawns in which she was 
inclosed; and who had no other Conversation but that of a grave and 
melancholy Father, or her own Attendants. (7) 
Because Arabella’s reading occurs in complete seclusion, she begins “supposing 
Romances were real Pictures of Life, [and] from them she drew all her Notions and 
Expectations” (7). Though the narrator does not reveal whether or not her father 
intervenes in her reading, his influence seems minimal at best. Her books supplant 
normal conversation with her father, and her reading takes place in “perfect Retirement” 
(7), completely removed from the world outside her father’s estate. By the time the novel 
closes, Arabella’s reading has been placed under the supervision of overbearing 
masculine authority in contrast to the presence of a “grave and melancholy father” who 
leaves her to read at her leisure. This masculine intervention essentially shifts her reading 
from one extreme to another. Where her father gave her complete license to read 
whatever books were in her mother’s library, the doctor, in recommending Clarissa, 
places a clear standard on what type of book is available to her: one which is instructive, 
sentimental, and pious and stands in opposition to books which can only harm the female 
reader. The doctor condemns Arabella’s beloved romances as fictions that “at once vitiate 
the Mind, and pervert the Understanding; and which if they are at any Time read with 
Safety, owe their Innocence only to their Absurdity” (374, emphasis mine) and charges 
them with “soften[ing] the Heart to Love, and harden[ing] it to Murder” (380). The 
problem from the doctor’s standpoint is, of course, that these romances cannot be read 
safely, but in criticizing her reading so harshly, the doctor attempts to shame Arabella by 
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belittling her character, implying she is corrupt and immoral as a result of her illicit 
reading practices. 
From a diagnostic standpoint, her father’s detachment from her reading practices, 
coupled with her complete seclusion, appear to be at fault. While the narrator understands 
her fairy-tale isolation as part of her susceptibility, the doctor’s assertion that Arabella’s 
mind is ruined or spoiled contradicts the narrator’s playful representation of her 
seclusion. The doctor’s criticism overshadows the narrator’s representations of her 
reading and draws attention to judgments made earlier in the novel by Glanville, 
judgments which imply mental instability and take on greater significance in light of the 
doctor’s diagnosis.260 When Arabella perceives herself in danger, she insists that 
Glanville defend her, admonishes him for being “cold and insensible as thou art to the 
Danger which threatens me,” and rides away from him. Glanville “flung himself off his 
Horse in a violent Rage; and, forgetting that the Stranger was observing, and now within 
Hearing, he fell a cursing and exclaiming against the Books, that had turned his Cousin’s 
Brain” (156, my emphasis). Later, Glanville realizes that his father and sister “seemed to 
look upon his beloved Cousin as one that was out of her Senses” when Arabella insists a 
group of highwaymen really must be out to rescue her and Miss Glanville (259). Finally, 
Arabella, mistaking a prostitute for a lady of quality, offers protection against a 
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gentleman who has drawn his sword against her. Glanville asks her if she is “mad [. . .] to 
make all this Rout about a Prostitute? Do you see how every body stares at you? What 
will they think?” (336). Glanville’s admonishment attempts to instill a sense of shame in 
Arabella but fails. It is not until Arabella has been introduced to the authority of the 
moralizing novel that she internalizes a sense of shame capable of reforming her into an 
appropriate domestic partner. 
Arabella’s newfound sense of shame at the end of the novel coupled with her 
relatives’ fear that she is “out of her senses” echo the various discourses of hysteria 
circulating in the eighteenth century. In what follows, I explore the discourses of hysteria, 
arguing that the eighteenth-century idea of the hysterical woman was much more 
complicated than modern critical treatments often imply. This requires that we set aside 
twenty-first century understandings of mental illness and rehistoricize the polyvalent 
discourses of hysteria. By closely looking at the major terms of the medical perceptions 
of mental illness in the eighteenth century, we can better understand both the scientific 
and artistic fixations with and representations of the disorder, which complicate the 
assertions within the novel that Arabella is “out of her senses” or “mad” for actions such 
as defending a prostitute. This is not to argue that Arabella is or is not hysterical. Rather, 
these discourses play a central role in constructing the moralizing anxieties about amoral 
fiction and The Female Quixote’s critique of the ways in which these anxieties are 
produced. Lennox, by virtue of her satire, is not concerned with the “reality” of 
Arabella’s “madness;” her aim is not to diagnose Arabella but to diagnose the diagnosis. 
The masculine perception of female hysteria (embodied by the pious and learned doctor) 
becomes the novel’s preoccupation in the final scene. On the surface, it allows Lennox to 
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conclude the novel satisfactorily according to reformative standards of moralizing fiction. 
However, it also operates, ironically, as a means of criticizing those very moralistic 
standards which dictate the novel’s conclusion. The ironies of the novel’s conclusion 
provoke the differing critical perceptions of the novel’s satirical targets and Lennox’s 
narrative strategies. 
Eighteenth-century fiction and medical texts became preoccupied with sensational 
representations of hysteria or, where men are concerned, hypochondria, representations 
which allowed the mental condition to play itself out on the body.
261
 The coalescence of 
the physical and psychological manifestations of hysteria is less an accurate 
representation of the disorder than it is an exploitation of the sensational characteristics of 
a complicated medical condition.  While some physicians certainly sensationalized 
disorders according to sentimental convention and while these sentimental displays serve 
as signs of moral superiority in the moralizing novel,
262
 the sentimental does not figure in 
all contemporary medical discourse. In fact, as Bernard Mandeville’s A Treatise of the 
Hypochondriack and Hysterick Passions (1711), Sir Richard Blackmore’s A Treatise of 
the Spleen and Vapours (1725), and John Hill’s Hypochondriasis (1775) suggest, 
contemporary medical discourse was often critical of sensationalized representations and 
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gendered hierarchies that exalt the male hypochondric (and by association, male 
sentimentality) and shame the female hysteric.   
Mandeville’s Polytheca, confessing her hysterical tendencies to her husband’s 
physician, emphasizes the intense social scorn and subsequent shame that force both a 
woman’s silence about her suffering and her compliance with masculine authority. 
Polytheca reveals the control public shame has over her in admitting to her struggle: 
“[M]y whole Distempter is counted a whimsy, and I have the mortification into the 
bargain, of passing for Fantastical in the midst of so many real Evils. I never dare speak 
of Vapours, [since] the very name is become a Joke.”263 Not only does the mortification 
Polytheca must endure encourage her silence but the tendency of the medical community 
to shame female patients also reinforces her silence:  “Physicians, because they cannot 
Cure them, are forc’d to ridicule them in their own Defense.”264 Though Polytheca has 
found a physician who will treat her and listen to her complaints, “he is of Opinion that 
[she is] incurable.”265 This ridicule and lack of sympathy from the medical community 
result in an internalized sense of shame that contributes to women’s silence. 
Acknowledging the shame which forces her silence, Polytheca criticizes the use of shame 
to coerce women into silence, a shame which, simultaneously, precipitates and is 
precipitated by Arabella’s “cure.”  
Similarly, Blackmore criticizes gender-specific treatments and the supposed 
moral superiority of the hypochondriac man as opposed to the hysterical woman.  
Blackmore argues that hysteria and hypochondria are “the same Malady, and not 
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different in Specie” and that treatment should “be adapted to this Notion [that the 
diseases are “of the same Species”] founded on Reason and Observation.”266  Like 
Mandeville, Blackmore claims those who suffer form hysterical tendencies often will not 
recognize their illness because the disorder is “looked upon as an imaginary and 
fantastick Sickness of the Brain” and it has, consequently become “an Object of Derision 
and Contempt.” Admitting that they suffer from hysteria “will expose [women] to 
Dishonour and Reproach.”267 Not only does Blackmore acknowledge the potential scorn 
which accompanies the disease, he also validates the reality of its symptoms and effects, 
agreeing that “the consequent Sufferings are without doubt real and unfeigned.”268  
Because Mandeville and Blackmore criticize perceptions of hysteria as inherently 
“feminine” and the use of shame as a form of treatment, these texts emphasize the 
relationship of the disease to the mind, not, as many physicians previously had, to 
women’s reproductive organs.269 In fact, Blackmore directly disputes uterine theories as 
they are “now exploded by learned Men” because “there are no Passages, or proper 
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(Princeton UP: Princeton, 1995), and Anita Guerrini, Obesity and Depression in the 
Enlightenment: The Life and Times of George Cheyne (Norman: U of Oklahoma P, 
2000). Both Micale and Guerrini recognize the development of neurological theories of 
hysteria and the decline in popularity of uterine disorders. However, Guerrini’s account 
of neurological developments implies that physiological theories were rare by mid-
century: “By Cheyne’s time the notion of a wandering womb had long been discarded, 
although Friedrich Hoffman believed the uterus was nonetheless implicated, and the 
French physician Jean Astruc, writing in 1740, attributed hysteria to ‘Impressions made 
on the Uterus, whereby certain sensations are raised in the Brain’” (7). Micale, 
conversely, sees a “reintroduction of uterine theories of the disease” in the late eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. However, physicians reversed the classical model which linked 
“hysterical symptomatology with female sexual deprivation, eighteenth-century writers 
blamed it on female sexual overindulgence” (23). 
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conveyances, by which these Steams and Exhalations may rise,” though it is still 
“retained, at least in Name, among the People.”270 Yet the shame that Arabella 
experiences as a result of the doctor’s “treatment” takes on sexual connotations in the 
context of the model of the symptomatically oversexed female hysteric. Simon Andre 
Tissot’s The Lady’s Physician (rather comically) explains the condition furor uterinus 
(the angry uterus) as “a continual and insatiable Desire of Copulation. [ in which a 
woman ] soon bids adieu to Shame.”271 Women should “renounce all Excitements to 
lustful Sensation, such as Reading, Conversation, Self-touching, &c.”272 Like Tissot’s 
female patient, Arabella seems to have lost her own sense of shame, and therefore, the 
only means she has of achieving her cure is renouncing her amoral reading in favor of 
reading which “Has taught the Passions to move at the Command of Virtue” (377).  
In light of Tissot, many of Arabella’s misreadings of her surroundings become 
heavily sexualized.
273
 Her reading leads to her misreading her father’s gardener, Edward, 
as a gentleman disguised in order to be close to her. Fearing he is a threat, she flees her 
father’s house in an effort to protect her virtue. When she encounters a young gentleman 
during her flight, she seeks his protection, but his excitement “at having so beautiful a 
Creature in his Power” implies that he poses a more realistic threat than the gardener, 
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though Arabella is unable to perceive it (100). However, whatever her mental state, she is 
not predisposed to uncontrollable sexual urges that inherently place her in danger. In fact, 
Lennox’s satirical mode diffuses the sexual threats that Arabella faces and criticize 
hypersexualized representations of female readers.
274
  Unlike Richardson’s Clarissa, 
Arabella does not find herself completely in the control of a threatening masculine 
presence like Lovelace. Male predatory power is quickly rendered impotent by 
circumstance and the comic confusion that Arabella habitually creates.  
The young gentleman Arabella prevails upon to protect her from Edward initially 
poses a threat to her safety. He is “astonished at [her] Beauty [. . .] Her Stature; her 
Shape, her inimitable Complexion, the Lustre of her fine Eyes, and the thousand Charms 
that adorned her whole Person” and finds himself “extremely glad at having so beautiful 
a Creature in his Power” (99, 100). However, the potential for sexual violence is diffused 
almost as quickly as it is established:  
[A]ll her fears being of Edward, whom she fansied every Moment she saw 
pursuing them: And, being extremely anxious to be in some Place of 
Safety, she urged her Protector to drive as fast as possible; who, willing to 
have her at his own House, complied with her Request; but was so 
unlucky in his Haste, as to overturn the Chaise. (100) 
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Though Arabella rather foolishly throws herself at the mercy of this stranger, the 
potential threat he presents is over almost as soon as it seems imminent. Not only does 
Lennox negate any threat by overturning the chaise, the young gentleman’s urgency 
makes him an ineffective predator incapable of stealing away with the woman who would 
be his victim. After Edward and Glanville arrive on the scene, Arabella’s evocations of 
the ancient romantic heroines Cleopatra and Parthenissa prove her potential 
protector/rapist unworthy of her desire for protection. When she asks him if he knows of 
either of these women, he replies that he has never heard of Parthenissa and calls 
Cleopatra a whore. Disgusted, and in the vein of Richardsonian parody,
275
 Arabella 
exclaims, “What a black Defamer have I chosen for my Protector!” (105). Not only is this 
gentleman too clumsy to abduct Arabella, his ignorance makes him undeserving of the 
responsibility of protecting the heroine. Ironically, Arabella’s romance-based 
epistemology has led her to judge correctly the character of her potential abductor. His 
dislike of romance saves Arabella. By treating the situation comically, Lennox negates 
the potential abductor’s power; the novel satirizes not the dangerous sexuality of the 
hysteric female patient but the sexual ideology of the Lovelacian predator. 
Recognizing the focus of Lennox’s satire as not the oversexed female readers of 
romance but masculinist sexual ideology allows us to return to the question of Arabella’s 
sanity. If the history of hysteria has illustrated nothing else, it is that we cannot read 
either Arabella’s mental condition or her sexuality straightforwardly. In arguing that The 
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Female Quixote is an orthodox quixotic narrative, Gordon invokes the ability of 
contemporary readers’ to recognize quixotic characteristics which seem to imply a degree 
of mental instability (though not necessarily a diminished intellectual capacity).
276
 These 
orthodox tales, ultimately, target as “the culprit (‘that fascinating kind of books, 
denominated Novels’) that captures young women’s imagination and leads them to 
mistake fictions for ‘reality.’”277 Though the reader is aware of the quixote’s tendency to 
misread events around her, her familiarity with romances inhibits her ability to see “the 
‘reality’ before [her] eyes (and what all others see ‘in common’) and ensure[s] that [she] 
sees, instead, a reality of [her] own making.”278 In this light, we might even go so far as 
to call the Quixote delusional. 
While I do not dispute that The Female Quixote readily fits into Gordon’s 
definition of an orthodox quixotic narrative, it is this very reliance on familiar devices 
that allows Lennox to criticize novelistic convention. Gordon claims that “readers were 
‘prepossessed’ to read quixote narratives in the orthodox mode,” a mode dictating that 
they interpret Arabella as the typical Quixote to be ridiculed, a ridicule which echoes the 
ridicule Polytheca faces.
279
  However, it is this familiar quixotic trope that allows Lennox 
room to satirize the reformative powers of virtuous reading without appearing to threaten 
the status quo. Arabella’s presumed madness serves as a means of recoding feminine 
satire within moralizing novelistic discourse.
280
  This, then, is the beauty of Lennox’s 
satire. By using a familiar form which readers could recognize (the quixotic tale), Lennox 
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can simultaneously produce fiction that can be widely read and applauded for subscribing 
to an ideology of feminine virtue while satirizing the very masculinist novelistic 
strategies The Female Quixote deploys.  
Though Arabella behaves according to romance conventions, the narrator of The 
Female Quixote consistently provides justifications for her interpretations rather than 
criticism of them by pointing out logical precedents for her actions in the romances she 
has read. Though Gordon argues that Arabella’s “quixotism itself remains a constant 
source of derision,” I would like to put pressure on his assertion that more recent critical 
treatments of The Female Quixote necessarily “ignore or obscure the steady ridicule that 
the novel directs at quixotism.”281 For Gordon, it seems that reading the novel as a 
quixotic tale and as a social satire are mutually exclusive. Instead, I argue that, Arabella 
is ridiculous only insofar as she makes ridiculous the notion that reading romances “turns 
one’s brain” to the extent that a woman reader would lack the judgment to restrain herself 
from jumping into the nearest river to save herself from what she believes to be an 
abduction.  
Because the narrator takes care to point to formulaic responses from Arabella, her 
reactions throughout the novel, as Gordon suggests, become predictable. Yet while her 
responses might be formulaic, they illustrate that she does not blindly act; rather, she 
evaluates her course of action based on what she knows should happen. In other words, 
Arabella’s interpretive skills are not in question. She follows, based on the knowledge 
available to her in the form of romance novels, a strict system of logically derived 
interpretive principles. When she receives a love letter from her first potential suitor, Mr. 
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Hervey, she orders her maid, Lucy, to return it and scolds her for accepting it, “being a 
strict Observer of romantic Forms.”  When Lucy does not immediately comply, Arabella 
“search[es] the Records of her Memory for a Precedent, and not finding that any Lady 
ever opened a Letter from an unknown Lover, she reiterated her Commands to Lucy to 
carry it back” (13).  Based on romantic convention, Arabella “expect[s] to hear, that the 
Return of his Letter would make her Lover commit some very extravagant actions” (14). 
Eventually, when Mr. Hervey does fall ill, Arabella believes her rejection is the cause. 
She has Lucy draft a letter to him commanding him to live. When she thinks she should 
alter it because it is “too kind,” Lucy asks her not to, fearing it might prompt Hervey to 
die. Rather than upbraiding Lucy for her intervention, Arabella conjures romantic 
convention once again, “remembering that is was not uncommon for the Ladies in 
Romances to relax a little in their Severity through the Remonstrances of their Women” 
(17).  When Glanville falls ill and she responds similarly, thinking his love for her is 
responsible and that only she can affect a cure, her reaction follows a logical precept. 
Similarly, once she has created a backstory for Edward, her fear of being abducted when 
he comes to her bedchamber follows logically. As she traipses through the woods after 
running away from the estate in search of protection, we come to expect that, based on 
our understanding of romance convention, she will encounter Edward, think he is in 
pursuit of her, and behave accordingly. While in the context of a presupposed masculinist 
ideology, her reactions can be easily ridiculed, it is clear that she behaves according to a 
predictable pattern rather than hysterically.  
Arabella’s misreadings are rooted in terror, but because her reactions have logical 
precedents, they lose their power as indicators of mental instability and illustrate the 
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intellectual capabilities that Glanville (rather backhandedly) attributes to her. Glanville 
believes that she would be “one of the most accomplished Ladies in the World,” were it 
not for the “ridiculous Whims” (50) of her mind created by her reading habits. He 
believes she possesses a “fine Sense, and the native Elegance of her Manners give an 
intimitable Grace to her Behaviour” (64). When Arabella suffers from her fever before 
her cure, Glanville “lamented pathetically the Ruin such a ridiculous Study had brought 
on so Noble a Mind” (367). Her presumed madness, then, serves a dual purpose: it masks 
Lennox’s satirical treatment of masculine belief in women’s susceptibility to scandalous 
reading practices by pacifying moralists who want affirmation of their efforts to control 
women’s reading and sexuality, while making ridiculous the ridiculous female reader. 
It is not simply the genre of moralizing fiction that Lennox targets, though. In 
reading the novel as a satire of moralizing fiction, we must also turn to the problem of 
Richardson and his novels. The Female Quixote prominently features its own version of 
the male-author of romances in Sir George, a potential suitor of Arabella’s who 
unsuccessfully crafts romantic tales; his lack of success in his storytelling (and Arabella’s 
ability to see through it) highlights the ineffectiveness of masculine manipulation through 
fiction. Though Sir George engages in concocting romantic tales as opposed to 
moralizing fictions, he does, like Richardson, concoct tales which rely on extensive 
familiarity with a salacious genre.  Though David Marshall claims The Female Quixote is 
most certainly “not a Richardsonian novel,” Bartolomeo argues that “The Female Quixote 
is a rewriting of Clarissa in the comic mode,”282 yet it is much more than a mere revision 
of Richardson’s novel. Like many good satires, the novel targets more than one satirical 
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object, and while Bartolomeo provides a thorough analysis of The Female Quixote as 
comic rendering of Clarissa, it does more than simply satirize Richardson’s novel. By 
making Sir George a(n unsuccessful) writer of romances, Lennox satirizes the masculinist 
desire to sanitize amatory fiction.
283
 After all, if Lennox’s novel criticizes the belief that 
reading romances creates hysterical women, it seems plausible that it also satirizes one of 
the fiercest proponents of that myth. 
Sir George’s manipulation of romantic conventions illustrates the problems 
inherent in masculine revisions of romances. Though Thomas Schmid quite accurately 
attributes to Sir George “a male authority to tell one’s story, an authority that Arabella 
herself can never claim,”284 it is an authority that the narrative is able to see through and 
manipulate for Arabella’s benefit. Once Sir George starts to appropriate narrative and 
romantic conventions, however, the effects of the Richardsonian model become apparent, 
creating more confusions, adventures, and intrigues. Sir George is the only character in 
the novel who is as familiar with romances as Arabella: “He was well read in Romances 
himself, [. . .] he was perfectly acquainted with the chief Characters in most of the French 
Romances: could tell everything that was borrowed from them, in all the new Novels that 
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‘men’ in the same way that much of eighteenth-century popular discourse yokes the term 
‘romance’ with ‘women’ (3) and critiques the motivations of those who “devalue 
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came out” (129-130). Marshall argues that Sir George acts, simultaneously, as a “parody 
of the author of romance fictions [and . . .] stands in the place of Lennox.”285 Sir George 
also takes over the novel from Lennox and Arabella but he is unable to maintain control 
over his narrative.
286
 That he is both a male connoisseur of romances and their redactions 
in contemporary novels identifies his position with male novelists, like Richardson, who 
seek to appropriate women’s writing for moral ends. In order to overwrite amatory 
fiction, Richardson must be, to some extent, familiar with the genre. That Sir George’s 
story begins in a chapter entitled “Containing the Beginning of Sir George’s History; in 
which the ingenious Relator has exactly copied the Stile of Romance,” reinforces his 
efforts to rewrite a feminized narrative, just as Samuel Richardson has.  
Yet Sir George cannot successfully play the role of the romantic hero. In addition 
to swooning himself during his story, he fails to live up to the standards of romance 
heroism. According to his tale, after his lover, Sydimiris, marries according to her 
brother’s wishes to secure Sir George’s freedom, he falls in love with Philonice, who is 
abducted, and he searches for but is unable to find her. Several years later, though he still 
grieves her loss, “another Object possesses his Soul.” Arabella, ever the astute reader, 
calls Sir George out on his inadequacies of his tale: “your suffering so tamely the Loss of 
this last Beauty, and allowing her to remain in the hands of her Ravisher, while you 
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permit another Affection to take Possession of your Soul, is such an Outrage to all Truth 
and Constancy, that you deserve to be ranked among the falsest of Mankind” (250).  
Bartolomeo, who argues Sir George is a comic rendering of Lovelace, notes that 
“Richardson himself objected to the length and improbability of Sir George’s story, 
perhaps because he was uncomfortably reminded of Lovelace’s superiority as a 
manipulator of narrative.”287 Yet, Lovelace’s own authorial authority slips out his control. 
Defending his imprisonment of Clarissa in a letter to Belford, Lovelace compares her to a 
captive bird who “at first, refusing all sustenance, it beats and bruises itself against its 
wires.” Eventually, the bird becomes familiar with its cage and “hops from perch to 
perch” and “sings a song to amuse itself and reward its keeper.”288  Thomas Keymer 
argues that, in this letter, Richardson “show[s] the ultimate resistance of the image to 
Lovelace’s intended meaning.”289 While Lovelace seems to intend to show that his 
“captive bird” will eventually “yield” to its captivity and try to please its captor, Lovelace 
ends up admitting to know a captive bird to “starve itself, and die with grief”290 and, as 
Keymer notes, draws attention to “the darker implications of Clarissa’s oppression.”291  
While Richardson’s anxiety over Lovelacean parallels in The Female Quixote are 
certainly plausible, it seems that his objections to Sir George also point to questions in his 
own mind about the success of Clarissa to sanitize the amatory tradition. Richardson’s 
own letters to readers of Clarissa illustrate his trouble controlling his text (trouble that 
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both Sir George and Lovelace face) and readers’ emotional response to his narrative. He 
writes to Aaron Hill that, though he intends Lovelace “to be unamiable” he was forced to 
make “him still more and more odious” in response to “a young Lady” who pit[ied] him, 
and wish[ed] he had been rather made a Penitent, than to be killed.”292 In a letter to Lady 
Bradshaw, Richardson admits that, despite the fact that  
“in the very first Letter of Lovelace all those Seeds of Wickedness were 
thick sown [. . .] it has been matter of Surprize to me, and indeed of some 
Concern, that this Character has met with so much Favour from the good 
and the virtuous, even as it stands from his two or three first Letters—and 
in some Measure convinced me of the Necessity of such a Catastrophe as I 
have made.”293  
And yet Richardson’s novel also faced its own charges of salaciousness and pornographic 
tendencies.
294
 The problem Richardson must confront is that his readers desired (or 
expected) not a moralizing novel but the salacious and tantalizing scenes of amatory 
fiction, scenes more like those in Sir George’s narratives, even if they were ultimately 
contained within a didactic framework of “virtue rewarded.” Despite Richardson’s stated 
intentions, then, the moralizing form becomes a form that he is similarly unable to 
control.
295
 In this way, Lennox’s portrayal of Sir George as an ineffective writer of 
romances serves to hoist Richardson on his own petard: Richardson’s loss of control of 
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his novel and the salacious desires it encouraged in its contemporary readers undercut the 
ostensible purpose of the moralizing novel (or Clarissa, in Arabella’s case) to instill 
virtue in its readers.  
Richardson’s inability to control interpretation becomes central, then, in 
evaluating the advice that the doctor provides at the end of The Female Quixote. 
Arabella’s cure becomes instrumental in disguising social criticism as conventional moral 
justice. When proposing Clarissa as the cure for Arabella’s “madness,” the doctor claims 
that “Truth is not always injured by Fiction” (377). Though he claims that Richardson’s 
novel upholds the values of truth and constancy, the success of the moralizing novel to 
instruct is called into question by Richardson’s own letters. Both Bartolomeo and 
Keymer question the ability of Clarissa to redeem its heroine and to pass adequate 
judgment on its villain.
296
 Arabella’s previous condemnation of Sir George questions the 
success of Richardson’s efforts to moralize the readings practices of women who expect a 
romance ending. The effectiveness of Arabella’s cure cannot be taken at face value. 
Though Gordon claims that “the novel does not regret curing her,”297 to expect that 
Lennox should betray any regret in using the cure for narrative and ideological closure 
imagines that the female writer had complete license in her fiction.
298
 Lennox cannot 
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afford a hint of any regret. Curing Arabella allows Lennox to continue criticizing 
masculinist notions of women’s susceptibility to immoral fiction under the guise of 
criticizing women’s improper reading.   
Yet Arabella has “a Noble mind” despite her romantic reading. Her intellectual 
dexterity in her debate with the doctor challenges his logic, repeatedly calling his 
intellectual superiority into question. Arabella argues that her leap into the Thames “was 
not only reasonable and just, but also great and glorious, and exactly conformable to the 
Rules of Heroick Virtue” (368, emphasis mine).  Rather than encouraging his perception 
of her as mad, Arabella’s defense of her actions amazes the doctor who finds he “was not 
so well prepar’d as he imagin’d” (373).  His reaction reinforces the notion that she has 
maintained a sense of reason despite and through her romantic indulgences.
 299
 Her 
reading experiences have created a schema of logical events and appropriate reactions 
upon which Arabella consistently relies in order to justify her behavior. Rather than make 
the doctor lament her folly, her romantic epistemology (an epistemology which has 
served to protect her before) makes his effort to cure her a much more difficult endeavor, 
and he is forced into a logical debate with a woman presumed mad by the men around 
her.  
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In full control of her reason, Arabella seizes on and exploits the flaws in the 
doctor’s logic. The doctor asks her whether she has ever known a lady of her position to 
have been attacked in the manner she imagined and says that a villain carrying her off to 
some remote castle would be impossible “because there is no such Castle, Desart, 
Cavern, or Lake” (373).  Following the solid logical principles she has developed from 
her reading, Arabella retorts, “That there is a Castle, any Man who has seen it may safely 
affirm. But you cannot with equal Reason, maintain that there is no Castle because you 
have not seen it” (373, my emphasis). If women who read romances are susceptible to or, 
in extreme cases, dangerous imaginings, then Arabella would be incapable of 
participating in this debate for any reasonable length of time. Also, she would be unable 
to point out when the doctor commits errors in logic. That Arabella not only matches him 
in wit but also nearly foils him on more than one occasion highlights the limitations of 
the Richardsonian paradigm as a means of developing moral sensibility through proper 
reading.  
Though she demonstrates her reason in her debate with the doctor, Arabella must 
relinquish her mental agency in the final moments of what has heretofore been a logical 
and reasonable discussion:  “It is not necessary, Sir, [ . . .] that you strengthen by any new 
Proof a Position which when considered calmly cannot be denied; my Heart yields to the 
Force of Truth” (381). Arabella’s final response to the doctor may indicate not Lennox’s 
approval of the moral cure but a coded dissent against the “moral” novel and the 
masculine suppression of feminine interpretation. The heroine’s ability to think critically 
is not at issue. Her debate with the doctor increases her knowledge base, allowing her to 
recognize that her world-view has been based on a faulty set of data rejected by 
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masculine ideology. She “yields” her heart to “force” rather than agrees to give over her 
mind willingly to his “Truth.” If “Truth” in the doctor’s esteem is the male-authored 
appropriation of romance, it can hardly be seen as a satisfying alternative for Arabella 
who acquiesces less of her own accord than through coercion. In claiming that the doctor 
offers Arabella male-authored fictions, I note Gardiner’s arguments about the doctor: 
“What separates the learned divine from other characters in the text is that he reads 
fiction for moral instruction as well as diversion [. . .] and the learned divine is asexual to 
boot.”300 In this asexuality, an asexuality privileged by the moralizing novel, the doctor 
affirms a passive and feminized virtue for Arabella. Reading Clarissa (or simply being 
offered Clarisssa) produces the apparently desireless but sexually-desirable heroine, one 
whom Glanville finds appropriate for marriage. 
Interestingly, Arabella’s diagnosis, treatment, and ultimate coercion to masculine 
reason seem to work in exactly the opposite fashion as Polytheca’s admission of hysteria 
in Mandeville’s Treatise of Hypochondriack and Hysterick Passions. While Polytheca 
clearly suffers from mental anguish which produces physical symptoms, her condition is 
undiagnosed and dismissed,
301
 and she is shamed into silence about her condition until 
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her husband’s physician sees her disease sympathetically and validates its existence. 
Arabella’s doctor, in contrast, creates his patient’s condition, and she is similarly shamed 
into silence. He behaves exactly as Polytheca has said physicians behave and is the 
incompetent doctor who Mandeville, Blackmore, and Hill rail against: the physician who 
endorses gendered binaries and dismisses dismisses or ridicules the disorder. Because he 
“cannot Cure [her], [he is] forc’d to ridicule [Arabella] in [his] own Defense.”302 Where 
Polytheca suffers from a real illness which is mocked and ignored, the doctor’s diagnosis 
of Arabella creates in her the mythical hysteric whom the moral novel wants to reform. 
Her diagnosis as a hysteric results in her shame rather than her hysteria resulting in 
proper diagnosis. Her internalization of shame, according to moralizing convention, seeks 
to reestablish her virtuous reputation, but as medicine has failed Polytheca, Arabella’s 
doctor fails her in misdiagnosing her. This failure highlights the importance not only of a 
physician’s understanding of hysteria but also his bedside manner. George Baglivi had 
emphasized earlier in the eighteenth century the importance of “the Physician’s Words [. 
. .] upon the Patient’s Life” arguing that “a physician that has his Tongue well hung, and 
is Master of the Art of perswading, fastens, by the mere Force of Words, such a Vertue 
upon his Remedies, and raises the Faith and Hope of the Patient to that pitch, that 
sometimes he masters difficult Diseases with the silliest Remedies.”303 Arabella’s doctor 
lacks the mastery of persuasion that Baglivi argues is necessary in treating patients; by 
questioning the authority of the doctor to diagnosis and cure Arabella through the 
heroine’s ability to out-reason him, Lennox destabilizes the effectiveness and legitimacy 
of the moralizing novel as the antidote to the poison of amoral fiction.  
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Not only does The Female Quixote’s satire criticize assumptions about feminine 
reading habits but it also criticizes the sentimental double standard the moralizing novel 
endorses. Once Arabella has come to her senses and the doctor informs Glanville of her 
conversion, he thanks him “for the Miracle as he called it, that he had performed” (382, 
my emphasis). That Glanville believes the doctor is capable of working miracles seems 
ironic after the lengthy logical debate he has engaged in with Arabella. Throughout her 
presumed madness, she has maintained the ability to engage intellectually with a 
reasonable man, avoiding any manifestation of bodily sentiment. Arabella’s previous 
displays of sentiment occur prior to her “cure.” Her father’s death causes “Her Spirits [ . . 
. to fail] her at once; and she fell upon the bed, without Sense of Motion, as soon as she 
saw him expire” (58). Believing Edward is in pursuit of her, she swoons and is in an 
“inconceivable Terror” when she trips and hurts her ankle (95). She recovers from her 
swoon to find Lucy gone and “she had like have relapsed into her Swoon” (99). Arabella, 
again, swoons when Lucy cries out in fear that Arabella is being carried away (300). Yet 
Arabella’s sentimental displays occur within the context of her romantic delusions, not 
within the context of her cure. In relying on sentimental displays, Richardson envisions 
himself as “a ‘painter’ of virtue [ . . . a virtue] realized in the capacity to feel and display 
sentiments” utilizing a “massively sensitized, female body.”304 In contrast, Arabella’s 
virtue manifests itself in her internalized sense of shame, not in her sentimental display of 
emotion. 
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Once she faces the shame induced by the moralizing novel, her body loses its 
sentimental capacity and Glanville’s body becomes the site of sentimental expression.305  
After she has been “recovered to the free Use of all her noble Powers of Reason,” the 
doctor’s “Miracle” leads Glanville to resort to what could be perceived as hysterics: he is 
“Transport[ed with] joy” and so overcome with emotion that he almost “throw[s] himself 
at [the doctor’s] feet” (382).  Interestingly enough, though, Richardson’s novels, the very 
novels intended to “cure” Arabella, seem to encourage similar responses in both real and 
fictional male readers. Carolyn Houlihan Flynn claims that these responses constitute 
“readers [who] ‘felt’ the dream and menace of his novels. Aaron Hill’s servant boy sobs 
over Pamela; Aaron Hill himself, confesses that he can never escape Mrs. Jewkes, ‘who 
often keeps me awake in the Night’; and Fielding’s Parson Tickletext, complains that ‘if I 
lay [Pamela] down it comes after me— [which] all testify to the emotional power 
Richardson enjoyed over his readers.”306 This physical experience of the dream, however, 
particularly Fielding’s satirical treatment of Tickletext, ironically underscores the power 
that romance supposedly has for women.  Richardson’s intention was to write novels that 
provided moral examples, yet they apparently induced in men feminine-like sobbing and 
terror despite his intention to channel these emotional excesses into unimpeachable 
female virtue. Reading Pamela, Hill, ironically, becomes a masculinized Arabella, driven 
to fear because of his romantic expectations.  Like Sir George’s affectations in his 
storytelling, Glanville’s reaction to Arabella’s cure recalls the responses of Richardson’s 
male readers. Through this lens, Arabella’s reaction to romance cannot be entirely 
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ridiculous if fictional characters such as Glanville and Fielding’s Tickletext and historical 
readers alike are overcome with emotion when they read or encounter the effects of moral 
fiction.  Arabella’s cure, then, does not serve as a means of restoring her to reason but as 
a means to highlight the complicated gendered expectations of readers and novelists 
alike.
307
   
While Arabella is returned to “sanity” at the novel’s conclusion, the ending 
provides yet one more chance for Lennox to mask her criticism of masculine ideology.  
Rather than affirming Lennox’s complicity in a discourse which diminishes the 
intellectual capacity of women, Arabella’s introduction to Richardson and subsequent 
cure challenge our assumptions about eighteenth-century hysteria, female identity, and 
the novel’s history. Though the ending of The Female Quixote recognizes the power of 
the Richardsonian paradigm, it signals much more than the straightforward 
internalization of the new moral novel.  Lennox’s novel is not an attempt to bridge 
generic gaps between amoral fiction and the moralizing novel; instead, it exposes the 
contradictions inherent in the process of sanitizing the amoral novel, a process which 
aims to control women’s reading by introducing and encouraging the internalization not 
of virtue but of shame. 
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Epilogue 
 
The popularity of Pamela in the eighteenth-century has no doubt colored literary 
history and the representation of amatory fiction. The premise of “virtue rewarded” 
encourages readers and literary historians to focus their attentions forward, on the 
consequences of both Pamela’s virtuous resistance to Mr. B’s advances in the novel and 
on the subsequent reinterpretations of this Richardsonian paradigm in “the” novel. 
However, as Bradford Mudge asserts, “‘Virtue Rewarded’ thus becomes both the central 
message of Richardson’s novel and, for the modern reader at least […] a startling 
oxymoron.”308 This oxymoronic message, though, did not go unnoticed by contemporary 
readers or the anti-pamelists would have not attacked Pamela so viciously.  And 
certainly, Richardson was forced to acknowledge the contradictions in “virtue rewarded” 
as evidenced by prefatory letters he included in the second edition praising his work
309
 
and in his own correspondence. George Cheyne advised Richardson to “avoid Fondling 
and Gallantry, tender Expressions not becoming the Character of Wisdom, Piety, and 
conjugal Chastity in the Sex.[…] clasping, kissing, stroking, hugging are but Approaches 
to those others, and are really dangerous to be proposed to or read by young Persons of 
either Sex.”310 Richardson defended the content of Pamela by stating that “I am 
endeavoring to write a story, which shall catch young and airy Minds, and when Passions 
run high in them, to shew how they may be directed to laudable Meanings and Purpose, 
in order to decry such Novels and Romances, as have a Tendency to inflame and 
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corrupt.”311 Cheyne’s directive to Richardson to avoid indecent content highlights the 
relationship between virtue and shame. The sexual content of Pamela threatens the 
“Wisdom, Piety, and conjugal Chastity” of women, the loss of which implies the loss of 
reputation and social shame.  
In drawing attention to the entangled discourses of shame and virtue, I have 
argued not for a new genealogy of the novel but for an enhanced understanding of the 
discourses which have shaped our perception of the novel’s development.  The early 
amatory fiction of Behn and Haywood actively challenged the conditions of female 
morality, questioning the stability and viability of conduct manual ideals and testing the 
limits of virtue, shame, and modesty.  In Pamela, Richardson attempted to stabilize the 
tenuous model of female virtue, plucking the ideal woman from the conduct manual and 
setting her loose in an idealized world where a woman’s virtue, acting as a talisman, 
preserves her from (nearly) all shame.  Lennox’s The Female Quixote blends the amatory 
modes of Behn and Haywood with the Richardson’s moralizing tone, playing out the 
shaming consequences of reformative reading.   
Though I have concluded with Lennox’s The Female Quixote, arguing that the 
novel’s conclusion serves as a meta-narrative of the progress of eighteenth-century 
fiction, it is actually the point at which this dissertation begins.   In her introduction to 
The Female Quixote, Margaret Doody notes that “Authority remoulds Arabella” and she 
“renounces narrative power, and submits to the role of object of paternal authority which 
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also claims the name of reason.” 312 Ros Ballaster argues that Arabella’s cure and 
subsequent marriage “mark…the book’s closure and the containment, indeed silencing, 
of its heroine. As reader of the novel, Arabella’s verbal power comes to an end.”313 In 
identifying the conclusion of The Female Quixote as the culmination of novelistic 
discourse, this dissertation understands the development of novelistic subjectivity as a 
cyclical process of internalization, rejection, and critical awareness of feminine 
subjectivity and morality. The Female Quixote, then, under these conditions, does not 
signal the silencing of the female subject but rather a refinement of earlier prose forms 
that address ever-evolving constructions of femininity, morality, and virtue. Rather than 
silencing her heroine, Lennox similarly tests the limitations of masculinist constructions 
of female virtue in the domestic novel, just as Behn and Haywood similarly tested the 
limitations of female morality. The women’s writing that I have focused on here is 
specifically invested in viable strategies to manage female shame (social, sexual and/or 
economic), not in capitulating to masculinist expectations of female morality. These texts 
illustrate that the struggle to manage shame is a shared struggle between the woman 
writer, her heroine, and the idealized female reader. The domestic novel does not afford 
women a successful pattern to manage shame. Rather than offer women a means of 
controlling and maintaining their virtue and reputations, the domestic novel demands 
woman internalize limiting forms of female morality: pious virtue, chastity, and modesty. 
Women’s writing, however, exposes not only the contradictions of gendered morality but 
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seems to find within those contradictions space to act autonomously, a space to shed the 
constraints of virtue and break open the limitations of shame. 
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